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The Opening Round – 1948 Air War |
On 26 October 1947 the Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir declared accession of his Muslim majority state to India in complete disregard of the principles enunciated in the documents concerning partition. He invited Indian Military help to crush his Muslim subjects’ uprising and the very next day, on 27 October, Indian forces moved into the state, thus exposing a pre-conceived plan for the occupation of Kashmir. When news of the Maharaja’s accession spread, Gilgit staged a bloodless coup and, at he invitation of local chieftains, Pakistan sent a political agent to to administer the area. Simultaneously, the people of Poonch and Mirpur districts formed the Azad Kashmir Government at Muzaffarabad. India immediately flew her army into the state to confront the Azad Kashmir forces. Gilgit Agency was totally cut off, and Pakistan as left with no option except to move its armed forces forward to protect certain strategic positions close to the border. The Indian Air Force also went into action, not only to harass the Azad forces but also to intimidate the isolated population of Gilgit Agency into surrender. A substantial number of Pakistan’s military stores were still stuck up in Indian warehouses and now India became more obstructive about releasing them. The RPAF was severely handicapped, with only 16 Tempests on its strength against the IAF’s 68. Furthermore, the Pakistan government had prohibited their employment in order to avoid a full scale air war. The RPAF could, however, endeavour to respond to the SOS calls for supplies from the besieged people of Gilgit and from the Azad Kashmir forces struggling against he Indian army. The Valley Shuttle Starts The four months old air force had only 2 war-worn Dakotas in serviceable condition when the first call for help came in December 47. There was hardly any maintenance support at hand and, above all, the pilots had no experience whatsoever in supply dropping. These handicaps, however, failed to daunt the crews of 6 Squadron who accepted the challenge with exemplary courage and launched their mercy mission without delay. One of the 2 Dakotas, with a set of aircrew and a ground party, were immediately detached to Risalpur, where it was to operate under the command of Wing Commander M Asghar Khan, the first commandant of the RPAF College. The task of this single-aircaft detachment was not an easy one. The worn out aircraft could not climb beyond 10,000 feet, while the supply dropping demands of the 250,000 besieged people were unimaginably large and urgent. Also, there was no replacement aicraft in the event of a mishap. The care and maintenance, and handling in the air, called for all the skills that the detachment possessed. With its ceiling limitation, the only course for the Dakota to reach Chilas, Bunji, Gilgit and Skardu, the main drop zones, was to fly into and along the Indus valley. The valley itself is flanked by peaks ranging from 7,000 to 17,000 feet, and it is so narrow that a large aircraft like the Dakota cold hardly turn around in it; there was no patch of ground fit for an emergency landing. The weather in the valley had always been very changeable and, in 1947-1948, there was no forecasting facility to cover this area. The captain of the aircraft had to make a very hard decision when faced with bad weather, weighing the risks to his aircraft against the desperate need of the intended recipients of his load. The operation involved yet another hazard: the Indian Air Force was operating freely in Kashmir; IAF planes had already strafed Azad Kashmir army positions and bombed undefended towns in the Gilgit Agency. Their fighters patrolled the skies over this territory without any possible interference from the Pakistan Air Force. No fighter escort could be provided to the Dakotas as the Pakistan government wanted to avoid any incident leading to escalation; its chief concern at the time was consolidation of independence. In early December 47 the first sortie, captained by Flying Officer S M A Shah was a complete success, and it paved the way for a regular air supply shuttle service operating daily from dawn to dusk. The solitary aircraft would start early in the morning, winding its perilous way along the tortuous Indus valley, often successfully skirting patches of threatening weather, occasionally slamming headlong into them, evermindful of the need to maintain a respectfull distance from the jagged peaks crowding the aircraft and its plucky crew. The first stage of this modest but vital airlift concluded successfully on 15 April 48. But the demand for supplies had, in the meantime, grown beyond the operational capacity of a single aircraft and 2 more Dakotas had been made serviceable; these were added to the detachment which by now had become aptly known as the ‘Valley Flight’. By October 48 the Pakistan Army’s demands outstripped the capacity of even the expanded detachment, and the rest of 6 Squadron was moved from Mauripur to Peshawar where its Risalpur detachment also joined it. The Defenceless Dakota At about this time, the Indians, stung by the reverses suffered by their land forces, increased their air patrols over the area. The RPAF aircrew were warned by their commanders to expect IAF fighter interference from then on. Before long, 2 Indian Tempests appeared over Chilas to challenge an RPAF Dakota returning from a para drop mission near Skardu. Flying Officer Mukhtar Ahmad Dogar was the captain and his crew included an under-training navigator, Pilot Officer Munir and Sergeant S M Mohsin, the air signaller. Also