by: Maj Gen Raj Mehta, AVSM, VSM (Retd)
9/16/2011
With second strike as our thoughtfully selected nuclear option, do we have our survivability plans, options and infrastructure in place? Presuming that we do, why is the lay public so ill informed about our ability to successfully live out our nuclear retaliation policy? The nation needs to know
Not being heard is no reason for silence... Victor Hugo (Les Misérables)
Prof Ms Manpreet Sethi, who heads the project on Nuclear Security at the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), New Delhi, has, in a recent web article on Chinese nuclear policy remarked that China has continued with its position of no-first-use (NFU), which makes great strategic sense. It not only earns China the moral high ground, but also is actually more conducive for national security and deterrence stability She writes that the same logic is equally applicable to India.
India unveiled its nuclear warfare policy after its nuclear tests in May 1998. The policy states that even though there will be no first use of nuclear weapons by India, "nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage". The Indian National Security Advisor (NSA) Shiv Shankar Menon, has, however, signaled a significant shift from "no first use" to "no first use against non-nuclear weapon states" in a speech on the occasion of Golden Jubilee celebrations of the National Defence College in New Delhi on October 21, 2010. That the tinkering of NFU in this manner had something to do with realpolitik and changing perceptions about Pakistan does not change the moral and material advantages that Manpreet Sethi feels accrue to practitioners of NFU.
The world's opinions on this bold, challenging policy however remain divided. This is so because NFU is not the policy of choice for the USA, Russia, NATO, UK, France, and Pakistan. For them it is First Strike (FS) and unabashedly so, or, as in the case of USA and perhaps Russia as well, its fine tuned, surveillance and intelligence resource heavy version; Launch on Warning (LOW). What they fear most perhaps, is the real as opposed to the theoretical ability for nations to survive an all out nuclear onslaught; a nuclear Armageddon. This is probably one reason why, regardless of whether a country advocates first or second strike, the issue of survivability of the apex authority that can order a strike; the legal chain of succession, the retaliatory nuclear weapons and infrastructure and, not the least, the command and control assets including ground, sea and air, space based sensors and platforms assumes overwhelming importance.
Where is India on this front? The simple, straight forward answer is that we, the people, do not know for the simple, blunt reason that the Government of the day has never let us know. America is a democracy like us; has been the world leader in nuclear matters and has set standards of transparency on nuclear survivability as well as its response mechanism that are worthy of emulation. The net result is that its people are well informed about the nuclear issues that confront the American state; warts and all. Erstwhile USSR and its successor, Russia continues to be secretive and the fragmented information on its nuclear scheme of things affecting survivability such as is available is what USA has managed to extrapolate, using a mix of satellite surveillance and intelligent guess work. Pakistan is also in the same category. Surprisingly, however, China has, in the recent past, officially put out a great deal of graphic information about its abilities in this arena; something that has made the world sit up and take urgent notice, besides getting genuinely worried about what display of such capability could mean.
Dr. PK Iyengar is a former Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. He has long been critical of our supposed state of preparedness in line with our declared nuclear policy. He writes that It is clear that the public in India are not satisfied with the country's state of nuclear readiness in spite of a demanding nuclear doctrine. As long as India followed a deliberate policy of nuclear ambivalence, nuclear secrecy was both desirable and necessary. But now that India has declared its capabilities openly, the time has come for transparency in nuclear policy, in order to inform the Indian people and to evolve a national consensus on the country's short-term and long-term policies on nuclear deterrence and disarmament He does not directly raise the issue of survivability but his deep concern is surely implied.
America has refined its nuclear war fighting approach into a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). This is a blueprint which specifies how American nuclear weapons would be used in the event of nuclear war. The plan integrates the nuclear capabilities of the "triad" of bombers with intercontinental range, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and sea-based submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). The SIOP is understandably a highly classified document, and has been one of the most secret and sensitive issues in U.S. national security policy. India needs to know whether we have such a document, even though its contents can and must remain a closely guarded state secret. We need to know whether our version of SIOP (presuming we have one) has emerged from a clear understanding of our nuclear doctrine and whether it will, in actual practice as opposed to theoretical assurances, allow the Indian response system to survive first strike well enough to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor.
