Salami Tactics

[sigatoka]

I just did a lecture on how deterrent threat can be weakened by Salami tactics. It shows why a very large strategic nuclear force with a very weak conventional force (and no tactical nuclear weapons) is very vulnerable.

This is because the opponent will make a series of small escalatory steps none of which individually amount to replying with all out strategic nuclear force.

I'll just post a link as well to the show we watched. http://www.yes-minister.com/ypmseas1a.htm

 

[blain2]

This is the reason that a significant conventional balance must be maintained. Enough to not all the allow weak side to escalate from the lowest rung of conventional deterrance to the highest rung of nuclear deterrance within a very short span of time.

 

[sigatoka]

1. This is the reason that a significant conventional balance must be maintained. Enough to not all the allow weak side to escalate from the lowest rung of conventional deterrance to the highest rung of nuclear deterrance within a very short span of time.

1. Unfortuanetly a significant conventional balance will prove extremely expensive which is why tactical nuclear weapons offers a cheaper way to defeat India's attempt to make small territorial gains.

It provides an intermediate step between conventional fighting and full strategic nuclear exchange.

 

[blain2]

1. Unfortuanetly a significant conventional balance will prove extremely expensive which is why tactical nuclear weapons offers a cheaper way to defeat India's attempt to make small territorial gains.

It provides an intermediate step between conventional fighting and full strategic nuclear exchange.

A significant conventional balance already exists in terms of land forces...Pakistan needs some beefing up in terms of AF and Navy (keep in mind by significant balance, I do not mean matching India 1:1 b/c that is impractical, rather having enough capability to make Indian defence planners think a few times prior to trying something).

Tactical nuclear weapon cannot be used in a situation like the one faced in Kargil. In the future, there may be short and intense conflicts between the two sides and during which India would make sure that it does not escalate the situation to the point where it could warrant even a tactical nuclear response by Pakistan (simply because once that happens then all bets are off). Within this short space and duration, India would like to punish Pakistan conventionally. This is why Pakistan needs to have a robust conventional capability to deter even limited conflicts.

Pakistan would need to have enough air, land and Naval capability where it does not allow India to have the freedom of even limited action without repercussions.

 

[sigatoka]

1. A significant conventional balance already exists in terms of land forces...I do not mean matching India 1:1 b/c that is impractical, rather having enough capability to make Indian defence planners think a few times prior to trying something).

2. Tactical nuclear weapon cannot be used in a situation like the one faced in Kargil. In the future, there may be

3. short and intense conflicts between the two sides and during which India would make sure that it does not escalate the situation to the point where it could warrant even a tactical nuclear response by Pakistan

4. (simply because once that happens then all bets are off).

5. Within this short space and duration, India would like to punish Pakistan conventionally. This is why Pakistan needs to have a robust conventional capability to deter even limited conflicts.

1. It does not, as of now due to improvements in naval capability (note not navy) and acquisition of F-16's, it is the land forces which are most at disadvantaged vis-a-vis India.

2. A probabilistic tactical nuclear threat can be made (if Pak. has enough of them which it clearly does not. Pak. would need at least 250 Tactical nuclear weapons to play that game).

3. That is why probabilistic threats have to be used. Tell the indians (their generals, their parliament and broadcoast to their t.v. and radio stations) that for every 2,000 Pak. soldiers killed, the Pak. nuclear command will take three coins and flip them and if they all come heads 30% of Pak. tactical nuclear weapons will be used in attacking Indian troops. Im just using this numbers from my what i think is realistic figures, of course the Pak. must have mathematicians who could refine these numbers.

4. All bets are never off, that is just a convienient excuse people use when the correct action requires complex thinking and calculations.

5. What Pak. lacks is robust Artillery capability. In every conflict has demostrated it is lethally effective, realiable, cheap and can be produced domestically. It is well suited to Pak-Indian conflicts due to close deployment of both forces and it is well suited to short, brutal bloody conflicts.

In addition Pak. lacks a well thought out nuclear deterrent policy. Where is the announcement of how tactical nuclear weapons will be used? By clearly explaining the probablistic manner in which Pak. tactical weapons will be used, it can be used to deter Indian adventures.

p.s. the idea of probablistic tactical nuclear threat and use might sound weird at first, but ponder for a moment and it is a brilliant solution if well formed and publicly announced to the Indians.

 

[vnomad]

1. It does not, as of now due to improvements in naval capability (note not navy) and acquisition of F-16's, it is the land forces which are most at disadvantaged vis-a-vis India.

2. A probabilistic tactical nuclear threat can be made (if Pak. has enough of them which it clearly does not. Pak. would need at least 250 Tactical nuclear weapons to play that game).

3. That is why probabilistic threats have to be used. Tell the indians (their generals, their parliament and broadcoast to their t.v. and radio stations) that for every 2,000 Pak. soldiers killed, the Pak. nuclear command will take three coins and flip them and if they all come heads 30% of Pak. tactical nuclear weapons will be used in attacking Indian troops. Im just using this numbers from my what i think is realistic figures, of course the Pak. must have mathematicians who could refine these numbers.

4. All bets are never off, that is just a convienient excuse people use when the correct action requires complex thinking and calculations.

5. What Pak. lacks is robust Artillery capability. In every conflict has demostrated it is lethally effective, realiable, cheap and can be produced domestically. It is well suited to Pak-Indian conflicts due to close deployment of both forces and it is well suited to short, brutal bloody conflicts.

In addition Pak. lacks a well thought out nuclear deterrent policy. Where is the announcement of how tactical nuclear weapons will be used? By clearly explaining the probablistic manner in which Pak. tactical weapons will be used, it can be used to deter Indian adventures.

p.s. the idea of probablistic tactical nuclear threat and use might sound weird at first, but ponder for a moment and it is a brilliant solution if well formed and publicly announced to the Indians.

