Sovereignty is a tricky word. On the one hand it stands for all that is patriotic and
embodies pride. On the other hand the very patriotism and pride that it invokes guide
the respective believers to sink into unrealistic and often delusionary assumptions.
Eventually, as and when this feeling of sovereignty gets hurt by an agent (read China),
when this pride is curtailed by harsh realities (read untenable military ambitions), it is
an awakening that in terms of geopolitics would take you to the White House.
Ask Philippines!
China is possibly regretting the way it dealt with its immediate neighbors including
Philippines in the South China Sea and the resultant citing of American hullUSS
Fitzgeraldin its traditional zone of influence.On the 16th of November on board the
USS Fitzgerald in Manila Bay, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Philippine
Secretary for Foreign Affairs Albert del Rosario signed the Manila Declaration.
A part of declaration read:
We (US and Philippines) share a common interest in maintaining freedom of navigation,
unimpeded lawful commerce, and transit of people across the seas and subscribe to a
rules-based approach in resolving competing claims in maritime areas through
peaceful, collaborative, multilateral, and diplomatic processes within the framework of
international law.emphasis added.On board the ship, Ms. Clinton said in a speech:
The USS Fitzgerald has patrolled the entire Western Pacific region this year. It traveled
to Australia, Russia, Guam, Saipan, the Marshall Islands, before docking here in Manila
Bay. As part of Operation Tomodachi, the search, rescue, and recovery mission
following the earthquake, the tsunami, and the nuclear reactor meltdown in Japan,
the Fitzgerald operated closest to shore. And this summer, it transited the Gregorio del
Pilar the flagship of the Filipino Navy on its maiden voyage across the Pacific. The ships
cross-decked and held training sessions for 16 days on emergency response and
onboard medical procedures. By the end of the exercise, the officers and crews onboard
both vessels achieved new levels of proficiency and partnership.
Chipping away the niceties in the speech and analyzing the substance would produce 4
points:
1. US Navy has unrestricted and unquestioned access to what it calls the high seas
or the international waters.
2. US Navy enjoys a pre-eminence in rescue operations (which often leads to
concrete relationship in post-crises periods).
3. US Navy enjoys cordial relationship with its previous rival (Russia; please see
that Russia is pronounced next to Australia).
4. US Navy cares for its allies and is keen on enhancing interoperability with
Philippines.
But there is one critical point that we should not miss in the declaration.
subscribe to
a rules-based approach in resolving competing claims in maritime areas through
peaceful, collaborative, multilateral, and diplomatic processes.
All these years, the US has maintained a neutral stand in South China Sea dispute
refusing to side with the claimants. Now it has changed the tack, and is taking active
interest in the whole issue. One can argue that by using the world multilateral, the US
is calling for enhanced ASEAN participation in the till-date regional issue.
But the very fact that the words virtually came from the mouth of none other than the
US Secretary of State puts across a point: The US will have the role of a patron, if not a
mediator. Any inkling of doubt in this regard is obliterated when you look at the venue
where the declaration was signed: the battle ship of the most powerful Navy in the
world! Unusual and probably unprecedented, in effect, it was as good as signing the
declaration on American soil.
What could this be if not a strong message to China?
Origins: South China Sea (SCS) dispute
A few would recall that the SCS island disputes originated with the end of the Second
World War.
In the San Francisco conference of 1951, the Allied powers failed to identify who had
the title to the South China Sea islandsSpartlys and Paracel-- when they stripped
Japan off the possession of the same after the Pacific War in Article 2(f) of the San
Francisco Treaty. (Japan occupied the islands in 1939, when the war was on foot.)
This paved way for the littoral states like Philippines and Vietnam to raise the claims.
Had China not fallen to the Communists, the treaty may well have accorded island
titles to the Chinese. But as fate would have it, this did not happen. In fact in one way or
other, the Chinese had laid claim to the disputed islands during various instances in
1877 (Qing dynasty), 1883 and 1887.
In fact, even before the conference, on August 15, 1951, the Chinese Foreign Minister
Zhou Enlai affirmed Chinas claim on the islands (see the current map). But these claims
went unheeded and Allied powers were in no mood to bequeath the islands to
Communist China. Now, only problem is that historical precedents alone will not help
China calcify its claims. Continuous and effective acts of occupation; which worked
in disputes concerning Island of Palmas, Clipperton and Eastern Greenland at the
Permanent Court of Arbitration, would do.
This partly explains the developments manifested as claims, occupations and counter
occupations in the South China Sea Islands in the past years by various parties,
including China, Vietnam and Philippines.
Source: eia.doe.gov, 2008; UNCLOS=United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
What brings the US to the table?
But, the Island disputes though central to the problem of the South China Sea,
singularly cannot warrant US intervention in the issue.It needs to be something more
important, lethal to be precise:
In an opinion piece written in the month of August in The Heritage Foundation portal,
Renato De Castro and Walter Lohman said:On March 2, 2011, in the South China Sea,
two Chinese patrol boats confronted a survey ship commissioned by the Philippine
Department of Energy to conduct oil exploration in the Reed Bank, just 80 nautical
miles west of the Philippine island of Palawan. The survey ship was in the process of
identifying sites for possible appraisal wells to be drilled for the next phase of a contract
with the Philippine Department of Energy, when it was accosted.