This article examines the issue of survivability in the context of South Asia and China in specific. It thereafter focuses on the kind of preparation that may be needed to guarantee survivability of leadership, personnel, equipment, command and control and other assets to survive a nuclear Armageddon and retaliate effectively. In so doing, the article examines what America and China have achieved in this sphere, with a passing reference to Russia. The article thereafter examines our survivability conundrum and suggests a way ahead.
What Survivability could mean
Indian nuclear strategy is premised on our second strike capability. This implies our assured ability to respond to a nuclear attack with powerful nuclear retaliation against the attacker. To have such an ability (and to convince the opponent of its viability) is considered most vital in nuclear deterrence, as otherwise the other side might be tempted to try to win a nuclear war in one massive first strike against the opponent's nuclear forces. The crucial issue is ensuring survivability that will prevent first strike attacks from taking out our nuclear arsenal that is needed for nuclear retaliation to be carried out. Possession of a nuclear triad is one way for us to diversify our nuclear arsenal in order to ensure second strike capability. The common man is broadly aware that we are inching towards such a capability. Wide dispersion, adequate all weather geo-synchronous surveillance of inimical countries that pose a threat, a variety of platforms that allow command and control as well as a coherent nuclear succession chain for conveying retaliation orders are also imperatives and one presumes/hopes that adequate work is in progress in these areas. What has to be borne in mind is that, unlike in the cases of USA, Russia, China, where the warning time between take off of platforms that carry nuclear loads to their estimated points of impact is adequate, extending in no case less than 15-20 minutes. However, in the case of an Indo-Pak nuclear war, the response time will range from three to five minutes for the first attacks to manifest. This demands an unprecedented state of readiness/alertness as well as easily accessible, hardened survivability of all personnel, vectors and systems that make retaliation possible. It also speaks of the availability of a variety of space based sensors, both own and those of friendly nations, that are focused on likely areas from which the nuclear threat will emerge. Failure to do so will result in being taken off guard and not quite being in a position to cause the intended unacceptable damage to the aggressor.
The American Underground Nuclear Operations centre
USA has several extremely elaborate and ruggedized command and control bunkers, the most famous of which is the North American (US and Canada) Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), tunneled a few thousand feet into Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. It has several regional centres spread over continental USA as well as in Canada and functions 24x7 looking at air threats to US safety and survivability. NORAD is believed to be capable of withstanding and continuing to operate after a nuclear direct hit. Other US C4ISTAR bunkers include an installation called Site R, located at Raven Rock, Pennsylvania, which is believed to be the Pentagon's relocation site if Washington, DC is destroyed, as well as Mount Weather, in Virginia, which is believed to be the relocation site for top Executive Branch officials.
Looking Glass, Nightwatch, and TACAMO are US airborne nuclear command posts, and represent survivable communication links with U.S. nuclear forces. In the event of significant political-military tensions between the nuclear powers, they would take to the skies, be air fuelled if necessary, and provide redundant, survivable communications in the event of enemy attack. They are capable of the full exercise of all available attack options as well as the current SIOP or Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) as it is now called, in the event of a first strike. They can directly initiate launch of all US ICBMs via radio and satellite communication, signal Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM's) to launch, and send bombers on their strike missions. The redundancies built into the US system are note worthy.
The Russian Underground Nuclear System
The Russians also have equivalent or superior capabilities based at Mount Yamantaw in the Urals in the Bashkortostan Republic. Mount Yamantaw is believed to be able to withstand multiple direct nuclear detonations. Russia. It is reportedly a large secret nuclear facility and/or bunker. Two cities, Beloretsk-15 and Beloretsk-16, are built on top of the facility, and possibly a third, Alkino-2, as well. They are said to house 30,000 workers each. The facility is designed to withstand up to six direct thermonuclear hits in the event of an attack. Large rail lines run into and out of the mountain.