1.Personally I believe that the PN is most vulnerable followed by the PAF.
The PN is both technologically and numerically inferior to the IN. The surface fleet wouldn't survive a conflict.
The PAF doesn't have the tech. Couple of dozen F-16s is not going to bring down the comparable MiG 29SM or the Mirage2000H(which are numerically superior) let alone the MKIs which now number well over 50. The remaining 3rd generation aircraft in the PAF's arsenal are outnumbered by corresponding ones with the IAF(which incidently are BVR capable). In the future though (once the JF-17 and the J-10 are inducted) the PAF will have some real detterence value.
The PA though will pose a bigger challenge to the IA not least because it can be mobilized very fast and very effectively while the IA will take weeks to reach full strength. The tanks with the PA too are enough to give the Indian armored corps a decent fight. Arty strength is insufficient though.

2. Works both ways. The PA is not in any way better equipped to deal with tactical nukes.

3. Any war will be very hyped within the Indian media. A lot of patriotic sentiment will be about (like during Kargil). Any threatening statements of this kind will only inflame public sentiment. No one's going to back down in India.

4. There is no clear cut definitions of what is permissible and what is not. Its uncharted area so all bets are off. Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is undefined as is India's. The common man doesn't know a tactical nuke from a strategic one. A radical government at the Indian centre could authorize a nuclear reply. Where does the war go from there?

5. Pakistan cannot afford a nuclear strike on its cities anymore than India can. The Pakistani leadership would be stupid to gamble where the country's existance is involved. The recently revealed Indian military doctrine is designed especially for a war in such circumstances and will go just as far as is possible without forcing Pakistan to resort to nukes.

 

[sigatoka]

1. The PN is both technologically and numerically inferior to the IN. The surface fleet wouldn't survive a conflict. Couple of dozen F-16s is not going to bring down the comparable MiG 29SM or the Mirage2000H(which are numerically superior) let alone the MKIs which now number well over 50.

2. Works both ways. The PA is not in any way better equipped to deal with tactical nukes.

A radical government at the Indian centre could authorize a nuclear reply. Where does the war go from there?

Pakistan cannot afford a nuclear strike on its cities anymore than India can. The recently revealed Indian military doctrine is designed especially for a war in such circumstances and will go just as far as is possible without forcing Pakistan to resort to nukes.

1. Who cares whether the PN survives a conflict as long as a total blockade cant be implemented of Pakistan (which even while being destroyed the PN will achieve).

The only thing more pathetic than F-16's are those Mig-29's and Mirages. A couple of dozen F-16's along with numerous anti-air defence weapons will prevent the IAF from achieving airsuperiority over Pak. airspace.

2. You misunderstand the situation. That it works one way (Pak. to Indian) is the only one that matters simply because firstly before India attempts adventure it will recognise that there is probability of nuclear attack on it. The catastrophic damage of a probabilistic nuclear threat will ensure that the payoff from adventure is lower than from staying put. If indeed India attempts adventure then there is a high probability that an attack will occur. Your saying that an Indian probabilistic threat of nuclear strike will prevent Pak. from employing it. This is incorrect simply because it is not credible. Since India has conventional superiority, it is always in its interest to try to resolve situation conventionaly. A probabilistic nuclear threat to prevent Pak. from employing it will simply not be believed by Pakistan.

The other point of yours is that, Pakistan can not make a probabilistic threat because any nuclear attack by it will invite nuclear retaliation. This also is incorrect, even if there will be a definite nuclear reply to Pakistan's nuclear attack a probabilistic nuclear threat from Pak's point of view can still be efficient. It is simply a risk vs. return thing. For e.g. Pak. might set a 30% of nuclear strike if India advances 40 km into Punjab, this threat means that India will in its cost benefit analysis include the damage from nuclear attack (30% * damage from nuclear attack) on the cost side of the invasion situation. If for e.g. a push by Indian forces 250km into Pak. is a definition by which Pak. leadership believe the nation is destroyed, then they will set probability of nuclear strike for when this occurs at 100%. It can thus be seen for every type of Indian "action" a Pak. probabilistic nuclear threat can exist, for more severe Indian actions there will be higher probability and for less severe a lower probability. What these probabilities do is ensure that Pak. remains indifferent form suffering the Indian action on one hand and from probabilistic destruction by India on the other hand. For e.g. if 30% probability of threat is set by Pakistan for invasion of Punjab, this means that Pakistan is indifferent between losing Punjab one hand and on suffering 30% probability of being destroyed on the other.

By always ensuring that indifference is maintained between "suffering" and facing probabilistic destruction, Pakistan's nuclear capability can provide maximum amount of deterrence capability.

So a short reply "Where does the war go from there?" In reality the war ends once the nuclear weapons are launched.

If you have a son, and the son is misbehaving you can make a threat "If you dont stop misbehaivour, you will be banished from home". Of course, you dont want your son to be banished, but neither do you want him to misbehave. What is the level of threat you should make? well if the payoff you get from banishing to you as father is (-20) while payoff from him continueing to misbehave is (-5) then you will want to make a threat of banishment of probability of 1/4. If your probability is less than 1/4, (implicit assumption that son enjoys misbehaving) then son will misbehave too much. If probability of threat is more than 1/4, then the risk of heartbreak by chasing son away is too much.

By same analogy, for every given possible "action" of India if probability of nuclear threat of Pakistan is too low, then India will overengage in that action. If however the probability of nuclear threat by Pakistan is too high, then the threat of nuclear destruction is too high and therefore risk is too high to be efficient.