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Taliban-Kabul talks begin

A-Team

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Interesting article by well known Pakistan diplomat. Basically he is saying that the Talis and NUG have established a direct channel of communication bypassing Islamabad, a country that hosted them and a policy that brought nothing but bad name to Pakistan and massive economic hardships and now the Talis are bypassing them and Pakistan has no say in the final outcome.

Good work for scoring an own-goal. Imagine if Pakistan worked with the Afghan state from the very beginning and not relying on Talis, how the situation would have been different.

Anyways not too late yet to call your losses and change Pak policies vis-a-vis Afghanistan.

http://tribune.com.pk/story/1203667/taliban-kabul-talks-begin/

______________________________________

On the 15th anniversary of the US invasion of Afghanistan, talks between representatives of Taliban and the Afghan Government have taken place in Doha, Qatar. Several rounds of talks had been held in late September and early October. The Afghan side was led by Mr Stanikzai, Afghan chief of Intelligence, while the Taliban team also included brother of the late Mullah Omar. A US representative also participated in the negotiations.

Taliban agreeing to meet with Kabul government’s and US officials is a slight modification of their stance on the issue of parleys with the Afghan Government. After the death of Mullah Mansoor, the movement had resolved not to sit for talks with government representatives or with the Americans. It appears that those in favour of entering into negotiations have prevailed. An important dimension of the interaction is the near-absence of Pakistani mediators. The Doha round of talks has been preceded by arrests, in Pakistan,of a number of top ranking leaders of the Taliban movement mainly in Balochistan’s Pakhtun areas.

The direct contacts between Taliban and the Kabul regime also show that communication channels have been established between the two entities—bypassing Islamabad. This is seen as a major victory for Kabul in its endeavours to seek direct access to the Taliban leadership without soliciting help from Islamabad. The Doha talks also show the deepening distrust between the Taliban and Pakistani officials. A breakdown of Islamabad-Kabul contacts is another factor that forced Ashraf Ghani’s government to intensify efforts to engage the Taliban in negotiations.

Perhaps the most important cause of the Kabul government’s keenness to open talks with the Taliban is the relentless offensive launched by the latter in recent weeks and the impending fears of the fall of many towns both in North Afghanistan as well as the Taliban’s strongholds of Helmand, Kabul is also genuinely worried about any escalation in the number of defections from the army and the police in the wake of the Taliban advances into government, held areas across the country.

But the Doha engagement would pose problems for the Taliban if the talks don’t deliver any tangible outcome. That is highly doubtful. Because the fundamental issue is a timetable for withdrawal of all foreign forces. The US Administration and the Kabul government are not desperately keen to organise the withdrawal of coalition forces for a host of reasons. Unless there is a change of policy or perception, either in the US or in the Afghan Government on this critical issue, there is no hope of any convergence of views between the Taliban and their interlocutors.

But as mentioned earlier the Taliban would face a dilemma, whether to remain part of a process that does not hold any real promise for reconciliation and risk losing volunteers or to withdraw and focus on continuing their struggle to score military victories in the face of heavy odds.

If the talks continue without any signs of real progress, the Kabul regime could use the interregnum to establish links and try to wean some Taliban activists from the main body led by Haibatulla Akhunzada. The regime could also tap into the differences in the Taliban hierarchy and help cause wider disaffection. On the other hand, the faction that does not support any contacts with the government could, in the event of prolonged and protracted negotiations, mount pressure on the top leadership for a boycott of the political process. In either case if the Taliban unity is in jeopardy — it will be a tremendous morale booster for the regime and its forces.

There is no immediate prospect for any significant development in the reconciliation endeavours. But for both sides so much is at stake in terms of whether each side would be able to demonstrate to the people and to the world that it has achieved a degree of success at the expense of the other. This has more serious ramifications for the Taliban than the Afghan Government because Kabul is not seen as the sole arbiter of decisions relating to the insurgency. On the other hand, the Taliban are now viewed as taking their own decisions after Islamabad launched a drive to arrest the movement’s leadership.

Pakistan losing its leverage with its erstwhile allies will have many implications as the Afghan conundrum escalates with Islamabad not having any clear vision or formula on how to help mainstream the Taliban on terms that are mutually agreeable to all. It is a failure that will haunt Pakistan for years to come.
 