It is rumored that a direct 1200 km long subway line from Moscow has been constructed to Mount Yamantaw, for the transportation of government officials and others who would be useful in a post-nuclear environment. Mount Yamantaw would be able to construct and launch new nuclear weapons.
The Chinese Underground Great Wall
In an August 2011 article, James Holmes, who teaches strategy at the US Naval War College wrote that, in March 2008, China's state-run CCTV network broke the news about a 5,000 km long network of hardened tunnels built to house the Chinese Second Artillery Corps's increasingly modern force of nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. Tunneling evidently commenced in 1995. Located under the mountainous districts of Hebei Province, in northern China, the facility is reportedly hundreds of meters deep. That makes it an exceptionally hard target against conventional or nuclear counterstrikes. China Defense Daily, a publication of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), confirmed the CCTV account in December 2009. The story was also picked up by Chosun Ilbo, in South Korea.
An excerpt: The Chinese Army is believed to have built an underground 'Great Wall' that stretches for more than 5,000 km in the Hebei region of northern China. Citing the People's Liberation Army's official newsletter, the Ta Kung Pao Daily of Hong Kong said China's tunnel(s) conceal nuclear weapons, including the Dongfeng 5 intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 13,000 km Since 1995, the Second Artillery Division has mobilized tens of thousands of soldiers to build a network of tunnels
Holmes adds that an invulnerable second-strike capability has been the gold standard of nuclear deterrence since the early Cold War. It appears that, by implication, China has it. Analysts have long speculated that the China's most important underground missile positions were located in the mountainous area in northern China. The geography of this region is cut by steep cliffs and canyons, and therefore suited for use in covering the network of tunnels that is 5000 km long and can feed a web of underground launch silos.
According to a military analyst cited by Ta Kung Pao, "the outermost layer is 1,000 meters [3,280 feet] deep and covered with soil that does not include any artificial reinforcements" Moreover, the Chinese reports described the tunnel system in terms of "hard and deeply buried targets" (HDBTs), which typically refers to facilities a few hundred feet deep in "underground installations." In the case of strategic nuclear missiles, it would mean that all preparations can be completed underground, and the transportation of missiles, equipments and personnel through a network of underground corridors by rail cars or heavy-duty trailers to fixed launch sites can not be detected from observations on the ground.
This report is not the first time that the existence of a tunnel of such magnitude was revealed. As early as 1995, according to a report in the Liberation Army Daily cited by Ta Kung Pao, a project called the "Great Wall" was completed after 10 years of construction through the labor of "tens of thousands" of Army engineers. Furthermore, the Chinese-television program, "Documentary for Military," aired by Chinese state run television network CCTV on March 24, 2008, also revealed the status of an underground nuclear counter-strike project called the "great wall project" The main objective of the Second Artillery Division is to be able to launch a counterattack against enemy targets after escaping the first volley of attacks. The Ta Kung Pao daily reported that it was unprecedented for the PLA's newsletter to reveal classified information about the tunnels and that this demonstrates Beijing's confidence in its military power.
This is not all. It will come as a greater shock to the lay reader to realise that China has been equally concerned about survivability of key aspects of the other vectors of its triad; the Navy and the Air Force. The stunning visuals that follow reveal the extent to which China has assured itself of survivability against damage caused by a nuclear first strike.
According to US diplomatic cables obtained by WikiLeaks and provided exclusively to The Age, the Deputy Chief of China's People's Liberation Army General Staff, Ma Xiaotian, told US Defence and State Department officials in June 2008 that the growth of China's nuclear forces was an ''imperative reality'' and there could be "no limit on technical progress''. There obviously isn't; certainly in the context of a nuclear war in for at least one country; China. It appears well poised not just to initiate a nuclear war if it so chooses, but certainly to survive an all out nuclear attack by a stronger nuclear power and thereafter retaliate effectively, in line with its NFU policy.
