WHY SMALL NUCLEAR POWERS WILL NOT DISARM? – OPED
AUGUST 23, 2014 EURASIA REVIEW 3 COMMENTS
By Eurasia Review
By Syed Muhammad Ali
Since the emergence of the modern nation-state after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, international politics can be characterized as the state’s pursuit of two core self-interests, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Almost three centuries later, World War II introduced nuclear weapons as an unprecedented factor within the international power politics, underwriting the earlier two. More recently, the Russian annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea proves that a small state can protect neither its sovereignty nor its territorial integrity if it gives up nuclear weapons, particularly if the aggressor state is a large anti-status quo nuclear power.
The Price of Nuclear Disarmament
Since the age of the Crusades in the 12th century, Europe has always remained as one of the most interesting and eventful continents in world history and politics. The politics and events within Europe have also affected the security of various states and stability of other regions around the globe, which continue to draw useful lessons from the rich yet turbulent European history. The Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, led the European states to pledge that they will mutually respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other. But this pledge could not become a practiced norm. Two of the largest, bloodiest and most destructive wars in the entire human history, which later engulfed many other continents around the world, the World War 1 and World War II, started on the European continent. However, since the end of the World War II, peace between the European powers has been successfully preserved. But this would not have been possible without the development and deployment of the ultimate weapon on the European continent, the nuclear weapon. Various events after the end of the cold war indicate that nuclear weapons continue to play a vital role in preserving peace in Europe and protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the European states. Despite the end of the cold war, Russia did not give up its nuclear arsenal and the US and its allies still continue to maintain nuclear weapons in Western Europe. However, like a handful other states, in return for international security guarantees, Ukraine chose to give up nuclear weapons, but paid a huge price of its nuclear disarmament recently, when Moscow annexed its Crimean region.
Five years after the end of the Cold War, the1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances marked a legal and political commitment by major powers including Russia, the US and the UK towards Ukraine that the security and territory of the former Soviet republic would face no threat from them.1 In return, Ukraine gave up the world’s third largest nuclear weapon arsenal, consisting of almost 1,900 strategic and 2,500 tactical nuclear weapons2 and signed NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. This remarkably noble gesture earned Kiev a lot of goodwill from the world in general and the most powerful states in particular, who called it as one of the most substantive contributions towards general and complete nuclear disarmament.
Two decades later, the recent Russian annexation of Crimea has led the western world powers, which earlier lauded Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament, to condemn Moscow for the violation of its international legal and political commitments and undermining a neighboring state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. But this condemnation is not sufficient to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.
World Condemnation Is Not a Deterrent Against A Nuclear Power
During the past quarter of a century, Russia has come a long way in terms of its international status, influence, economy, political stability and military capabilities. Thanks to the growing and proactive role of Moscow in international politics in various regions and international forums, western powers view Russia as a rising anti-status quo power at the global level, challenging the US-led alliance system, both in the Western Europe and in the Asia-Pacific.
US Vice President Joe Biden condemned the Russian take-over of Crimea as a ‘land grab3, British Prime Minister called it ‘completely unacceptable’ and German Chancellor Merkel described it as ‘a move against international law’. Russia has been evicted from the elite G-8 group of rich and influential states and US, UK and Germany have warned Moscow against more sanctions, isolation and serious consequences.4 Nevertheless, these threats have not deterred Moscow’s territorial expansion, which has retaliated by a more alert and defiant strategic and diplomatic posture towards the US and its allies in the Western Europe and Asia-Pacific and further improving its nuclear arsenal.
Russia’s Dismissal of International Criticism
At best, the Russian response to the searing Western criticism reflects little more than annoyance and President Putin has warned the West against provoking Moscow further. Besides signing a treaty on 18 March to lay a legal claim over the strategically important Black Sea region of Crimea5, Putin has shot back at the Western powers. In a fiery address before Kremlin, the Russian President claimed that the hearts and minds of Crimean people and the territory of Crimea have always belonged to Russia. He further warned that Moscow is ‘tired of being pushed into a corner by the West’ and being repeatedly deceived on issues such as NATO, ballistic missile defence and visa regime. 6 Moscow also cut down civilian space co-operation with Washington and drastically reduced food and other imports from US allies, which imposed trade related sanctions on Russia.
