Afghan Warlords Turn Their Guns On U.S. Troops

[dr.umer]

Reported by US News

They defeated the Soviets with Washington’s help, but now they attack Americans as the new occupiers

By Anna Mulrine

KABUL—The war in Afghanistan reached a wrenching milestone this summer: For the second month in a row, U.S. and coalition troop deaths in the country surpassed casualties in Iraq. This is driven in large part, U.S. officials point out, by simple cause and effect. Marines flowed into southern Afghanistan earlier this year to rout firmly entrenched Taliban fighters, prompting a spike in combat in territory where NATO forces previously didn't have the manpower to send troops. "We're doing something we haven't done in seven years, which is go after the Taliban where they're living," says a U.S. official.

But amid a well-coordinated assassination attempt on Afghan President Hamid Karzai and large-scale bombings last week in the capitals of both Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. forces are keenly aware that they are facing an increasingly complex enemy here—what U.S. military officials now call a syndicate—composed not only of Taliban fighters but also powerful warlords who were once on the payroll of the Central Intelligence Agency. "You could almost describe the insurgency as having two branches," says a senior U.S. military official here. "It's the Taliban in the south and a 'rainbow coalition' in the east."

Indeed, along with a smattering of Afghan tribal groups, Pakistani extremists, and drug kingpins, two of the most dangerous players are violent Afghan Islamists named Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani, according to U.S. officials. In recent weeks, Hekmatyar has called upon Pakistani militants to attack U.S. targets, while the Haqqani network is blamed for three large vehicle bombings, along with the attempted assassination of Karzai in April.

Ironically, these two warlords—currently at the top of America's list of most wanted men in Afghanistan—were once among America's most valued allies. In the 1980s, the CIA funneled hundreds of millions of dollars in weapons and ammunition to help them battle the Soviet Army during its occupation of Afghanistan. Hekmatyar, then widely considered by Washington to be a reliable anti-Soviet rebel, was even flown to the United States by the CIA in 1985.

"He was the most radical of the radicals," recalls former Rep. Charlie Wilson, immortalized in the recent film Charlie Wilson's War for his role in directing U.S. military aid to anti-Soviet Afghan warlords. "He didn't hate us as much as he hated the Soviets," he adds, "but he sure didn't like us much." In his early years, the warlord distinguished himself by throwing acid in the faces of unveiled women. Today, a senior defense official says Hekmatyar is "as vicious as they come." In 2002, the CIA shot a Hellfire missile from an unmanned drone in an effort to kill him.

U.S. officials had an even higher opinion of Haqqani, who was considered the most effective rebel warlord. "I adored Haqqani. When I was in Afghanistan, Haqqani was the guy who made sure I would get out," says Wilson. "He was a marvelous leader and very beloved in his territory."

Haqqani was also one of the leading advocates of the so-called Arab Afghans, deftly organizing Arab volunteer fighters who came to wage jihad against the Soviet Union and helping to protect future al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Today, U.S. military officials are not certain that Haqqani is alive, though he was featured in an undated video that recently surfaced. "Either way, the Haqqani we're fighting now is the son"—34-year-old Sirajuddin Haqqani—says the senior U.S. military official. "He gets a lot of benefit from his father's prestige."

Today, the Haqqani network is driving the recent rise in violence in eastern Afghanistan, according to U.S. military officials. Haqqani "is definitely the strongest" enemy in the border provinces of Paktia, Paktika, and Khost, known among military officials as p2k. The senior U.S. military official notes that Haqqani is increasingly moving to more-asymmetric means of attack to avoid straight-on shootouts with better-armed U.S. forces, a general tactical guidance that came from Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar last year. To that end, U.S. military officials estimate that they have seen a 10 percent rise in use of roadside bombs, which now account for one third of the attacks against coalition forces in the country.

A very interesting comment i read & i quote

To anyone who hasn't seen the movie "Charlie Wilson's War", this might not be a bad time to see it.

This gives an amazing snapshot of how the US got involved with the Taliban in the first place, and what happened right after Soviet troops were defeated.

The US congress had a marvelous chance at that moment to start building infrastructure, and really make a difference.

Congress chose not to, because it was "too expensive" to do that, and besides, US had gotten the Soviets out, right??

So when the oil companies couldn't work out a deal with the Taliban for pipelines, because it was "too expensive", US went in to clobber the country militarily, blaming Osama Bin Laden for 9/11.Now, having installed a puppet government in place which is perceived by the Afghani people as so crooked that they collectively have to screw their socks on in the morning, the consequence is that the Taliban are starting to look like the good guys.

US had never, ever enough troops on the ground (which, by the American military estimates, would be around 400,000) to make this thing work.

So what now??

Declare victory, and come home?

Continue to bomb the crap out of this country, declare victory, and come home?

Or do the US and NATO do the unthinkable, and bring the Taliban into the political process?.

That is ultimately the only logical course of action to take.

Of course, logic and this administration have never had a comfortable, on-going relationship.