The Indian Survivability Conundrum
James Holmes has earlier been quoted saying that invulnerable second-strike capability has been the gold standard of nuclear deterrence since the early Cold War. Where are we on this issue? Because of a near total blanking out of public information on it, all we can do is to hope that the Government of the day is paying attention to the under mentioned key aspects whose availability spells guaranteed second strike capability in line with our most challenging doctrine of NFU:
Do we have the hardened, redundant, long distance, air refuel-able aircraft on the lines of the US TACAMO, Looking Glass or Nightwatch at the command of the Indian nuclear establishment? Each of these systems comprise of several aircraft that have been made proof against enemy electronic as well as missile attack. They have redundant communication hot lines to all key players from submarines in the deep sea to nuclear bomb loaded aircraft in flight as well as deep underground land vectors?
Following the American, Russian and the startling Chinese leads, do we have hardened, deep underground bunkers or shelters that are at once remote as well as road, sea and rail communication aided for our nuclear succession as well as retaliation infrastructure? In terms of retaliatory aircraft and submarine(s), do we have hardened shelters for them and their nuclear weapons of war?
We can be presumed to have the nuclear football with our apex political authority, the PM. Is it, however, networked into our Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence and Surveillance (C4 ISR) systems? This is a valid question only if one presumes that our current C2 system has, for NFU purposes, been upgraded to C4 ISR
It is a known fact that we now have defence satellites available for surveillance purposes. What is not known is whether they are in geo-synchronous 24x7 watch and over the right locations; whether they are proof against the emerging Chinese Anti Satellite (ASAT) capability that rattled USA and the world so much in 2007?
Who looks after the execution of our version of the SIOP? Is it the NSA? The Strategic Forces Command (SFC)? The DRDO? The BARC? All together in committee format?
Lastly, given our situation of uneasy proximity with Pakistan and its current instabilities, do we have an LOW option available to us? If not today, do we have an overall second strike survivability road map; part of which must be shared with the public for reassuring them that serious work is indeed in progress?
Remaining on higher moral grounds, while ensuring national security, as Ms Manpreet Sethi opines, is indeed a difficult task. The public needs to be reassured that the Indian nation
is up to it.
South Asia Defence & Strategic Reveiw
9/16/2011
With second strike as our thoughtfully selected nuclear option, do we have our survivability plans, options and infrastructure in place? Presuming that we do, why is the lay public so ill informed about our ability to successfully live out our nuclear retaliation policy? The nation needs to know
Not being heard is no reason for silence... Victor Hugo (Les Misérables)
Prof Ms Manpreet Sethi, who heads the project on Nuclear Security at the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), New Delhi, has, in a recent web article on Chinese nuclear policy remarked that China has continued with its position of no-first-use (NFU), which makes great strategic sense. It not only earns China the moral high ground, but also is actually more conducive for national security and deterrence stability She writes that the same logic is equally applicable to India.
India unveiled its nuclear warfare policy after its nuclear tests in May 1998. The policy states that even though there will be no first use of nuclear weapons by India, "nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage". The Indian National Security Advisor (NSA) Shiv Shankar Menon, has, however, signaled a significant shift from "no first use" to "no first use against non-nuclear weapon states" in a speech on the occasion of Golden Jubilee celebrations of the National Defence College in New Delhi on October 21, 2010. That the tinkering of NFU in this manner had something to do with realpolitik and changing perceptions about Pakistan does not change the moral and material advantages that Manpreet Sethi feels accrue to practitioners of NFU.
The world's opinions on this bold, challenging policy however remain divided. This is so because NFU is not the policy of choice for the USA, Russia, NATO, UK, France, and Pakistan. For them it is First Strike (FS) and unabashedly so, or, as in the case of USA and perhaps Russia as well, its fine tuned, surveillance and intelligence resource heavy version; Launch on Warning (LOW). What they fear most perhaps, is the real as opposed to the theoretical ability for nations to survive an all out nuclear onslaught; a nuclear Armageddon. This is probably one reason why, regardless of whether a country advocates first or second strike, the issue of survivability of the apex authority that can order a strike; the legal chain of succession, the retaliatory nuclear weapons and infrastructure and, not the least, the command and control assets including ground, sea and air, space based sensors and platforms assumes overwhelming importance.