Why Military Action Is Not An Option Against A Nuclear Power?
So why are these threats by major western powers not working? Besides immense diplomatic, political and economic leverage at both global and regional levels, the US and NATO also maintain the world’s largest, most effective and ready nuclear forces.7 However, protecting Ukraine may be important for the credibility and image of the US and NATO but does not represent a vital interest of Washington and NATO member states, which will deter them from rescuing Crimea and getting entangled in any direct military effort against a resurgent Russia, armed with the largest nuclear arsenal in Eurasia. Therefore, let us look at the ground realities beyond the ongoing blame game, which is likely to continue or even intensify in the foreseeable future.
First, clearly Putin’s top priority is not his international image and he has made a well-calculated, but risky, move to trade Russian goodwill and economic stakes over its largest European energy market for long-term geopolitical and geostrategic gains.
Second, the Russian dismissal of the western criticism and defiant annexation of the strategically vital Crimean region via a treaty, indicates it views itself as an anti-status quo power in international politics, challenging the US-led world security architecture.
Third, in the presence of a ready, large and growing Russia nuclear arsenal and the western European energy dependence on Moscow, the US and NATO cannot do much except attempting to diplomatic isolate Moscow and impose economic sanctions on it. Both these steps will eventually fail to constrain Russia, only antagonize it further and compel it to accelerate its efforts to alter the international security architecture.
Fourth, Moscow is well aware that realistically, despite all hue and cry, a military option is not available to the US and NATO against Russia, which also possesses the world’s second largest nuclear arsenal. In addition, in the absence of a cheaper or ready alternative, it will not be easy to swiftly or significantly reduce the growing western European energy dependence on Russia.
Fifth, despite forming part of the Ukrainian territory, the Crimean majority is ethnically of Russian origin8 and a combination of weak central government and poor economy helped Putin transform the large-scale disenchantment of Crimean people into popular sympathy towards Moscow.
Sixth, Putin has exploited this popular sympathy towards Moscow with great precision at a time when the US, ruffled by the recent Afghan and Iraqi campaigns and focusing on its re-balancing strategy, is reluctant to get entangled in large, costly or new military commitments in distant regions, not directly affecting its core national interests.
Nevertheless, an ineffective and ineffective central government, responsible for a weak economy, is not reason enough for a modern state to lose one’s territory in the increasingly interdependent 21st Century world. Principally, Kiev could still have waged a prolonged war of attrition against the Russian forces to buy time and gradually muster international diplomatic and political support, at least to contest if not to entirely preserve its territorial integrity and sovereignty from being immediately and completely lost. But the Ukrainian leadership knew very well why this was not an option and so did the Russians. Deterring a nuclear power through conventional means by a non-nuclear weapon state, is not an option.
Crimean Annexation and Revival of Nuclear Deterrence
Twenty years ago, Ukraine possessed the world’s third largest nuclear weapon arsenal9 consisting of 1,900 strategic and 2,500 tactical nuclear weapons. Kiev traded it in return for looking good and becoming acceptable to the ‘free world’, some economic incentives and security assurances from Russia and other major powers.
Today, the loss of significant part of Ukrainian territory represents the ultimate price it paid for giving up its nuclear weapons which could have provided it a deterrent against foreign aggression, occupation or annexation. This reflects an unfortunate reality that history is cruel to those who do not learn from it, but could be useful for those who learn from their own, or better still, others’ mistakes.