According to Philippine sources, the Chinese boats moved dangerously close to the
Philippine vessel twice, as they ordered it to leave the area. Then, the Chinese boats
maneuvered straight toward the survey vessel two times, apparently threatening to ram
it, but turned away in time. The unarmed survey vessel radioed for assistance to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Western Command in Palawan, and the
Philippine Air Force (PAF) dispatched two reconnaissance planes to fly over the area.
The Chinese patrol boats, however, had left the area before the aircraft arrived.After
due diplomatic consultations between both sides, Philippine President Benigno Aquino
III said that he wanted to defuse the tension between the two countries and announced
that an unarmed Philippine Coast Guard patrol craft would be deployed to protect the
survey ship conducting oil exploration at the Reed Bank.
In other words, it was all he could do; despite his countrys sovereignty getting violated
in the Exclusive Economic Zone that stretched 200 kilometers into the ocean in blatant
terms, that was all he could do. Meanwhile, Chinese embassy officials in Manila
insisted that China had indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands (Spratlys)
and their adjacent maritime territory. China was blind to the fact that the claims are
disputed and the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea)
stipulates 200nm EEZ rights to the Philippines.
China has ratified the convention but with riders attached that gives it exclusive
sovereignty on the disputed islands which means exclusive EEZ rights (though that
may overlap with EEZ claims made by others under the provisions of the same
convention!) and has reaffirmed that, the provisions of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea concerning innocent passage through the territorial sea shall not
prejudice the right of a coastal State to request, in accordance with its laws and
regulations, a foreign State to obtain advance approval from or give prior notification to
the coastal State for the passage of its warships through the territorial sea of the coastal
State.
In other words, the Freedom of the Seas as enjoyed by traditional maritime powers like
US would require Chinese approval or at least notifying China, if the US Navy or some
other forces ever has to pass through the SCS. Clearly US is vehemently against this.
Writes Walter Lohman in another opinion piece in The Heritage Foundation portal:
(Freedom of the Seas) is bedrock, non-negotiable interest of the United States. The U.S.
is the worlds preeminent seafaring nation. When it comes to the South China Sea
through which half of global shipping and most of Northeast Asias energy supplies
transitits position is consistent: All nations enjoy navigational rights and freedoms
there that are qualitatively and quantitatively the same as those applicable on the high
seas.
The caveat is here: SCS is a vital shipping lane and by far the shortest route from the
North Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. The worlds second busiest international sealane,
with over half of the worlds petroleum-bearing traffic passing through, the region
boasts of rich fishery resources, and is widely said to hold enormous potential as a
source of oil and natural gas.
Clearly, it is a region that the US cannot ignore as long as it cares about its multi-faceted
national interests. If the US, by far thousands of kilometers away from the region, is
finding the region to be important, one can only sigh at the enormous interest China
has in the Sea; Chinas vulnerable backyard.It also tells us why China is reluctant to
involve third parties in the issue; especially the US.
The United States was among the nations that participated in the third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which took place from 1973 through 1982
and resulted in the international treaty known as the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The United States also participated in the subsequent
negotiations of modifications to the treaty from 1990 to 1994. The UNCLOS came into
force in 1994. Although the United States now recognizes the UNCLOS as a
codification of customary international law, it has not ratified it.From national
sovereignty to taxation to economics, a variety of arguments is doing rounds for the
non-ratification of treaty by the United States.
Writes David A. Ridenour in an article:
there are serious flaws in the treaty that -
if U.S. ratified the treaty - could place U.S. sovereignty, security and political
independence in doubt. The "right of innocent passage" is the right of any
nation's ships to traverse continuously and expeditiously through the territorial
waters of a coastal nation, subject to certain conditions. Under the Law of the Sea
Treaty, such passage is conditioned on passing in a manner that isn't threatening to
"sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence" or the "good order and
security" of that nation.
By this definition, if the Law of the Sea Treaty was a ship, it would fail to qualify.
he elaborates. So clearly there are tussles: While states like Philippines and China
interpret the UNCLOS in their own terms that foments episodes of uncalled-for
provocations, pre-eminent sea faring powers like the US are reluctant to cede the
traditional rights that they have enjoyed for decades. Both these tussles are shaping
the nature of future conflicts in the South China Sea.
In a 1998 Pacific Forum CSIS paper titled, Security Implications of Conflict in the South
China Sea: Exploring Potential Triggers of Conflict, prepared by Ralph A. Cossa it is
said, the proximity of the Spratlys to South China Sea shipping lanes adds an
important strategic element to the dispute. A threat to freedom of passage through the
South China Seas would severely disrupt regional economies. If, during any military
action in the Spratlys--or, for that matter, in the course of defining its claim over the
currently occupied or coveted territory--any nation threatened to inhibit the free flow of
maritime traffic along these critical SLOCs (Sea lines of communication), the U.S. would
almost certainly become involved since America's economic growth and security
depend upon continued freedom of navigation for both merchant and military
shipping. Other nations heavily dependent on maritime commerce could be expected to
at least endorse, if not actively participate in, any U.S.-led enforcement of freedom of
navigation along the South China Sea's heavily-traveled sea lanes.