Where is India on this front? The simple, straight forward answer is that we, the people, do not know for the simple, blunt reason that the Government of the day has never let us know. America is a democracy like us; has been the world leader in nuclear matters and has set standards of transparency on nuclear survivability as well as its response mechanism that are worthy of emulation. The net result is that its people are well informed about the nuclear issues that confront the American state; warts and all. Erstwhile USSR and its successor, Russia continues to be secretive and the fragmented information on its nuclear scheme of things affecting survivability such as is available is what USA has managed to extrapolate, using a mix of satellite surveillance and intelligent guess work. Pakistan is also in the same category. Surprisingly, however, China has, in the recent past, officially put out a great deal of graphic information about its abilities in this arena; something that has made the world sit up and take urgent notice, besides getting genuinely worried about what display of such capability could mean.
Dr. PK Iyengar is a former Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. He has long been critical of our supposed state of preparedness in line with our declared nuclear policy. He writes that It is clear that the public in India are not satisfied with the country's state of nuclear readiness in spite of a demanding nuclear doctrine. As long as India followed a deliberate policy of nuclear ambivalence, nuclear secrecy was both desirable and necessary. But now that India has declared its capabilities openly, the time has come for transparency in nuclear policy, in order to inform the Indian people and to evolve a national consensus on the country's short-term and long-term policies on nuclear deterrence and disarmament He does not directly raise the issue of survivability but his deep concern is surely implied.
America has refined its nuclear war fighting approach into a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). This is a blueprint which specifies how American nuclear weapons would be used in the event of nuclear war. The plan integrates the nuclear capabilities of the "triad" of bombers with intercontinental range, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and sea-based submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). The SIOP is understandably a highly classified document, and has been one of the most secret and sensitive issues in U.S. national security policy. India needs to know whether we have such a document, even though its contents can and must remain a closely guarded state secret. We need to know whether our version of SIOP (presuming we have one) has emerged from a clear understanding of our nuclear doctrine and whether it will, in actual practice as opposed to theoretical assurances, allow the Indian response system to survive first strike well enough to inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor.
This article examines the issue of survivability in the context of South Asia and China in specific. It thereafter focuses on the kind of preparation that may be needed to guarantee survivability of leadership, personnel, equipment, command and control and other assets to survive a nuclear Armageddon and retaliate effectively. In so doing, the article examines what America and China have achieved in this sphere, with a passing reference to Russia. The article thereafter examines our survivability conundrum and suggests a way ahead.
What Survivability could mean
Indian nuclear strategy is premised on our second strike capability. This implies our assured ability to respond to a nuclear attack with powerful nuclear retaliation against the attacker. To have such an ability (and to convince the opponent of its viability) is considered most vital in nuclear deterrence, as otherwise the other side might be tempted to try to win a nuclear war in one massive first strike against the opponent's nuclear forces. The crucial issue is ensuring survivability that will prevent first strike attacks from taking out our nuclear arsenal that is needed for nuclear retaliation to be carried out. Possession of a nuclear triad is one way for us to diversify our nuclear arsenal in order to ensure second strike capability. The common man is broadly aware that we are inching towards such a capability. Wide dispersion, adequate all weather geo-synchronous surveillance of inimical countries that pose a threat, a variety of platforms that allow command and control as well as a coherent nuclear succession chain for conveying retaliation orders are also imperatives and one presumes/hopes that adequate work is in progress in these areas. What has to be borne in mind is that, unlike in the cases of USA, Russia, China, where the warning time between take off of platforms that carry nuclear loads to their estimated points of impact is adequate, extending in no case less than 15-20 minutes. However, in the case of an Indo-Pak nuclear war, the response time will range from three to five minutes for the first attacks to manifest. This demands an unprecedented state of readiness/alertness as well as easily accessible, hardened survivability of all personnel, vectors and systems that make retaliation possible. It also speaks of the availability of a variety of space based sensors, both own and those of friendly nations, that are focused on likely areas from which the nuclear threat will emerge. Failure to do so will result in being taken off guard and not quite being in a position to cause the intended unacceptable damage to the aggressor.