on board were Flying Officer Alfred Jagjivan, another under-training navigator, the air supply ejection crew including Naik Mohammad Din of the army, and 3,500 lbs of load. Dogar tells us: “I took off in the early morning of 4 November 48. The weather was fine and our spirits were high. Winding my way through the now familiar Indus valley, I para-dropped my load over a sandy bed near Skardu. Pleased with yet another successful mission, I had given the controls over to Flying Officer Jagjivan on the way back so that I could relax a little. We were somewhere over over Chilas when I sighted 2 Tempests above us and I first took them for our own aircraft. In the drop area I had no visual warning from our army posts about the presence of enemy aircraft and our own Tempests did occasionally sneak over to cavort in the bracing neighourhood of Nanga Parbat. It was only when these fighters came close that I discovered their true identity and quickly took over the controls; the Indians seemed to grudge me the momentary relaxation which I thought I had earned. “The valley at Chilas is about 4 to 5 miles wide permitting easy manoeuvring of an aircraft, and I weaved along in the direction of Risalpur. On the radio the Tempests ordered me to go to the nearest Indian air field but I took no notice of this. The order was repeated three times bit I did not respond. At this point the Indians threatened to shoot me down if I did not comply, and they fired a free burst to show that they were armed. I pressed on regardless, at full throttle, my main concern being to get to the narrower portion of the valley as quickly as possible. “The army personnel on board were feeling rather queasy by now with all my evasive manoeuvring and, ignorant of the situation outside, requested me to ease off; they appeared to be under the impression that I was trying to impress them with my skill! A fateful realisation came over them when they learnt that I was fighting not only for my own life but for theirs too, and they quickly returned to their seats. Flying Officer Jagjivan and Naik Mohammad Din, however, stood watching from the open doorway of the aircraft, blissfully unaware of what was to come to them a minute later. You’ll Never Get Me! “At this time, one of the Indians broke off, gained a little height and came in to attack. He obviously meant business now and fired a full burst of 20mm at us, fatally wounding Naik Mohammad Din and knocking Jagjivan unconscious with a profusely bleeding arm. By now, I had got to the narrow neck of the valley and had asked air signaller Mohsin to stand up in the astrohatch and kick me every time he saw the fighters coming in for a kill. Thrice I was kicked and thrice, with quick half throttle, full flaps and left rudder I successfully eluded death. I had come down to deck level now, scraping almost along the river’s surface but well out of the fighters’ reach. A feeling of relative security sometimes inspires defiant talk and I found myself calling out to the Indians: if you haven’t got me so far you will never get me! They seemed to agree and pushed off. “The encounter had lasted twenty to twenty five minutes. Earlier, when the Indian pilots had asked me to go to the nearest Indian airfield they had felt too sure of having air-arrested me. But for me it was a question not only of ‘to be or not to be’, but also one of the Pakistan’s prestige. Looking back I can only say that we were lucky, unarmed as we were, to reach home base at all.” For this outstanding act of gallantry Dogar was awarded the Sitara-e-Jurat. Dusk to Dawn Although the encounter constituted something of a triumph for the infant RPAF, daylight operations by Dakotas were forthwith suspended by Air Headquarters for obvious reasons. Wing Commander Asghar Khan and OC 6 Squadron immediately decided to explore the extremely hazardous prospects of night navigation and supply drops in that narrow and winding valley. The aircrew were given concentrated night flying practice in the hilly region near Peshawar and on the night of 17/18 November 48, a proving flight was flown with Asghar Khan himself on board. Its manifest success was quickly exploited with two more missions on the same night. And so started an instant night air drop operation which would normally have taken weeks, if not months, to plan, practice and master. The shuttle would start at dusk and continue through the night till the last Dokata landed back at Peshawar in the grey light of dawn. The relatively low intensity of night operations, however, could not hope to keep pace with the ever increasing demand, and something else had to be thought up – and fast. Just about the same time, the RPAF had acquired 2 old Halifax bombers with some vague strategic objective in mind. These were now quickly pressed into service and locally modified for supply drop operations. The risk to these aircraft during day operations in the Indian-patrolled valley was considered minimal as the Halifaxes could fly direct to the drop zones, high across the mountaine ranges, and thus hope to escape detection. Besides, they were armed with a detached Lewis machine gun carried in the front and a Bren gun in the tail. High Flying Halifaxes Flight Lieutenant A K S Ahmed spearheaded these operations as he was the most experienced pilot in 6 Squadron at the time but, needless to say, all the aircrew who flew these missions, as well as the army despatchers who accompanied them, demonstrated great disregard of, if not contempt for, personal safety. The Halifaxes were fairly old machines and in case of an emergency, the jagged terrain offered no prospects for a forced landing – only the