Interesting article by well known Pakistan diplomat. Basically he is saying that the Talis and NUG have established a direct channel of communication bypassing Islamabad, a country that hosted them and a policy that brought nothing but bad name to Pakistan and massive economic hardships and now the Talis are bypassing them and Pakistan has no say in the final outcome.

Good work for scoring an own-goal. Imagine if Pakistan worked with the Afghan state from the very beginning and not relying on Talis, how the situation would have been different.

Anyways not too late yet to call your losses and change Pak policies vis-a-vis Afghanistan.

http://tribune.com.pk/story/1203667/taliban-kabul-talks-begin/

______________________________________

On the 15th anniversary of the US invasion of Afghanistan, talks between representatives of Taliban and the Afghan Government have taken place in Doha, Qatar. Several rounds of talks had been held in late September and early October. The Afghan side was led by Mr Stanikzai, Afghan chief of Intelligence, while the Taliban team also included brother of the late Mullah Omar. A US representative also participated in the negotiations.

Taliban agreeing to meet with Kabul government’s and US officials is a slight modification of their stance on the issue of parleys with the Afghan Government. After the death of Mullah Mansoor, the movement had resolved not to sit for talks with government representatives or with the Americans. It appears that those in favour of entering into negotiations have prevailed. An important dimension of the interaction is the near-absence of Pakistani mediators. The Doha round of talks has been preceded by arrests, in Pakistan,of a number of top ranking leaders of the Taliban movement mainly in Balochistan’s Pakhtun areas.

The direct contacts between Taliban and the Kabul regime also show that communication channels have been established between the two entities—bypassing Islamabad. This is seen as a major victory for Kabul in its endeavours to seek direct access to the Taliban leadership without soliciting help from Islamabad. The Doha talks also show the deepening distrust between the Taliban and Pakistani officials. A breakdown of Islamabad-Kabul contacts is another factor that forced Ashraf Ghani’s government to intensify efforts to engage the Taliban in negotiations.

Perhaps the most important cause of the Kabul government’s keenness to open talks with the Taliban is the relentless offensive launched by the latter in recent weeks and the impending fears of the fall of many towns both in North Afghanistan as well as the Taliban’s strongholds of Helmand, Kabul is also genuinely worried about any escalation in the number of defections from the army and the police in the wake of the Taliban advances into government, held areas across the country.

But the Doha engagement would pose problems for the Taliban if the talks don’t deliver any tangible outcome. That is highly doubtful. Because the fundamental issue is a timetable for withdrawal of all foreign forces. The US Administration and the Kabul government are not desperately keen to organise the withdrawal of coalition forces for a host of reasons. Unless there is a change of policy or perception, either in the US or in the Afghan Government on this critical issue, there is no hope of any convergence of views between the Taliban and their interlocutors.

But as mentioned earlier the Taliban would face a dilemma, whether to remain part of a process that does not hold any real promise for reconciliation and risk losing volunteers or to withdraw and focus on continuing their struggle to score military victories in the face of heavy odds.

If the talks continue without any signs of real progress, the Kabul regime could use the interregnum to establish links and try to wean some Taliban activists from the main body led by Haibatulla Akhunzada. The regime could also tap into the differences in the Taliban hierarchy and help cause wider disaffection. On the other hand, the faction that does not support any contacts with the government could, in the event of prolonged and protracted negotiations, mount pressure on the top leadership for a boycott of the political process. In either case if the Taliban unity is in jeopardy — it will be a tremendous morale booster for the regime and its forces.

There is no immediate prospect for any significant development in the reconciliation endeavours. But for both sides so much is at stake in terms of whether each side would be able to demonstrate to the people and to the world that it has achieved a degree of success at the expense of the other. This has more serious ramifications for the Taliban than the Afghan Government because Kabul is not seen as the sole arbiter of decisions relating to the insurgency. On the other hand, the Taliban are now viewed as taking their own decisions after Islamabad launched a drive to arrest the movement’s leadership.

Pakistan losing its leverage with its erstwhile allies will have many implications as the Afghan conundrum escalates with Islamabad not having any clear vision or formula on how to help mainstream the Taliban on terms that are mutually agreeable to all. It is a failure that will haunt Pakistan for years to come.
Do you know views of this gentlemen regarding Taliban?
 
Interesting article by well known Pakistan diplomat. Basically he is saying that the Talis and NUG have established a direct channel of communication bypassing Islamabad, a country that hosted them and a policy that brought nothing but bad name to Pakistan and massive economic hardships and now the Talis are bypassing them and Pakistan has no say in the final outcome.