The American Underground Nuclear Operations centre
USA has several extremely elaborate and ruggedized command and control bunkers, the most famous of which is the North American (US and Canada) Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), tunneled a few thousand feet into Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. It has several regional centres spread over continental USA as well as in Canada and functions 24x7 looking at air threats to US safety and survivability. NORAD is believed to be capable of withstanding and continuing to operate after a nuclear direct hit. Other US C4ISTAR bunkers include an installation called Site R, located at Raven Rock, Pennsylvania, which is believed to be the Pentagon's relocation site if Washington, DC is destroyed, as well as Mount Weather, in Virginia, which is believed to be the relocation site for top Executive Branch officials.
Looking Glass, Nightwatch, and TACAMO are US airborne nuclear command posts, and represent survivable communication links with U.S. nuclear forces. In the event of significant political-military tensions between the nuclear powers, they would take to the skies, be air fuelled if necessary, and provide redundant, survivable communications in the event of enemy attack. They are capable of the full exercise of all available attack options as well as the current SIOP or Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) as it is now called, in the event of a first strike. They can directly initiate launch of all US ICBMs via radio and satellite communication, signal Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM's) to launch, and send bombers on their strike missions. The redundancies built into the US system are note worthy.
The Russian Underground Nuclear System
The Russians also have equivalent or superior capabilities based at Mount Yamantaw in the Urals in the Bashkortostan Republic. Mount Yamantaw is believed to be able to withstand multiple direct nuclear detonations. Russia. It is reportedly a large secret nuclear facility and/or bunker. Two cities, Beloretsk-15 and Beloretsk-16, are built on top of the facility, and possibly a third, Alkino-2, as well. They are said to house 30,000 workers each. The facility is designed to withstand up to six direct thermonuclear hits in the event of an attack. Large rail lines run into and out of the mountain.
It is rumored that a direct 1200 km long subway line from Moscow has been constructed to Mount Yamantaw, for the transportation of government officials and others who would be useful in a post-nuclear environment. Mount Yamantaw would be able to construct and launch new nuclear weapons.
The Chinese Underground Great Wall
In an August 2011 article, James Holmes, who teaches strategy at the US Naval War College wrote that, in March 2008, China's state-run CCTV network broke the news about a 5,000 km long network of hardened tunnels built to house the Chinese Second Artillery Corps's increasingly modern force of nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. Tunneling evidently commenced in 1995. Located under the mountainous districts of Hebei Province, in northern China, the facility is reportedly hundreds of meters deep. That makes it an exceptionally hard target against conventional or nuclear counterstrikes. China Defense Daily, a publication of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), confirmed the CCTV account in December 2009. The story was also picked up by Chosun Ilbo, in South Korea.
An excerpt: The Chinese Army is believed to have built an underground 'Great Wall' that stretches for more than 5,000 km in the Hebei region of northern China. Citing the People's Liberation Army's official newsletter, the Ta Kung Pao Daily of Hong Kong said China's tunnel(s) conceal nuclear weapons, including the Dongfeng 5 intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 13,000 km Since 1995, the Second Artillery Division has mobilized tens of thousands of soldiers to build a network of tunnels
Holmes adds that an invulnerable second-strike capability has been the gold standard of nuclear deterrence since the early Cold War. It appears that, by implication, China has it. Analysts have long speculated that the China's most important underground missile positions were located in the mountainous area in northern China. The geography of this region is cut by steep cliffs and canyons, and therefore suited for use in covering the network of tunnels that is 5000 km long and can feed a web of underground launch silos.
According to a military analyst cited by Ta Kung Pao, "the outermost layer is 1,000 meters [3,280 feet] deep and covered with soil that does not include any artificial reinforcements" Moreover, the Chinese reports described the tunnel system in terms of "hard and deeply buried targets" (HDBTs), which typically refers to facilities a few hundred feet deep in "underground installations." In the case of strategic nuclear missiles, it would mean that all preparations can be completed underground, and the transportation of missiles, equipments and personnel through a network of underground corridors by rail cars or heavy-duty trailers to fixed launch sites can not be detected from observations on the ground.