Lessons for Smaller Nuclear Powers
Like Ukraine, Pakistan faces a similar dilemma in the form of an eight times bigger nuclear-armed eastern neighbor, which has maintained very close military ties with Moscow throughout its Post-independence history.10 Forty-Three years ago, in a war over East Pakistan, India arrogantly dismissed the global and in particular Nixon Administration’s condemnation and deprived Pakistan of half of its country through first supporting an insurgency and subsequently its direct military intervention.11
For years, despite various periodic dialogues and multiple CBMs, this nuclear-armed neighbor of Pakistan refuses to peacefully settle numerous lingering territorial, water and other internationally-recognized disputes and its massive and unprecedented conventional and nuclear arms build-up offers no end in sight.
Moreover, it has not fulfilled its own international commitments to the United Nations and international community to hold a plebiscite, giving the right of self-determination to the millions of people of Kashmir, a beautiful region bordering Pakistan, India and China, which New Delhi continues to militarily occupy since 1948.
On August 18, India, using the Pakistani envoy’s meeting with the Kashmiri leaders as an excuse, backed out of foreign secretary-level talks with Islamabad, it had promised Pakistan after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s India visit, early this year. PM Sharif had gone to New Delhi not only to congratulate Indian PM Narendra Modi on his election victory, but also to invite the Indian leadership to resume the stalled composite dialogue to peacefully settle all outstanding disputes particularly Kashmir, through negotiations with Pakistan, in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of the Kashmiri people.
These disturbing trends leave Pakistan with no option but to take a skeptical view of the effectiveness of international law, international organizations, and international security guarantees in preserving peace, territorial integrity and sovereignty of states, a duty in which the international community miserably failed in 1971, to the detriment of Pakistan and in 2014, at the cost of Ukraine.
However, this also does not mean Islamabad should engage in a costly arms race with New Delhi, it can ill-afford but to rely on its own jealously guarded, small but effective nuclear arsenal as ‘the ultimate, long-term and cost-effective guarantee’ to its national security amidst a dynamic environment of changing alliances, shifting foreign policies and redistribution of global economic and military power.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2013 estimates, at $ 47.39 billion the Indian defence budget is 7 times greater than Pakistan’s defence budget and three and-a-half times more than what New Delhi spent on its military at the time of 9/11. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has effectively deterred and will increasingly deter India, whose growing external ambitions seem out of sync with its huge domestic socio-economic problems.
This increasingly became evident when it backed out of peaceful negotiations with Pakistan on Monday August 18, 2014, describing the Kashmiri people, seeking their right of self-determination as ‘separatists’ and the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir as its own, against the UN resolutions it had earlier accepted. Earlier, senior serving and retired Indian leaders and officials have openly discussed a variety of coercive actions and aggressive plans, against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan. These range from the belligerent ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, threats to take over the part of Kashmir, free from Indian occupation and New Delhi’s plans to impose naval blockade on Karachi. Top Indian military officers and strategic thinkers continue to seriously and repeatedly articulate these ideas at various national and international forums and during their engagements with Pakistani and the US scholars.
Why Pakistan does not consider these Indian ideas as mere rhetoric or the western reassurances to the contrary very convincing, is because these threats seem consistent with the ever burgeoning Indian defence budget and military capabilities. New Delhi has an army twice the size of the US army, the world’s fourth largest air force and is developing a massive blue water navy, which in terms of the number of vessels, will be second only to the US fleet deployed in the Asia-Pacific. Thanks to the ballistic missile nuclear submarines it is building, the Indian Navy will be able to deploy its nuclear weapons far beyond the Indian Ocean, into South China Sea and other regions.
In addition, India has struck multiple nuclear deals with various states, enjoys exceptional access to the most advanced western defence hardware and technologies, has forged close security ties with both the US and Russia and is developing strategic partnerships with Afghanistan, Japan, Australia, Iran and Saudi Arabia. These strategic trends worry Islamabad and make it believe that it does not have many friends it can trust during crisis or war. Therefore, Islamabad has done exactly what any other state would have rationally done with a similar history, geography and economy. It has developed an indigenous, affordable, survivable and credible nuclear deterrent to survive in such an insecure, changing and lonely international system.
Ukraine – A Victim of Nuclear Blackmail?