Good work for scoring an own-goal. Imagine if Pakistan worked with the Afghan state from the very beginning and not relying on Talis, how the situation would have been different.

Anyways not too late yet to call your losses and change Pak policies vis-a-vis Afghanistan.

http://tribune.com.pk/story/1203667/taliban-kabul-talks-begin/

______________________________________

On the 15th anniversary of the US invasion of Afghanistan, talks between representatives of Taliban and the Afghan Government have taken place in Doha, Qatar. Several rounds of talks had been held in late September and early October. The Afghan side was led by Mr Stanikzai, Afghan chief of Intelligence, while the Taliban team also included brother of the late Mullah Omar. A US representative also participated in the negotiations.

Taliban agreeing to meet with Kabul government’s and US officials is a slight modification of their stance on the issue of parleys with the Afghan Government. After the death of Mullah Mansoor, the movement had resolved not to sit for talks with government representatives or with the Americans. It appears that those in favour of entering into negotiations have prevailed. An important dimension of the interaction is the near-absence of Pakistani mediators. The Doha round of talks has been preceded by arrests, in Pakistan,of a number of top ranking leaders of the Taliban movement mainly in Balochistan’s Pakhtun areas.

The direct contacts between Taliban and the Kabul regime also show that communication channels have been established between the two entities—bypassing Islamabad. This is seen as a major victory for Kabul in its endeavours to seek direct access to the Taliban leadership without soliciting help from Islamabad. The Doha talks also show the deepening distrust between the Taliban and Pakistani officials. A breakdown of Islamabad-Kabul contacts is another factor that forced Ashraf Ghani’s government to intensify efforts to engage the Taliban in negotiations.

Perhaps the most important cause of the Kabul government’s keenness to open talks with the Taliban is the relentless offensive launched by the latter in recent weeks and the impending fears of the fall of many towns both in North Afghanistan as well as the Taliban’s strongholds of Helmand, Kabul is also genuinely worried about any escalation in the number of defections from the army and the police in the wake of the Taliban advances into government, held areas across the country.

But the Doha engagement would pose problems for the Taliban if the talks don’t deliver any tangible outcome. That is highly doubtful. Because the fundamental issue is a timetable for withdrawal of all foreign forces. The US Administration and the Kabul government are not desperately keen to organise the withdrawal of coalition forces for a host of reasons. Unless there is a change of policy or perception, either in the US or in the Afghan Government on this critical issue, there is no hope of any convergence of views between the Taliban and their interlocutors.

But as mentioned earlier the Taliban would face a dilemma, whether to remain part of a process that does not hold any real promise for reconciliation and risk losing volunteers or to withdraw and focus on continuing their struggle to score military victories in the face of heavy odds.

If the talks continue without any signs of real progress, the Kabul regime could use the interregnum to establish links and try to wean some Taliban activists from the main body led by Haibatulla Akhunzada. The regime could also tap into the differences in the Taliban hierarchy and help cause wider disaffection. On the other hand, the faction that does not support any contacts with the government could, in the event of prolonged and protracted negotiations, mount pressure on the top leadership for a boycott of the political process. In either case if the Taliban unity is in jeopardy — it will be a tremendous morale booster for the regime and its forces.

There is no immediate prospect for any significant development in the reconciliation endeavours. But for both sides so much is at stake in terms of whether each side would be able to demonstrate to the people and to the world that it has achieved a degree of success at the expense of the other. This has more serious ramifications for the Taliban than the Afghan Government because Kabul is not seen as the sole arbiter of decisions relating to the insurgency. On the other hand, the Taliban are now viewed as taking their own decisions after Islamabad launched a drive to arrest the movement’s leadership.

Pakistan losing its leverage with its erstwhile allies will have many implications as the Afghan conundrum escalates with Islamabad not having any clear vision or formula on how to help mainstream the Taliban on terms that are mutually agreeable to all. It is a failure that will haunt Pakistan for years to come.

Even without reading i can bet if he said something like this "country that hosted them and a policy that brought nothing but bad name to Pakistan and massive economic hardships".Gone through article he is trying to say :
1) how to help mainstream the Taliban on terms that are mutually agreeable to all (He is trying to say we failed in helping Taliban to gain weight in Political solution which everybody knows under this constitution it will never happen)
2) I think you know his views better he is neither Gul Khan nor Gul Marjan :P. In fact he used to blame Pakistan Establishment that we are not helping Taliban and we have betrayed them .
3) When sent for negotiations with TTP on his return he said government should pay to them for the loss o_O.

