angeldemon_007
SENIOR MEMBER
- Nov 29, 2010
- 5,298
- 0
NATO's invitation earlier this month for India to join its missile defense program deserves serious consideration. New Delhi faces increasing regional challenges and the possibility of gaining valuable missile defense technology.
Both NATO and India share similar ballistic missile threats. There has been a steady growth in the range and accuracy of ballistic missiles on the perimeter of NATO, as well as the Indian borders. Measures such as export controls devised under the Missile Technology Control Regime have not prevented these programs from maturing while arms control efforts have arguably had limited success.
As a result, NATO and India have resorted to missile defense to address challenges posed by missile proliferation. In November 2010 at the Lisbon Summit, NATO adopted its new strategic concept: "Active Engagement, Modern Defense," which outlined the alliance's approach to emerging security challenges. The document underscores the commitment to defend NATO members' populations and territories against ballistic missile threats. Missile defense plays a major role.
On a technical level, the phased-adapted approach introduced in September 2009 by President Barack Obama appears to be the centerpiece of NATO's missile defense architecture. This strategy aims to protect the U.S. and European allies in the short term while working on a comprehensive missile defense in the long run.
This policy, in principle, provides a number of benefits: increasing the extent of participation from member states, reducing costs, bolstering trans-Atlantic ties, as well as infrastructure sharing. However, it also poses a number of questions: identifying an external threat, encouraging active cooperation with Russia, debating how best the U.S. missile defense plans can be integrated into NATO's plans and identifying a configuration that would contribute to the indivisible security of the alliance.
While missile defense may be short of a technical reality, the political reality is certain and will prove decisive. For most European NATO members, this would be an interesting debate on two critical issues: how best to engage Russia and differing perceptions about countering the Iranian and Syrian missile threats.
Cooperation in the technical realms could prove to be a bone of contention. This is especially true for France, where the debate is about the impact on European cooperation in technology development and the defense industrial impact of adopting what is essentially a U.S. system.
The latest NATO offer to India should be viewed in this broader light. India could leverage its position to bargain for more technolo-gies to aid its nascent missile defense program.
In one of its swiftest diplomatic moves ever, within hours of the 2004 U.S. declaration that it intends to pursue its plans to deploy the first phase of ballistic missile defense, India became one of the few nations in the world to extend its support for the new security architecture being proposed by the United States. India hailed the U.S. proposals for deep cuts in nuclear arsenals, as well as building missile defenses as a far-reaching effort to move away from the adversarial legacy of the Cold War.
But India's position drew a lot of opposition from the left, right and center of its political and strategic community. India's engagement with the United States on missile defense came to reflect, for some, an example of and a means toward enhancing U.S.-India rapprochement. But that was precisely the problem for others.
India decided to take a solitary route and announced its own missile defense test for the first time in November 2006. V.K. Saraswat, who is leading India's BMD program, has suggested that by late 2011, India would have the capability to intercept ballistic missiles with a range of up to 2,000 kilometers, a claim questioned by some.
As China continues to target its missiles against India and as Pakistan becomes more unstable, the option of missile defense from a policy angle will grow for India. The country must take the option of missile defense seriously, and this will require collaboration in this high-technology frontier. It should give the alliance's proposal serious consideration.
Russia has been one of the strongest opponents of NATO's missile defense program for Europe, but NATO is working with Russia to remove its misgivings. NATO has formed the NATO-Russia Council, which meets every month and briefs Russia about the missile defense project. If Russia, with all of its Cold War baggage, can work with NATO on missile defense, there is no reason for India to ignore the offer.
At first, cooperation is likely to be merely symbolic. It is not clear what parameters NATO envisions for its cooperation with India. It is also not readily evident what India brings to the table technically. Polit-ically, it's symbolic, at least at this juncture, but symbolism matters.
Indian security demands that New Delhi examine this issue dispassionately rather than getting swayed by those still fighting old-style ideological battles. As the major powers reduce their nuclear arsenals, missile defense policies will become increasingly rational. Ultimately, technology will determine whether it will be fully deployed or not rather than arms control considerations. India would not like to be behind in this technological race, and the politics of missile defense in India are bound to grow more interesting in the future.
