Wikileaks Information by Sri Lankan

[Lankan Ranger]

PANAMANIANS HOPE FOR A SUCCESSFUL COUP

THROUGHOUT 1989, RAPIDLY UNFOLDING POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENTS HELD OUT HOPE TO MANY PANAMANIANS FOR
A RESOLUTION TO PANAMA’S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS: THE ELECTION OF MAY 7, THE SUBSEQUENT OAS
NEGOTIATIONS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEADLINE OF
SEPTEMBER 1, THE COUP ATTEMPT OF OCTOBER 3, AND
THE TREATY DEADLINE OF JANUARY 1, 1990.
PROJECTING INTO THE FIRST HALF OF 1990, NO SUCH
HOPEFUL EVENTS AND DATES ARE READILY APPARENT.
THE OPPOSITION’S MAIN OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO SURVIVE
POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY, AND LITERALLY UNTIL THE
NEXT COUP. NORIEGA WILL HAVE TO TRY AND
CONSOLIDATE HIS CONTROL OVER THE PANAMA DEFENSE
FORCES (FDP) AND AVOID ANOTHER UPRISING.

PRESSURES ON NORIEGA HAVE INCREASED ACROSS THE
BOARD, BUT HE SEEMS TO HAVE DETERMINED THAT HE CAN
MANAGE THEM. DESPITE NEW U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS,
THE MOST PRECIPITOUS ECONOMIC DROP IS OVER FOR
NOW, FOLLOWING A TWO-YEAR, 25 PERCENT DROP IN
GDP. INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION REMAINS AN IRRITANT
TO THE REGIME, BUT IT IS NOT A SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR
NORIEGA’S STABILITY. U.S. ACTIONS, FROM THE
APPOINTMENT OF AN ACTING CANAL ADMINISTRATOR TO
RUMORED COVERT PLANS AGAINST NORIEGA AS WELL AS
NEW ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, ALLOW NORIEGA TO BEAT THE
NATIONALISTIC DRUM AND MAKE IT APPEAR AS IF
DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR HIM IS GROWING.

NORIEGA’S WEAKEST POINT REMAINS HIS OWN
INSTITUTION. WHISPERS THAT “THE OCTOBER 3 COUP IS
NOT OVER” CONTINUE AND NORIEGA CONTINUES TO HOLD
ON MAINLY BY BRUTAL REPRESSION OF ANY POTENTIAL
NEW INSIDE OPPONENTS. WHEN ANOTHER ACTION TO
REMOVE NORIEGA WILL TAKE PLACE IS UNCERTAIN, BUT
WAITING FOR THAT POSSIBILITY IS THE MAIN PROSPECT
FOR PANAMA IN 1990.

 

[Lankan Ranger]

The End is Nigh

Robert Mugabe has survived for so long because he is more
clever and more ruthless than any other politician in
Zimbabwe. To give the devil his due, he is a brilliant
tactitian and has long thrived on his ability to abruptly
change the rules of the game, radicalize the political
dynamic and force everyone else to react to his agenda.
However, he is fundamentally hampered by several factors:
his ego and belief in his own infallibility; his obsessive
focus on the past as a justification for everything in the
present and future; his deep ignorance on economic issues
(coupled with the belief that his 18 doctorates give him
the authority to suspend the laws of economics, including
supply and demand); and his essentially short-term,
tactical style.

---------- Post added at 11:20 AM ---------- Previous post was at 11:19 AM ----------

DUBAI RULER DISCUSSES IRAN AND IRAQ WITH SENATOR LIEBERMAN

Senator Joseph Lieberman met with Sheikh
Mohammad bin Rashid Al Maktoum (MbR), Vice President and Prime
Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai, on 29 May. MbR voiced
support for US policy in Iraq, but expressed strong reservations
about the al Maliki government and its links to Iran. He called
for new elections to produce leaders who would work for Iraq's
interests. He voiced suspicion of Iran's goals in the region,
and their claims that their nuclear program was for energy
purposes alone. He recommended, however, that the US seek to
contain Iran through negotiations and diplomacy. Using force, he
said, would only help the current leadership stay in power. MbR
also talked about his ambitions for Dubai as a regional model,
noting "we want to be number one.

 

[Lankan Ranger]

UK AMBASSADOR TO IRAN ON IRI NEGOTIATING STYLE

UK Ambassador to Tehran Geoffrey Adams, in a series of
meetings with U.S. Embassy Baghdad and MNF-I officials,
outlined his recommendations on how to negotiate with
Iranians. Ambassador Adams thought that Iran had several
goals from talks with the U.S., both superficial and
substantive. In negotiations, he advised being steady and
firm, tough but not aggressive, and at the same time, seeking
to engage and draw attention to mutual interests. He
outlined Iran,s preconceptions and its obsession with and
mistrust of the West, which, he said, can blind it to its
interests.