In essence he is saying we don not have any influence on Taliban nor on Afg Government/USA .
 
Good work for scoring an own-goal. Imagine if Pakistan worked with the Afghan state from the very beginning and not relying on Talis, how the situation would have been different.

Three Afghan Taliban leaders arrested
By Tahir Khan
Published: October 12, 2016
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PHOTO: FILE

ISLAMABAD: Three key members of the Afghan Taliban, including Ahmadullah Muti alias Mullah Nanai who served as intelligence chief under Mullah Akhtar Mansoor have been arrested, two Taliban leaders confirmed to The Express Tribune late Tuesday.

The Taliban leaders said Nanai was picked up three days ago from Balochistan. Suleman Agha, the Taliban governor for Daykund province, and Mullah Sani, also known as Samad Sani, chief of a religious school and a well-known trader, who have links with the Taliban, have also been taken into custody, they added on the condition of anonymity.

Former TTP leader Azam Tariq killed in Afghanistan

There was no official word on the arrests. However, some sources have confided to The Express Tribune that the arrests have been made after the Taliban had ‘refused’ to start peace talks with the government. A Taliban source said at least eight Taliban leaders have been arrested from different parts of Balochistan in recent days.

“Several senior leaders, including Amir Khan Muttaqi, former information minister during the Taliban rule, have gone into hiding,” he said.

Mullah Nanai, some Taliban sources say, was recently appointed as the Taliban Chief Justice by Maulvi Haibatullah. He was one of the few top Taliban leaders who had been involved in wooing dissident Taliban leaders to declare support for Akhtar Mansour.

Sri Lanka cricket team attack mastermind ‘killed’ in Afghanistan

The arrests have been made at a time when the Taliban have intensified attacks in parts of Afghanistan. A credible source close to the Taliban said the “Pakistani crackdown” is linked to the Taliban’s refusal to come to the negotiating table”.

He said Pakistan had recently “approached” the Taliban and asked them to join the peace process. However, they reiterated their stance to not talk to the government.

Published in The Express Tribune, October 12th, 2016.

http://tribune.com.pk/story/1197663/3-afghan-taliban-leaders-arrested/
 
Interesting article by well known Pakistan diplomat. Basically he is saying that the Talis and NUG have established a direct channel of communication bypassing Islamabad, a country that hosted them and a policy that brought nothing but bad name to Pakistan and massive economic hardships and now the Talis are bypassing them and Pakistan has no say in the final outcome.

Good work for scoring an own-goal. Imagine if Pakistan worked with the Afghan state from the very beginning and not relying on Talis, how the situation would have been different.

Anyways not too late yet to call your losses and change Pak policies vis-a-vis Afghanistan.

http://tribune.com.pk/story/1203667/taliban-kabul-talks-begin/

______________________________________

On the 15th anniversary of the US invasion of Afghanistan, talks between representatives of Taliban and the Afghan Government have taken place in Doha, Qatar. Several rounds of talks had been held in late September and early October. The Afghan side was led by Mr Stanikzai, Afghan chief of Intelligence, while the Taliban team also included brother of the late Mullah Omar. A US representative also participated in the negotiations.

Taliban agreeing to meet with Kabul government’s and US officials is a slight modification of their stance on the issue of parleys with the Afghan Government. After the death of Mullah Mansoor, the movement had resolved not to sit for talks with government representatives or with the Americans. It appears that those in favour of entering into negotiations have prevailed. An important dimension of the interaction is the near-absence of Pakistani mediators. The Doha round of talks has been preceded by arrests, in Pakistan,of a number of top ranking leaders of the Taliban movement mainly in Balochistan’s Pakhtun areas.

The direct contacts between Taliban and the Kabul regime also show that communication channels have been established between the two entities—bypassing Islamabad. This is seen as a major victory for Kabul in its endeavours to seek direct access to the Taliban leadership without soliciting help from Islamabad. The Doha talks also show the deepening distrust between the Taliban and Pakistani officials. A breakdown of Islamabad-Kabul contacts is another factor that forced Ashraf Ghani’s government to intensify efforts to engage the Taliban in negotiations.