Twenty years ago, Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament raised the hopes of international non-proliferation proponents because it did away with the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal. However, international law and the commitments which the international community made towards Ukraine, pale in comparison to the reality that it is a non-nuclear weapon state, neighboring a large nuclear power.
What is more worrying is whether the annexation of Crimea without any major military Ukrainian response tantamount to nuclear blackmail of a disarmed state by a neighboring nuclear power, since losing territory is a smaller price to pay to avoid the greater risk of nuclear annihilation, in case the crisis between Ukraine and Moscow further escalates. This critical paradox Kiev faces today, reminds one of the historic words of the former Pakistani prime minister Z. A. Bhutto, who after the 1974 ‘peaceful’ Indian nuclear explosion, promised that Pakistan would never be a victim of nuclear blackmail, a phenomenon which Ukraine, clipped of its nuclear deterrent, faces four decades later, in the form of its inability to deter the coercive actions of its large nuclear armed resurgent neighbor.
Conclusion
The Ukrainian example offers convincing evidence that as a factor of regional stability, nuclear deterrent may make a state less popular internationally, but helps it survive in dangerous neighborhoods, particularly if it involves large anti-status quo nuclear powers.
The revival of Russia might revitalize European interest in maintaining the US nuclear umbrella, which would make arms control more challenging and renew the value of nuclear deterrence in international politics once again.
In an anarchic and insecure world, nuclear deterrent, however minimum, continues to offer a cost-effective recipe for preserving peace, sovereignty and territorial integrity, particularly to smaller status quo states, threatened by larger, well-armed anti-status quo nuclear powers, whose ambitions cannot be constrained by international law or international organizations.
Unfortunately, the United Nations has failed to prevent war, resolve territorial disputes or to help small states preserve their sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has also failed to convince the permanent members of the UN Security Council to live up to their promise to eliminate their nuclear weapons. The Conference on Disarmament is still unable to convince the powers maintaining huge fissile material stocks, developing space weapons to reduce or eliminate their existing or growing capabilities and resources.
Looking good is important, particularly for smaller states to remain relevant in an increasingly globalized world, but if your large nuclear-armed neighbor seizes your territory, you could actually look much worse, no matter how bad your neighbor might be called by the international community, international organizations or international law.
Today, Ukraine would understand exactly how Pakistan felt in 1971, when it naively trusted international law, major powers and international institutions to provide it security against external aggression but these unrealistic expectations and blind trust cost Pakistan half of its country. That is why, a successful nuclear blackmail of a smaller disarmed neighbour by a major nuclear power, an uncertain international security environment and the transforming international power structure are three compelling reasons why smaller states maintaining credible minimum nuclear deterrent, are more unlikely to give up their nuclear weapons, than powers with larger nuclear arsenals. Even today, despite its distinct features, European politics continue to offer useful lessons to other states and regions, how to preserve peace in an anarchic world.
About the author:
Syed Muhammad Ali is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad. Earlier he has taught nuclear strategy, foreign policy analysis and comparative politics at the National Defence University of Pakistan. He has been writing on international security, strategic and nuclear affairs for the past two decades.
Endnotes:
1. http://www.cfr.org/arms-control-dis...t-memorandums-security-assurances-1994/p32484
2. Steven Pifer, “The Trilateral Process: The United States, Ukraine, Russia and Nuclear Weapons,” Arms Control Series Paper 6, Foreign Policy at Brookings, May 2011, Brookings - Quality. Independence. Impact.