He warned that the Iranian participants would
likely have very strict instructions what they could say and
that it would be difficult to get them off script, though the
element of surprise could work. Adams added that the
Iranians would be very nervous of negative repercussions if
they made a misstep, and they would likely report on each
other. Answers to questions and proposals would more likely
only come at follow-on meetings, and decision-making in Iran
is slowed by the need for consensus, so patience is needed.
That said, it was important to rid the Iranians of their
standard notion that time was on their side.

 

[Lankan Ranger]

GERMAN ECONOMICS MINISTER THROWS IN TOWEL

The sudden resignation of Economics Minister
Michael Glos (CSU) on February 7 caught Chancellor Angela
Merkel (CDU) and her party off guard at a time when
addressing Germany's economic downturn is paramount.

To minimize damage, the CSU quickly replaced Glos with its
Secretary General Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, a decision
which continues to draw criticism from other parties as well
as from within the CDU due to thirty-seven-year-old,s
minimal background in economic policy. The shuffle reveals
strains between the CDU and CSU, and presents an opportunity
for Merkel's political foes to portray her as lacking control
as the country tries to deal with its worst economic crisis
since World War II.

 

[Lankan Ranger]

RUSSIA DELAYS DELIVERY OF S-300S TO IRAN

In response to media reports surrounding the visit of
Iranian Defense Minister Najar to Moscow February 16-18 that
Russia would move ahead with the delivery of the S-300 air
defense missile system to Iran, Ambassador expressed strong
concern to DFM Ryabkov February 17 (ref A). Ryabkov replied
that Moscow had "gotten the message."

This followed Ambassador's demarches on the issue the previous week to
Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Prikhodko and PM FP
Advisor Ushakov, as well as U/S Burns' and NSC Senior
Director McFaul's expressions of strong concern regarding the
possible completion of the delivery with FM Lavrov (ref B),
Prikhodko and Ushakov.

 

[Lankan Ranger]

IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN AND SYRIA

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Director General (DG) ElBaradei released his latest
reports on the status of the IAEA's investigations into
Iran and Syria's nuclear programs on 19 February 2009.

Both reports conformed to expectations in describing the
absence of any meaningful steps by either country to
address the serious issues that exist with respect to
their nuclear programs.

 

[Lankan Ranger]

URGENT UAE REQUEST FOR AIR DEFENSE -- FIVE PATRIOT BATTERIES

UAE Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces convoked
the Ambassador to request the urgent deployment of five U.S. patriot
batteries in the UAE as an interim measure until the UAE's own
batteries are operational (anticipated in 2012).

The UAE belief that an increasingly likely pre-emptive Israeli attack on Iran would
prompt quick retaliation on U.S. allies (foremost among them the very
proximate UAE) prompted the request.

 

[Lankan Ranger]

US-IRAN RELATIONS: WHY IRAN REFUSED THE US

A trusted contact claims he was told by a
close advisor to Iranian President Ahmadinejad that Iran
denied visas for the planned February 4, 2009 visit of the US
women's badminton because of the USG's "bad faith" in
announcing the visit earlier than Iran had requested.

According to the contact, Supreme Leader Khamenei only agreed
to the visit after Ahmadinejad urged him to do so, and only
on the understanding that no public announcements would be
made until after the team's arrival in Iran. Instead, the
USG announced the visit on February 2, as the team was
awaiting Iranian visas in Dubai. The regime wanted to
maintain full control of media coverage of the event, to
avoid a replay of the 1998 US wrestling team visit, when
Iranian crowds were filmed waving American flags and cheering
the US team.

The regime believed the USG issued the early
announcement to create a similar dynamic, and now Khamenei
and Ahmadinejad feel "burned." Comment: If accurate, this
scenario underscores the challenges to building trust with a
regime that feels an obsessive fear of losing control over
both the process and substance of possible engagement with
the USG.

 

[Lankan Ranger]

CHINA SEEKS CLARITY ON U.S. IRAN POLICY

China is keen to understand the direction of
U.S. policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) and is
willing to facilitate dialogue between the two sides,
according to an MFA official.

China remains committed to the P5-plus-1 process but values its bilateral engagement with Iran. Nonetheless, the Iran should not take for granted its
economic relations with the PRC. Despite PRC urging that
Iran respond positively to American overtures, initial rounds
of direct talks with the Iranians on the nuclear issue would
be difficult, the official suggested. The official said that
it is too soon to contemplate what actions should be taken
should Iran develop a nuclear weapon.

An academic contact suggested that there is no "point of no return" on Iran's
development of nuclear technology and that the Iranians
believe they are in a strong bargaining position should some
form of new diplomatic engagement emerge.