certainty of a crash. Moreover, if spotted by Indian fighters, the large and sluggish bomber would be an easy prey. Even basic manoeuvring in the narrow drop zones demanded exceptional skill and judgement, but the RPAF pilots had vowed to see these operations through to a successful end. During one particular supply drop at Skardu, Flight Lieutenant Ahmed was warned by the secret radio network specially set up for this purpose that 3 Indian Tempests were lurking in the area. Ahmed quickly completed his drop, climbed away with full power and managed to avoid interception by remaining inside cloud till he reached 20,000 feet. The Harvards Chip In While the Halifaxes and Dakotas kept up a relentless cycle of air drops by day and night respectively, the abandoned landing grounds at Gilgit and Skardu were brought into commission, permitting operation of small aircraft, and Harvards from Peshawar and Risalpur, armed with a single .303 machine gun each, joined the operations. They were used to convey army command and staff personnel, and light loads, to these airstrips, sometimes diverting over enemy areas for reconnaissance. Because of their small size they were considered less vulnerable to detection by Indian fighters and their manoeuvrability gave them excellent chances of successful evasive action. The biggest danger to them was while they were on the ground at either destination when they would be sitting ducks for a roving Indian patrol. The hub of the Kashmir operations were the RPAF stations of Risalpur and later Peshawar which provided all the admin and maintenance facilities to the 6 Squadron detachment. The preparation of load pallets, their loading, lashing and ejection from the aircraft was conducted by 603 Company, RPASC (air dispatch) unit of Pakistan Army. The latter were in constant competition with 6 Squadron to produce loads faster then the squadron could drop them! It was the team work and dedication of the two contingents together which enabled this series of operations to be brought to a succesful close: by the end of December 48, air drops alone had involved four hundred and thirty seven sorties to deliver 1,036,470 lbs of critical supplies at Bunji, Astor, Burzi, Gilgit Chilas and Skardu. With their pioneering exploits, the transport crews set very exacting standards of daring and enterprise in the very first year of the RPAF’s life; in the decades to come, their example would inspire their successors to even greater heights of courage and initiative. The Cease Fire Pakistan, like India, was still a dominion in the Commonwealth and the C-in-Cs of all its 3 defence services were British, as were several other key officers. Pakistan had received an unmistakable warning from whitehall that in the case of open hostilities with India, all British personnel would be withdrawn immediately and the delivery of military equipment ordered in the UK would be withheld. In the absence of military supplies from abroad, the army’s ammunition stocks would have lasted barely a fortnight of action in Kashmir; army cover for the rest of West Pakistan would have been nominal and East Pakistan would have remained undefended. As for any offensive use of the RPAF, the comparative figures in the table below speak for themselves:
An open war with India was clearly unthinkable, and Pakistan continued, as a matter of principle as well as imperatives, to seek redress through the United Nations. The Foreign Office had duly informed the Security Council in Paris on 24 November 48 that the RPAF had not been used in a combat role and that unless the Indian offensive was halted Pakistan would have to undertake a full scale counter offensive. On new year’s day, 1949 a UN-sponsored cease fire, approved by the governments of both Pakistan and India, was put into effect, which halted all offensive operations along the line of control. The cease fire brought only a temporary relief to the crews of 6 Squadron who had soon to resume air supply operations in the same area, but now for a peaceful purpose. The winter snows had as usual blocked the tenuous road links with the northern areas, and the problem of feeding and clothing the refugees from occupied Kashmir and of consolidation of army positions along the line of control, demanded an indefinite continuation of the air supply system the RPAF had evolved. The only difference the cease fire had made was that their unarmed aircraft would now not to be liable to attack by enemy fighters. In due course, 6 Squadron’s vital air link with these areas became a permanent feature, and continues to this day, as does their comrade like team-work with 603 Company. On 1 January 49, the Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr Liaquat Ali Khan in a letter to the Services’ Chiefs said: “Both as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, I wish to express my appreciation and gratitude, and those of the Government and people of Pakistan, for the efforts you have made to ensure the defence of Pakistan during the past eight months. I fully realise how difficult your task has been regard to both the type of terrain and the climatic conditions in which you have been operating; also, that for political reasons your operational role has been purely defensive… “To the RPAF who took part, I would say that I also realise how great a strain was imposed upon you by denial of a combatant role, the lack of fighter protection and the hazards of weather and other adverse conditions you faced in maintaining the air lift, on which the people of Gilgit mainly depend for their sustenance during these winter months. Under these conditions your work has been admirable.” |