Profound and prophetic!
Meanwhile, The Wall Street Journal has reported that Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao
reluctantly discussed the issue with 17 other leaders at the East Asia Summit in Bali,
Indonesia, on Saturday (November 20, 2011) while restating China's position that it was
an inappropriate forum to address the matter, according to U.S. and Chinese official
accounts of the meeting.
The reported noted that Five Asean membersSingapore, Philippines, Vietnam,
Malaysia and Thailandas well as Australia and India raised the South China Sea issue
directly with the Chinese Premier. (Meanwhile, a U.S. official denied that he had
lobbied other attendees to put the South China Sea on the agenda.)
China's state-run Xinhua news agency quoted Mr. Wen saying: "I don't want to discuss
this issue at the summit. However, leaders of some countries mentioned China on the
issue. It's impolite not to make a return for what one receives. So, I am willing to
reiterate China's stance. The Wall Street Journal said.
Axial shift in the stand of small littoral states
To involve US in the issue is an axial shift in the stand of all the littoral states that has
cemented their grouping under the ASEAN umbrella. This is because the Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea proved to be an ineffectual angle. As
per the crux of the declaration signed by ASEAN and China in 2002:
 The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional
disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force,
through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly
concerned, in accordance with universally recognized principles of international
law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;
 The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that
would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including,
among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited
islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a
constructive manner.
This has sporadically been violated by China many times. No wonder ASEAN sent the
SOS to US.
Password: Philippines
This incident (Reed Bank incident)and at least eight others since February 25
underscores the sensitivity of the territorial dispute in the bilateral PhilippinesChina
relationship; highlights broader tensions in the South China Sea, which is claimed in
whole or part by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan; and
starkly points to the continued relevance of the obligations embodied in the 1951 U.S.
Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. Renato De Castro and Walter Lohman added.
It has to be noted that, U.S.-Philippine relations are based on shared history and
commitment to democratic principles, as well as on economic ties.
The historical and cultural links between the Philippines and the United States remain
strong. The Philippines modeled its governmental institutions on those of the United
States and continues to share a commitment to democracy and human rights. At the
most fundamental level of bilateral relations, human links continue to form a strong
bridge between the two countries. (There are an estimated four million Americans of
Philippine ancestry in the United States, and more than 300,000 American citizens in the
Philippines.)
Until November 1992, pursuant to the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, the United States
maintained and operated major facilities at Clark Air Base, Subic Bay Naval Complex,
and several small subsidiary installations in the Philippines. In August 1991, negotiators
from the two countries reached agreement on a draft treaty providing for use of Subic
Bay Naval Base by U.S. forces for 10 years
The post-U.S. bases era has seen U.S.-Philippine relations improved and broadened,
with a prominent focus on economic and commercial ties while maintaining the
importance of the security dimension. U.S. investment continues to play an important
role in the Philippine economy, while a strong security relationship rests on the 1952
U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). In February 1998, U.S. and Philippine
negotiators concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), paving the way for
increased military cooperation under the MDT. The agreement was approved by the
Philippine Senate in May 1999 and entered into force on June 1, 1999. Under the VFA,
the United States has conducted ship visits to Philippine ports and resumed large
combined military exercises with Philippine forces.
In October 2003, the United States designated the Philippines as a Major Non-NATO
Ally. That same month, the Philippines joined the select group of countries to have
ratified all 12 UN counterterrorism conventions.
The military relation between both states has been gaining traction and China may
backtrack if not launch another round of charm offensive for a while to pacify the
situation in SCS. Estranging its neighbors may not prove good for China and Beijing
knows this well. In the same breath, estranging China is not good for other littoral
states.
While the core problem is a regional one, global issues and concerns are raised that
could have far-reaching consequences. Today, all parties have a vested interest in a
peaceful resolution of the dispute. As a result, the prospects for conflict seem low in the
near term. However, the potential for conflict remains and could grow, especially if
potential triggers of conflict are not clearly understood and avoided. the paper
Security Implications of Conflict in the South China Sea: Exploring Potential Triggers of
Conflict, prepared by Ralph A. Cossa cautioned.
While the prospects of military confrontation over the Spratlys remains low, it would
be naive to completely rule out the possibility of the use of force. This is especially so if
major oil discoveries are made or if energy shortages add to the perceived (even if
unproven) importance of the Spratlys. It said, and added. If it were positively
determined tomorrow that there was no exploitable oil in the Spratlys, the dispute
would not go away; no claimant would, as a result of such news, abandon its claim
the bottom line issue is still sovereignty.
With the US declaring the Pacific Century in a big way, it is not going to be deluded by
the charm offensive that China may launch. With Canberra in tight embrace and Manila
joining the stable, the US will continue to make its presence felt in the traditional
Chinese zone of influence. The question is whether other ASEAN members would start
talking Filipino? Well, that depends a lot on China.