3. Biden Calls Russia’s Move Into Crimea a ‘Land Grab’ - Bloomberg
4. U.S., other powers kick Russia out of G8 - CNN.com
5. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304747404579446920731715270
6. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/world/europe/ukraine.html?_r=0
7. http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/images/euronukes2010.pdf
8. BBC News - Crimea profile - Overview
9. Ukraine | Country Profiles | NTI
10. India’s Defence Budget 2013-14: A Bumpy Road Ahead | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
11. Document 168
Why Small Nuclear Powers Will Not Disarm? - OpEd - Eurasia Review
AUGUST 23, 2014 EURASIA REVIEW 3 COMMENTS
By Eurasia Review
By Syed Muhammad Ali
Since the emergence of the modern nation-state after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, international politics can be characterized as the state’s pursuit of two core self-interests, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Almost three centuries later, World War II introduced nuclear weapons as an unprecedented factor within the international power politics, underwriting the earlier two. More recently, the Russian annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea proves that a small state can protect neither its sovereignty nor its territorial integrity if it gives up nuclear weapons, particularly if the aggressor state is a large anti-status quo nuclear power.
The Price of Nuclear Disarmament
Since the age of the Crusades in the 12th century, Europe has always remained as one of the most interesting and eventful continents in world history and politics. The politics and events within Europe have also affected the security of various states and stability of other regions around the globe, which continue to draw useful lessons from the rich yet turbulent European history. The Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, led the European states to pledge that they will mutually respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other. But this pledge could not become a practiced norm. Two of the largest, bloodiest and most destructive wars in the entire human history, which later engulfed many other continents around the world, the World War 1 and World War II, started on the European continent. However, since the end of the World War II, peace between the European powers has been successfully preserved. But this would not have been possible without the development and deployment of the ultimate weapon on the European continent, the nuclear weapon. Various events after the end of the cold war indicate that nuclear weapons continue to play a vital role in preserving peace in Europe and protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the European states. Despite the end of the cold war, Russia did not give up its nuclear arsenal and the US and its allies still continue to maintain nuclear weapons in Western Europe. However, like a handful other states, in return for international security guarantees, Ukraine chose to give up nuclear weapons, but paid a huge price of its nuclear disarmament recently, when Moscow annexed its Crimean region.
Five years after the end of the Cold War, the1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances marked a legal and political commitment by major powers including Russia, the US and the UK towards Ukraine that the security and territory of the former Soviet republic would face no threat from them.1 In return, Ukraine gave up the world’s third largest nuclear weapon arsenal, consisting of almost 1,900 strategic and 2,500 tactical nuclear weapons2 and signed NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. This remarkably noble gesture earned Kiev a lot of goodwill from the world in general and the most powerful states in particular, who called it as one of the most substantive contributions towards general and complete nuclear disarmament.
Two decades later, the recent Russian annexation of Crimea has led the western world powers, which earlier lauded Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament, to condemn Moscow for the violation of its international legal and political commitments and undermining a neighboring state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. But this condemnation is not sufficient to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.
World Condemnation Is Not a Deterrent Against A Nuclear Power
During the past quarter of a century, Russia has come a long way in terms of its international status, influence, economy, political stability and military capabilities. Thanks to the growing and proactive role of Moscow in international politics in various regions and international forums, western powers view Russia as a rising anti-status quo power at the global level, challenging the US-led alliance system, both in the Western Europe and in the Asia-Pacific.
US Vice President Joe Biden condemned the Russian take-over of Crimea as a ‘land grab3, British Prime Minister called it ‘completely unacceptable’ and German Chancellor Merkel described it as ‘a move against international law’. Russia has been evicted from the elite G-8 group of rich and influential states and US, UK and Germany have warned Moscow against more sanctions, isolation and serious consequences.4 Nevertheless, these threats have not deterred Moscow’s territorial expansion, which has retaliated by a more alert and defiant strategic and diplomatic posture towards the US and its allies in the Western Europe and Asia-Pacific and further improving its nuclear arsenal.
Russia’s Dismissal of International Criticism
At best, the Russian response to the searing Western criticism reflects little more than annoyance and President Putin has warned the West against provoking Moscow further. Besides signing a treaty on 18 March to lay a legal claim over the strategically important Black Sea region of Crimea5, Putin has shot back at the Western powers. In a fiery address before Kremlin, the Russian President claimed that the hearts and minds of Crimean people and the territory of Crimea have always belonged to Russia. He further warned that Moscow is ‘tired of being pushed into a corner by the West’ and being repeatedly deceived on issues such as NATO, ballistic missile defence and visa regime. 6 Moscow also cut down civilian space co-operation with Washington and drastically reduced food and other imports from US allies, which imposed trade related sanctions on Russia.