 

[Lankan Ranger]

FM LAVROV DISCUSSES MISSILE DEFENSE AND IRAN

Foreign Minister Lavrov told visiting Codel
Levin April 15 that arms control issues were Russia's top
priority. Noting that Moscow was waiting for concrete
proposals, including specific language, from the U.S. on a
post-START treaty agreement, Lavrov said he recognized that
the U.S. would not want to address the link between offensive
and defensive weapons in the post-START negotiations, but it
would be important to have such a dialogue in the future.
Russia was interested in developing a joint missile defense
system (MD) with the U.S., but we should start "from
scratch," with joint threat assessments, determination of
necessary resources, and best location for MD assets. Lavrov
rejected a quid pro quo in which the U.S. would discontinue
its MD plans for eastern Europe in exchange for Russia
pressuring Iran to end its nuclear weapons program,
emphasizing that each issue should be considered separately.

He acknowledged that Moscow was concerned about Iran's
longer-range missile development and said Russia would be
prepared to undertake a "dual-track" approach towards Iran's
nuclear program; offering incentives to Tehran, but keeping
in reserve measures within the Agreed Framework.

He reconfirmed that Moscow had suspended the sale of S-300's to
Iran "for the moment." In a follow-on meeting, DFM Sergey
Ryabkov stressed that while Russia was interested in working
with the U.S. on MD, it would be difficult for Russia to join
a U.S. MD effort that included sites in Poland and the Czech
Republic, and urged that if the U.S. intended to pursue sites
in Europe, they should be further west and south, so as to
diminish the effect on Russian capabilities.

Ryabkov emphasized that "no one can deliver Iran to the U.S., except
the U.S. itself," and argued that, while the S-300 sale was
"frozen," the "less Moscow heard from Washington about it,
the better."

 

[Lankan Ranger]

MOSCOW'S INCREASING FRUSTRATION WITH TEHRAN

Official GOR reports and media have
pronounced the Russian-Iranian relationship healthy and
Minister of Energy's Shmatko's recent visit to Tehran as a
success. Privately, GOR officials and Russian analysts agree
that there are serious tensions in the bilateral relationship
such as the S-300s issue, the Bushehr project and the
possibility of Russia's support of sanctions.

They downplay Moscow's ability to influence Iran, noting competing
interests within Russia that complicate Russian policy
decisions. Iran policy remains a sensitive domestic
question.

 

[Lankan Ranger]

PREMIER WEN PUSHES RAHIMI ON DIALOGUE

On the margins of Shanghai Cooperation
Organization high-level meetings October 15, PRC Premier Wen
Jiabao urged Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza
Rahimi to move forward with direct talks with the United
States and offered PRC support to do so, according to an MFA
official. Wen reportedly reiterated that Iran had the right
to peaceful nuclear technology, but stressed China's
opposition to Iranian development of nuclear weapons.

Our MFA contact claimed that China recognizes the importance of
seizing the present opportunity and that the Iranian side did
as well. The PRC assesses that Iran's willingness to
negotiate over the nuclear issue comes from Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, not President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
but the Iranian regime remains divided over the June election
and its aftermath. Our contact urged the U.S. to downplay
sanctions and seek positive, even if symbolic, benefits to
provide Iran in response to progress in the talks.

China has been pushing Iran to improve its cooperation with the IAEA
and assesses that Iran will make good on its offer to allow
inspectors into the Qom nuclear site. Beijing believes that
Iran's nuclear technology is not as advanced "as some
believe." Iranian Embassy officials in Beijing expressed
satisfaction to the Chinese with the outcomes of the October
1 P5-plus-1-plus-Iran meeting and were particularly positive
on the bilateral meeting with the U.S. side, according to the
MFA.

Our contact argued that a constituency within Iranian
society that advocates flexibility on the nuclear issue is a
force in politics, but that the government will need any
negotiations to accrue benefits to Iran given the strength of
the conservative camp.

 

[Lankan Ranger]

TARGETED BY IRANIAN REGIME

prominent VOA commentator Ali Reza Nourizadeh recently told [NAME REMOVED] he had been targeted by Iranian intelligence, an allegation confirmed by London LEGATT. Nourizadeh was approached some months ago by Mohammad Reza Sadeqinia, an Iranian national who introduced himself as a “big fan” of Nourizadeh’s.

Nourizadeh met Sadeqinia on several occasions in London and Washington, DC, but became suspicious when Sadeqinia took large numbers of photos, including of Nourizadeh’s vehicle. Sadeqinia was arrested in California on charges of soliciting murder after he attempted to hire a hitman to kill Iranian-American broadcaster Jamshid Sharmahd. Because his pattern of behavior towards Nourizadeh was similar to his interactions with Sharmahd, FBI shared the threat information with UK authorities, who subsequently warned Nourizadeh.