Perhaps the most important cause of the Kabul government’s keenness to open talks with the Taliban is the relentless offensive launched by the latter in recent weeks and the impending fears of the fall of many towns both in North Afghanistan as well as the Taliban’s strongholds of Helmand, Kabul is also genuinely worried about any escalation in the number of defections from the army and the police in the wake of the Taliban advances into government, held areas across the country.

But the Doha engagement would pose problems for the Taliban if the talks don’t deliver any tangible outcome. That is highly doubtful. Because the fundamental issue is a timetable for withdrawal of all foreign forces. The US Administration and the Kabul government are not desperately keen to organise the withdrawal of coalition forces for a host of reasons. Unless there is a change of policy or perception, either in the US or in the Afghan Government on this critical issue, there is no hope of any convergence of views between the Taliban and their interlocutors.

But as mentioned earlier the Taliban would face a dilemma, whether to remain part of a process that does not hold any real promise for reconciliation and risk losing volunteers or to withdraw and focus on continuing their struggle to score military victories in the face of heavy odds.

If the talks continue without any signs of real progress, the Kabul regime could use the interregnum to establish links and try to wean some Taliban activists from the main body led by Haibatulla Akhunzada. The regime could also tap into the differences in the Taliban hierarchy and help cause wider disaffection. On the other hand, the faction that does not support any contacts with the government could, in the event of prolonged and protracted negotiations, mount pressure on the top leadership for a boycott of the political process. In either case if the Taliban unity is in jeopardy — it will be a tremendous morale booster for the regime and its forces.

There is no immediate prospect for any significant development in the reconciliation endeavours. But for both sides so much is at stake in terms of whether each side would be able to demonstrate to the people and to the world that it has achieved a degree of success at the expense of the other. This has more serious ramifications for the Taliban than the Afghan Government because Kabul is not seen as the sole arbiter of decisions relating to the insurgency. On the other hand, the Taliban are now viewed as taking their own decisions after Islamabad launched a drive to arrest the movement’s leadership.

Pakistan losing its leverage with its erstwhile allies will have many implications as the Afghan conundrum escalates with Islamabad not having any clear vision or formula on how to help mainstream the Taliban on terms that are mutually agreeable to all. It is a failure that will haunt Pakistan for years to come.


https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...avel-pakistan-discuss-afghanistan-peace-talks


Taliban envoys travel to Pakistan to discuss Afghanistan peace talks


Meeting with Pakistani officials follows insurgent group’s contacts with both Afghan and US officials in recent months



Taliban fighters in Herat province, Afghanistan. Photograph: Allauddin Khan/AP
Sami Yousufzai and Jon Boone in Islamabad

Friday 21 October 2016 15.48 BST

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Senior members of the Taliban’s political commission based in Qatar have travelled to Pakistan for discussions with security officials there about possible peace talks with the Afghan government.

The development follows the revelation this week that Taliban officials held two rounds of secret talks with Afghanistan’s spy chief and a senior US diplomat in the capital of the Gulf state, Doha, this month and last month – meetings Pakistan was excluded from despite its long association with the Islamist movement.

Two sources within the insurgency told the Guardian that a trio of Taliban diplomats left Doha on Wednesday with a mission to hold talks with Pakistani officials.

“The visiting Afghan Taliban delegation will discuss various topics, including peace talks, and share the latest information with Pakistan,” a senior official told the Guardian.

The men are Maulvi Shahabuddin Dilawar, a former ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Jan Muhammad Madani, a former foreign minister under the Taliban regime in the 1990s, and Mullah Abdul Salam, a former deputy education minister.

The Taliban official said the discussions being held in Pakistan follow successful contacts made with both Afghan and US officials in recent months.

“Taliban and the Americans have been engaged in a number of rounds of talks in Qatar,” he said. “They have made some progress, on a very zigzag path. God willing, we hope further talks will create progress.”


Last year Pakistan succeeded in establishing itself as the host and broker of an effort to end the 15-year insurgency in Afghanistan. Islamabad managed to bring Taliban, US and Chinese diplomats around the same table at a breakthrough meeting in the Pakistani hill resort of Murree in July 2015.

But a scheduled second meeting never took place after the Afghan government confirmed that the former Taliban leader Mullah Omar had died years previously and that the movement had been run in his name by Mullah Akhtar Mansoor.

After a bitter leadership fight, Mansoor formally became the Taliban leader but showed little interest in re-engaging in the Pakistan-brokered process.