Why Military Action Is Not An Option Against A Nuclear Power?
So why are these threats by major western powers not working? Besides immense diplomatic, political and economic leverage at both global and regional levels, the US and NATO also maintain the world’s largest, most effective and ready nuclear forces.7 However, protecting Ukraine may be important for the credibility and image of the US and NATO but does not represent a vital interest of Washington and NATO member states, which will deter them from rescuing Crimea and getting entangled in any direct military effort against a resurgent Russia, armed with the largest nuclear arsenal in Eurasia. Therefore, let us look at the ground realities beyond the ongoing blame game, which is likely to continue or even intensify in the foreseeable future.
First, clearly Putin’s top priority is not his international image and he has made a well-calculated, but risky, move to trade Russian goodwill and economic stakes over its largest European energy market for long-term geopolitical and geostrategic gains.
Second, the Russian dismissal of the western criticism and defiant annexation of the strategically vital Crimean region via a treaty, indicates it views itself as an anti-status quo power in international politics, challenging the US-led world security architecture.
Third, in the presence of a ready, large and growing Russia nuclear arsenal and the western European energy dependence on Moscow, the US and NATO cannot do much except attempting to diplomatic isolate Moscow and impose economic sanctions on it. Both these steps will eventually fail to constrain Russia, only antagonize it further and compel it to accelerate its efforts to alter the international security architecture.
Fourth, Moscow is well aware that realistically, despite all hue and cry, a military option is not available to the US and NATO against Russia, which also possesses the world’s second largest nuclear arsenal. In addition, in the absence of a cheaper or ready alternative, it will not be easy to swiftly or significantly reduce the growing western European energy dependence on Russia.
Fifth, despite forming part of the Ukrainian territory, the Crimean majority is ethnically of Russian origin8 and a combination of weak central government and poor economy helped Putin transform the large-scale disenchantment of Crimean people into popular sympathy towards Moscow.
Sixth, Putin has exploited this popular sympathy towards Moscow with great precision at a time when the US, ruffled by the recent Afghan and Iraqi campaigns and focusing on its re-balancing strategy, is reluctant to get entangled in large, costly or new military commitments in distant regions, not directly affecting its core national interests.
Nevertheless, an ineffective and ineffective central government, responsible for a weak economy, is not reason enough for a modern state to lose one’s territory in the increasingly interdependent 21st Century world. Principally, Kiev could still have waged a prolonged war of attrition against the Russian forces to buy time and gradually muster international diplomatic and political support, at least to contest if not to entirely preserve its territorial integrity and sovereignty from being immediately and completely lost. But the Ukrainian leadership knew very well why this was not an option and so did the Russians. Deterring a nuclear power through conventional means by a non-nuclear weapon state, is not an option.
Crimean Annexation and Revival of Nuclear Deterrence
Twenty years ago, Ukraine possessed the world’s third largest nuclear weapon arsenal9 consisting of 1,900 strategic and 2,500 tactical nuclear weapons. Kiev traded it in return for looking good and becoming acceptable to the ‘free world’, some economic incentives and security assurances from Russia and other major powers.
Today, the loss of significant part of Ukrainian territory represents the ultimate price it paid for giving up its nuclear weapons which could have provided it a deterrent against foreign aggression, occupation or annexation. This reflects an unfortunate reality that history is cruel to those who do not learn from it, but could be useful for those who learn from their own, or better still, others’ mistakes.