This report is not the first time that the existence of a tunnel of such magnitude was revealed. As early as 1995, according to a report in the Liberation Army Daily cited by Ta Kung Pao, a project called the "Great Wall" was completed after 10 years of construction through the labor of "tens of thousands" of Army engineers. Furthermore, the Chinese-television program, "Documentary for Military," aired by Chinese state run television network CCTV on March 24, 2008, also revealed the status of an underground nuclear counter-strike project called the "great wall project" The main objective of the Second Artillery Division is to be able to launch a counterattack against enemy targets after escaping the first volley of attacks. The Ta Kung Pao daily reported that it was unprecedented for the PLA's newsletter to reveal classified information about the tunnels and that this demonstrates Beijing's confidence in its military power.
This is not all. It will come as a greater shock to the lay reader to realise that China has been equally concerned about survivability of key aspects of the other vectors of its triad; the Navy and the Air Force. The stunning visuals that follow reveal the extent to which China has assured itself of survivability against damage caused by a nuclear first strike.
According to US diplomatic cables obtained by WikiLeaks and provided exclusively to The Age, the Deputy Chief of China's People's Liberation Army General Staff, Ma Xiaotian, told US Defence and State Department officials in June 2008 that the growth of China's nuclear forces was an ''imperative reality'' and there could be "no limit on technical progress''. There obviously isn't; certainly in the context of a nuclear war in for at least one country; China. It appears well poised not just to initiate a nuclear war if it so chooses, but certainly to survive an all out nuclear attack by a stronger nuclear power and thereafter retaliate effectively, in line with its NFU policy.
The Indian Survivability Conundrum
James Holmes has earlier been quoted saying that invulnerable second-strike capability has been the gold standard of nuclear deterrence since the early Cold War. Where are we on this issue? Because of a near total blanking out of public information on it, all we can do is to hope that the Government of the day is paying attention to the under mentioned key aspects whose availability spells guaranteed second strike capability in line with our most challenging doctrine of NFU:
Do we have the hardened, redundant, long distance, air refuel-able aircraft on the lines of the US TACAMO, Looking Glass or Nightwatch at the command of the Indian nuclear establishment? Each of these systems comprise of several aircraft that have been made proof against enemy electronic as well as missile attack. They have redundant communication hot lines to all key players from submarines in the deep sea to nuclear bomb loaded aircraft in flight as well as deep underground land vectors?
Following the American, Russian and the startling Chinese leads, do we have hardened, deep underground bunkers or shelters that are at once remote as well as road, sea and rail communication aided for our nuclear succession as well as retaliation infrastructure? In terms of retaliatory aircraft and submarine(s), do we have hardened shelters for them and their nuclear weapons of war?
We can be presumed to have the nuclear football with our apex political authority, the PM. Is it, however, networked into our Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence and Surveillance (C4 ISR) systems? This is a valid question only if one presumes that our current C2 system has, for NFU purposes, been upgraded to C4 ISR
It is a known fact that we now have defence satellites available for surveillance purposes. What is not known is whether they are in geo-synchronous 24x7 watch and over the right locations; whether they are proof against the emerging Chinese Anti Satellite (ASAT) capability that rattled USA and the world so much in 2007?
Who looks after the execution of our version of the SIOP? Is it the NSA? The Strategic Forces Command (SFC)? The DRDO? The BARC? All together in committee format?
Lastly, given our situation of uneasy proximity with Pakistan and its current instabilities, do we have an LOW option available to us? If not today, do we have an overall second strike survivability road map; part of which must be shared with the public for reassuring them that serious work is indeed in progress?
Remaining on higher moral grounds, while ensuring national security, as Ms Manpreet Sethi opines, is indeed a difficult task. The public needs to be reassured that the Indian nation
is up to it.
South Asia Defence & Strategic Reveiw
Baba please don't bring your Maao History... and start preparing your Rockets with Thermonuclear bombs to free Indian Peasants.. and Please do it fast..