Mansoor was killed by a US drone strike in May, creating further uncertainty about the chances of peace talks.


Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, the Taliban leader, has sought to ‘speed up’ talks with Kabul and Washington. Photograph: Xinhua/Rex
Although Pakistan has been a key ally for the Taliban during both its rise to power in the 1990s and its re-emergence as an anti-Nato insurgency after 2001, some within the movement resent Pakistani interference in the Taliban’s affairs.


A Taliban official who talked to the Guardian said the group’s current leader, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, had sought to “speed up” talks with Kabul and the US.

He said: “Pakistan and the rest of the neighbours will be gradually brought on board. Pakistan is an important neighbour and no doubt they will want to be involved.”

But a western official who was aware that at least two of the Taliban envoys had travelled to Pakistan said the envoys’ meeting was unlikely to be related to the recent Doha talks.

The official said it was an attempt by Islamabad to wrest back control and escape “immense US pressure and international isolation”.

“They and a group from Quetta are talking to the Pakistanis about a Pakistan-led process,” the official said. “This is a separate initiative to escape US and Chinese pressure.”


The official said some within the Taliban had objected to the way members of the political commission appear to have been summoned to Islamabad.

The Taliban is split between rival factions, both among and between commanders on the battlefield in Afghanistan and those living inside Pakistan. Bitter divides exist over whether to pursue peace talks or not, as well as over the control of money and resources.

The western official described the current situation within the movement as “chaos as normal”.

Quoting a Taliban official, the Associated Press reported this week that the head of the Doha office had not taken part in the talks with the Afghan government, reflecting “a continuing power struggle within the movement over who should run the Qatar office”.

A Pakistani intelligence official declined to comment on the latest claims.

ISI has played this game for a very long time and are experts at it:) . they know what they are doing . if indeed they are talking for peace hope it comes soon .
 
Interesting article by well known Pakistan diplomat. Basically he is saying that the Talis and NUG have established a direct channel of communication bypassing Islamabad, a country that hosted them and a policy that brought nothing but bad name to Pakistan and massive economic hardships and now the Talis are bypassing them and Pakistan has no say in the final outcome.

Good work for scoring an own-goal. Imagine if Pakistan worked with the Afghan state from the very beginning and not relying on Talis, how the situation would have been different.

Anyways not too late yet to call your losses and change Pak policies vis-a-vis Afghanistan.

http://tribune.com.pk/story/1203667/taliban-kabul-talks-begin/

______________________________________

On the 15th anniversary of the US invasion of Afghanistan, talks between representatives of Taliban and the Afghan Government have taken place in Doha, Qatar. Several rounds of talks had been held in late September and early October. The Afghan side was led by Mr Stanikzai, Afghan chief of Intelligence, while the Taliban team also included brother of the late Mullah Omar. A US representative also participated in the negotiations.

Taliban agreeing to meet with Kabul government’s and US officials is a slight modification of their stance on the issue of parleys with the Afghan Government. After the death of Mullah Mansoor, the movement had resolved not to sit for talks with government representatives or with the Americans. It appears that those in favour of entering into negotiations have prevailed. An important dimension of the interaction is the near-absence of Pakistani mediators. The Doha round of talks has been preceded by arrests, in Pakistan,of a number of top ranking leaders of the Taliban movement mainly in Balochistan’s Pakhtun areas.

The direct contacts between Taliban and the Kabul regime also show that communication channels have been established between the two entities—bypassing Islamabad. This is seen as a major victory for Kabul in its endeavours to seek direct access to the Taliban leadership without soliciting help from Islamabad. The Doha talks also show the deepening distrust between the Taliban and Pakistani officials. A breakdown of Islamabad-Kabul contacts is another factor that forced Ashraf Ghani’s government to intensify efforts to engage the Taliban in negotiations.

Perhaps the most important cause of the Kabul government’s keenness to open talks with the Taliban is the relentless offensive launched by the latter in recent weeks and the impending fears of the fall of many towns both in North Afghanistan as well as the Taliban’s strongholds of Helmand, Kabul is also genuinely worried about any escalation in the number of defections from the army and the police in the wake of the Taliban advances into government, held areas across the country.