Lessons for Smaller Nuclear Powers
Like Ukraine, Pakistan faces a similar dilemma in the form of an eight times bigger nuclear-armed eastern neighbor, which has maintained very close military ties with Moscow throughout its Post-independence history.10 Forty-Three years ago, in a war over East Pakistan, India arrogantly dismissed the global and in particular Nixon Administration’s condemnation and deprived Pakistan of half of its country through first supporting an insurgency and subsequently its direct military intervention.11
For years, despite various periodic dialogues and multiple CBMs, this nuclear-armed neighbor of Pakistan refuses to peacefully settle numerous lingering territorial, water and other internationally-recognized disputes and its massive and unprecedented conventional and nuclear arms build-up offers no end in sight.
Moreover, it has not fulfilled its own international commitments to the United Nations and international community to hold a plebiscite, giving the right of self-determination to the millions of people of Kashmir, a beautiful region bordering Pakistan, India and China, which New Delhi continues to militarily occupy since 1948.
On August 18, India, using the Pakistani envoy’s meeting with the Kashmiri leaders as an excuse, backed out of foreign secretary-level talks with Islamabad, it had promised Pakistan after Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s India visit, early this year. PM Sharif had gone to New Delhi not only to congratulate Indian PM Narendra Modi on his election victory, but also to invite the Indian leadership to resume the stalled composite dialogue to peacefully settle all outstanding disputes particularly Kashmir, through negotiations with Pakistan, in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of the Kashmiri people.
These disturbing trends leave Pakistan with no option but to take a skeptical view of the effectiveness of international law, international organizations, and international security guarantees in preserving peace, territorial integrity and sovereignty of states, a duty in which the international community miserably failed in 1971, to the detriment of Pakistan and in 2014, at the cost of Ukraine.
However, this also does not mean Islamabad should engage in a costly arms race with New Delhi, it can ill-afford but to rely on its own jealously guarded, small but effective nuclear arsenal as ‘the ultimate, long-term and cost-effective guarantee’ to its national security amidst a dynamic environment of changing alliances, shifting foreign policies and redistribution of global economic and military power.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2013 estimates, at $ 47.39 billion the Indian defence budget is 7 times greater than Pakistan’s defence budget and three and-a-half times more than what New Delhi spent on its military at the time of 9/11. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has effectively deterred and will increasingly deter India, whose growing external ambitions seem out of sync with its huge domestic socio-economic problems.
This increasingly became evident when it backed out of peaceful negotiations with Pakistan on Monday August 18, 2014, describing the Kashmiri people, seeking their right of self-determination as ‘separatists’ and the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir as its own, against the UN resolutions it had earlier accepted. Earlier, senior serving and retired Indian leaders and officials have openly discussed a variety of coercive actions and aggressive plans, against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan. These range from the belligerent ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, threats to take over the part of Kashmir, free from Indian occupation and New Delhi’s plans to impose naval blockade on Karachi. Top Indian military officers and strategic thinkers continue to seriously and repeatedly articulate these ideas at various national and international forums and during their engagements with Pakistani and the US scholars.
Why Pakistan does not consider these Indian ideas as mere rhetoric or the western reassurances to the contrary very convincing, is because these threats seem consistent with the ever burgeoning Indian defence budget and military capabilities. New Delhi has an army twice the size of the US army, the world’s fourth largest air force and is developing a massive blue water navy, which in terms of the number of vessels, will be second only to the US fleet deployed in the Asia-Pacific. Thanks to the ballistic missile nuclear submarines it is building, the Indian Navy will be able to deploy its nuclear weapons far beyond the Indian Ocean, into South China Sea and other regions.
In addition, India has struck multiple nuclear deals with various states, enjoys exceptional access to the most advanced western defence hardware and technologies, has forged close security ties with both the US and Russia and is developing strategic partnerships with Afghanistan, Japan, Australia, Iran and Saudi Arabia. These strategic trends worry Islamabad and make it believe that it does not have many friends it can trust during crisis or war. Therefore, Islamabad has done exactly what any other state would have rationally done with a similar history, geography and economy. It has developed an indigenous, affordable, survivable and credible nuclear deterrent to survive in such an insecure, changing and lonely international system.
Ukraine – A Victim of Nuclear Blackmail?