Take NATO's Offer - Defense News
Both NATO and India share similar ballistic missile threats. There has been a steady growth in the range and accuracy of ballistic missiles on the perimeter of NATO, as well as the Indian borders. Measures such as export controls devised under the Missile Technology Control Regime have not prevented these programs from maturing while arms control efforts have arguably had limited success.
As a result, NATO and India have resorted to missile defense to address challenges posed by missile proliferation. In November 2010 at the Lisbon Summit, NATO adopted its new strategic concept: "Active Engagement, Modern Defense," which outlined the alliance's approach to emerging security challenges. The document underscores the commitment to defend NATO members' populations and territories against ballistic missile threats. Missile defense plays a major role.
On a technical level, the phased-adapted approach introduced in September 2009 by President Barack Obama appears to be the centerpiece of NATO's missile defense architecture. This strategy aims to protect the U.S. and European allies in the short term while working on a comprehensive missile defense in the long run.
This policy, in principle, provides a number of benefits: increasing the extent of participation from member states, reducing costs, bolstering trans-Atlantic ties, as well as infrastructure sharing. However, it also poses a number of questions: identifying an external threat, encouraging active cooperation with Russia, debating how best the U.S. missile defense plans can be integrated into NATO's plans and identifying a configuration that would contribute to the indivisible security of the alliance.
While missile defense may be short of a technical reality, the political reality is certain and will prove decisive. For most European NATO members, this would be an interesting debate on two critical issues: how best to engage Russia and differing perceptions about countering the Iranian and Syrian missile threats.
Cooperation in the technical realms could prove to be a bone of contention. This is especially true for France, where the debate is about the impact on European cooperation in technology development and the defense industrial impact of adopting what is essentially a U.S. system.
The latest NATO offer to India should be viewed in this broader light. India could leverage its position to bargain for more technolo-gies to aid its nascent missile defense program.
In one of its swiftest diplomatic moves ever, within hours of the 2004 U.S. declaration that it intends to pursue its plans to deploy the first phase of ballistic missile defense, India became one of the few nations in the world to extend its support for the new security architecture being proposed by the United States. India hailed the U.S. proposals for deep cuts in nuclear arsenals, as well as building missile defenses as a far-reaching effort to move away from the adversarial legacy of the Cold War.
But India's position drew a lot of opposition from the left, right and center of its political and strategic community. India's engagement with the United States on missile defense came to reflect, for some, an example of and a means toward enhancing U.S.-India rapprochement. But that was precisely the problem for others.
India decided to take a solitary route and announced its own missile defense test for the first time in November 2006. V.K. Saraswat, who is leading India's BMD program, has suggested that by late 2011, India would have the capability to intercept ballistic missiles with a range of up to 2,000 kilometers, a claim questioned by some.
As China continues to target its missiles against India and as Pakistan becomes more unstable, the option of missile defense from a policy angle will grow for India. The country must take the option of missile defense seriously, and this will require collaboration in this high-technology frontier. It should give the alliance's proposal serious consideration.
Russia has been one of the strongest opponents of NATO's missile defense program for Europe, but NATO is working with Russia to remove its misgivings. NATO has formed the NATO-Russia Council, which meets every month and briefs Russia about the missile defense project. If Russia, with all of its Cold War baggage, can work with NATO on missile defense, there is no reason for India to ignore the offer.
At first, cooperation is likely to be merely symbolic. It is not clear what parameters NATO envisions for its cooperation with India. It is also not readily evident what India brings to the table technically. Polit-ically, it's symbolic, at least at this juncture, but symbolism matters.
Indian security demands that New Delhi examine this issue dispassionately rather than getting swayed by those still fighting old-style ideological battles. As the major powers reduce their nuclear arsenals, missile defense policies will become increasingly rational. Ultimately, technology will determine whether it will be fully deployed or not rather than arms control considerations. India would not like to be behind in this technological race, and the politics of missile defense in India are bound to grow more interesting in the future.
Take NATO's Offer - Defense News
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