But the Doha engagement would pose problems for the Taliban if the talks don’t deliver any tangible outcome. That is highly doubtful. Because the fundamental issue is a timetable for withdrawal of all foreign forces. The US Administration and the Kabul government are not desperately keen to organise the withdrawal of coalition forces for a host of reasons. Unless there is a change of policy or perception, either in the US or in the Afghan Government on this critical issue, there is no hope of any convergence of views between the Taliban and their interlocutors.

But as mentioned earlier the Taliban would face a dilemma, whether to remain part of a process that does not hold any real promise for reconciliation and risk losing volunteers or to withdraw and focus on continuing their struggle to score military victories in the face of heavy odds.

If the talks continue without any signs of real progress, the Kabul regime could use the interregnum to establish links and try to wean some Taliban activists from the main body led by Haibatulla Akhunzada. The regime could also tap into the differences in the Taliban hierarchy and help cause wider disaffection. On the other hand, the faction that does not support any contacts with the government could, in the event of prolonged and protracted negotiations, mount pressure on the top leadership for a boycott of the political process. In either case if the Taliban unity is in jeopardy — it will be a tremendous morale booster for the regime and its forces.

There is no immediate prospect for any significant development in the reconciliation endeavours. But for both sides so much is at stake in terms of whether each side would be able to demonstrate to the people and to the world that it has achieved a degree of success at the expense of the other. This has more serious ramifications for the Taliban than the Afghan Government because Kabul is not seen as the sole arbiter of decisions relating to the insurgency. On the other hand, the Taliban are now viewed as taking their own decisions after Islamabad launched a drive to arrest the movement’s leadership.

Pakistan losing its leverage with its erstwhile allies will have many implications as the Afghan conundrum escalates with Islamabad not having any clear vision or formula on how to help mainstream the Taliban on terms that are mutually agreeable to all. It is a failure that will haunt Pakistan for years to come.

So @A-Team please enlighten us:

"Taliban-Kabul talks begin"

Are these good Talis or bad Talis. Will appreciate the reply, since I need to understand how Talis are classified.

Thanks.
 
Do you know views of this gentlemen regarding Taliban?

I know he is a Tali apologist.

BTW dont blame me, I am just a messenger, a Pakistani diplomat is the author ;)

So its your internal problem now, OK. Don't blame Pakistan from now on..

Did you read the article? I think not because the that author is saying that whatever investment Pak had on Talis is not worth a penny, meaning support was there from the beginning. It is not me saying its the author ;)

So @A-Team please enlighten us:

"Taliban-Kabul talks begin"

Are these good Talis or bad Talis. Will appreciate the reply, since I need to understand how Talis are classified.

Thanks.

You dont seem to understand the definiation.

- Bad Talis : those that attack Pak Military
- Good Talis : those that attack Afghans

But from our perspective we dont differentiate, if TTP attacks Pak military we still consider them bad.
 
Pakistan's stance is now vindicated that Taliban are Afghan , that we have no control over them and most certainly we did not "create" Taliban.

Is good that Afghan government and Taliban are talking to each other.
 
Pakistan has realized long ago that you cannot get rid of the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is in our best interests as neighbours to have good relations with them. We have no interest in creating more enemies. Good step. Hope fully Uncle Sam doesn't ruin this one.
 
You dont seem to understand the definiation.

- Bad Talis : those that attack Pak Military
- Good Talis : those that attack Afghans

But from our perspective we dont differentiate, if TTP attacks Pak military we still consider them bad.

I know TTP terrorists are living under your protection, but that was not the question.

Whom you consider good Talis or bad Talis?

Or you don't have any differentiation and consider them all as good Talis?
 
I know TTP are living under your protection, but that was not the question.

Whom you consider good Talis or bad Talis?

Or you don't have any differentiation and consider them all as good Talis?

Incase you have not been paying attention but Afghans security forces have taken ut major TTP commanders in the recent months [ google it ] but on the other hands, you guys not taken out even one Afghan Tali commander, I repeat not even ONE.
So you do the math as to who is differentiating between good and bad.

Even a monkey can see the difference that we are not differentiating.

Pakistan has realized long ago that you cannot get rid of the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is in our best interests as neighbours to have good relations with them. We have no interest in creating more enemies. Good step. Hope fully Uncle Sam doesn't ruin this one.

What a ridiculous logic, how about I return the favor using your logic, that Afghans should have nice and chummy relationship with TTP, BLA and whatnot because they are Pakistanis and Pakistan cant get rid of them?

You see this logic is plain stupid.
 

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