Twenty years ago, Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament raised the hopes of international non-proliferation proponents because it did away with the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal. However, international law and the commitments which the international community made towards Ukraine, pale in comparison to the reality that it is a non-nuclear weapon state, neighboring a large nuclear power.
What is more worrying is whether the annexation of Crimea without any major military Ukrainian response tantamount to nuclear blackmail of a disarmed state by a neighboring nuclear power, since losing territory is a smaller price to pay to avoid the greater risk of nuclear annihilation, in case the crisis between Ukraine and Moscow further escalates. This critical paradox Kiev faces today, reminds one of the historic words of the former Pakistani prime minister Z. A. Bhutto, who after the 1974 ‘peaceful’ Indian nuclear explosion, promised that Pakistan would never be a victim of nuclear blackmail, a phenomenon which Ukraine, clipped of its nuclear deterrent, faces four decades later, in the form of its inability to deter the coercive actions of its large nuclear armed resurgent neighbor.
Conclusion
The Ukrainian example offers convincing evidence that as a factor of regional stability, nuclear deterrent may make a state less popular internationally, but helps it survive in dangerous neighborhoods, particularly if it involves large anti-status quo nuclear powers.
The revival of Russia might revitalize European interest in maintaining the US nuclear umbrella, which would make arms control more challenging and renew the value of nuclear deterrence in international politics once again.
In an anarchic and insecure world, nuclear deterrent, however minimum, continues to offer a cost-effective recipe for preserving peace, sovereignty and territorial integrity, particularly to smaller status quo states, threatened by larger, well-armed anti-status quo nuclear powers, whose ambitions cannot be constrained by international law or international organizations.
Unfortunately, the United Nations has failed to prevent war, resolve territorial disputes or to help small states preserve their sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has also failed to convince the permanent members of the UN Security Council to live up to their promise to eliminate their nuclear weapons. The Conference on Disarmament is still unable to convince the powers maintaining huge fissile material stocks, developing space weapons to reduce or eliminate their existing or growing capabilities and resources.
Looking good is important, particularly for smaller states to remain relevant in an increasingly globalized world, but if your large nuclear-armed neighbor seizes your territory, you could actually look much worse, no matter how bad your neighbor might be called by the international community, international organizations or international law.
Today, Ukraine would understand exactly how Pakistan felt in 1971, when it naively trusted international law, major powers and international institutions to provide it security against external aggression but these unrealistic expectations and blind trust cost Pakistan half of its country. That is why, a successful nuclear blackmail of a smaller disarmed neighbour by a major nuclear power, an uncertain international security environment and the transforming international power structure are three compelling reasons why smaller states maintaining credible minimum nuclear deterrent, are more unlikely to give up their nuclear weapons, than powers with larger nuclear arsenals. Even today, despite its distinct features, European politics continue to offer useful lessons to other states and regions, how to preserve peace in an anarchic world.
About the author:
Syed Muhammad Ali is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad. Earlier he has taught nuclear strategy, foreign policy analysis and comparative politics at the National Defence University of Pakistan. He has been writing on international security, strategic and nuclear affairs for the past two decades.
Endnotes:
1. http://www.cfr.org/arms-control-dis...t-memorandums-security-assurances-1994/p32484
2. Steven Pifer, “The Trilateral Process: The United States, Ukraine, Russia and Nuclear Weapons,” Arms Control Series Paper 6, Foreign Policy at Brookings, May 2011, Brookings - Quality. Independence. Impact.
3. Biden Calls Russia’s Move Into Crimea a ‘Land Grab’ - Bloomberg
4. U.S., other powers kick Russia out of G8 - CNN.com
5. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304747404579446920731715270
6. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/world/europe/ukraine.html?_r=0
7. http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/images/euronukes2010.pdf
8. BBC News - Crimea profile - Overview
9. Ukraine | Country Profiles | NTI
10. India’s Defence Budget 2013-14: A Bumpy Road Ahead | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
11. Document 168
Why Small Nuclear Powers Will Not Disarm? - OpEd - Eurasia Review

