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Pakistan and the new Great Game

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Pakistan and the new Great Game

By Shahid Javed Burki

Published: January 16, 2012

The writer is a former vice-president of the World Bank and a former caretaker finance minister of Pakistan

The latest American defence strategy revealed by President Barack Obama, on January 5, could result in the South Asian subcontinent becoming the stage on which the large powers will play the new Great Game. India and Pakistan are likely to find themselves on the opposite side of the new great power divide. It would not be healthy for South Asia if the United States growing concern about China’s increasing influence results in promoting rivalry between China and India. A healthy competition between the two Asian giants will serve the two well. What would not help is Washington’s use of India to balance China’s rise and thus have New Delhi serve its strategic interests.

The deteriorating relations between the US and Pakistan, as result of a series of events in 2011, have presented the policymakers in Washington with a choice. They can work to resolve the differences and remain engaged with the country that remains critical to its long-term — not just short-term — strategic interests or, they can simply walk out of the country as was done in 1989 when Pakistan’s usefulness to the US was diminished after the Soviet Union was pushed out of Afghanistan. There is considerable temptation to adopt the latter approach. That is certainly the case in the US Congress, which has already declared its intention to reduce the amount of military assistance and economic aid promised to Pakistan.

The new US defence strategy, by focusing so much attention on China, is bound to further complicate the situation and add another element in the American-Pakistani equation. With heavy dependence on external flows to retain some dynamism in the economy and with the Americans threatening to reduce their assistance, Islamabad has already reacted by attempting to draw even closer to Beijing. This effort was only partially successful; Beijing, with its eye on Washington, was not inclined to walk into Pakistan to fully compensate for the threatened American withdrawal. But Beijing may rethink its cautious approach. If the defence strategy sends the message to Beijing that China-containment had become the main interest for the US in world affairs, the Chinese may seek to list Islamabad as its partner to counter the American moves. And if the US responds by getting even closer to India what will result is a four-power ‘Great Game’ with America and India seeking to contain China and China and Pakistan working together to limit Washington’s influence in their geographic space. This will be an unhappy development for South Asia.

What is needed instead is a deep American involvement in helping Pakistan to develop its political system and its economy to guide the ongoing revolution in the Middle East and several other Muslim countries into the right channels. Drawing a connection between the Arab Spring and Pakistan’s development as a way of helping the West’s strategic interests may, at first sight, seem a bit of a stretch. But such a link becomes apparent when the dynamic unleashed by the events in the Middle East is put in a historical perspective.

What is at issue now is the direction the Arab Spring is likely to take. The first series of elections in the Arab world — in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt — following the street-inspired revolutions have brought parties with strong Islamic roots into prominence. In Egypt, it is already clear that the party affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood will have the largest presence in the newly elected assembly. It has won close to one-half of the seats, while another quarter has gone to the Salafists. The revolution was brought about by disaffected youth but its consequences will not bring them into political power. “So why are so many Arabs voting for parties that seem regressive to Westerners?” asks John M Owen, a professor of politics at the University of Virginia and the author of an important book on the clash of ideas and politics. His answer: “Liberalism in the 19-century Europe and Islamism in the Arab world today, are like channels dug by one generation of activists and kept open, sometimes quietly, by future ones. When the storms of revolution arrive, whether in Europe or in the Middle East, the waters will find those channels. Islamism is winning out because it is the deepest and widest channel into which today’s Arab discontent can flow”.

But today’s revolutions are different from those that came earlier; they are taking place in full global view where those participating in them are in constant communication with those watching them. It is unlikely that the liberal forces that relieved the countries of absolutist leadership will easily give way to the dominance of political forces that may take the affected countries towards another form of control. This happened in Iran in the late 1970s. To ensure that Islamists, even if they win elections, will not dispense with liberal democratic forms, the liberal forces are looking for models in which religious parties are embedded within democratic systems.

Pakistan could become such a model if its fledgling democratic system succeeds. Pakistan, at this time, is deeply involved in containing the rise of Islamic extremism. One way to deal with it is to combine the use of force with accommodation. Those not prepared to work within the established legal framework must be dealt with firmly while those inclined to use the norms of democracy to advance their agendas must be given accommodation. Pakistan’s difficult political evolution is being watched by many in the Middle East. If it succeeds, it will be seen as an example to be replicated. However, the United States by withdrawing its support at such a critical time and forcing the new Great Game on South Asia, will unleash another dynamic that could seriously set back the Pakistani experiment. A strong anti-American sentiment would undoubtedly help the Islamic groups and inhibit the more liberal forces. In other words, Washington must look at Pakistan through the lens of the Arab Spring rather than as a player on the other side of the game to contain China.

Published in The Express Tribune, January 17th, 2012.
 
The writer doesn't take into account India's long and distinguished history of non-allignment. India is strong enough to say "NO" to the US and has/does/ Look at the plethora of deals the US wanted India to sign for the C-130J program- LSA, EUMA, CISMOA, LSA etc. India turned them down and will get better kit as replacements.
 
The writer doesn't take into account India's long and distinguished history of non-allignment. India is strong enough to say "NO" to the US and has/does/ Look at the plethora of deals the US wanted India to sign for the C-130J program- LSA, EUMA, CISMOA, LSA etc. India turned them down and will get better kit as replacements.

It is a myth that India was or is non alighned.

A former respected ambassador of India wrote in article about India/Russia/America
:

Dai Bingguo heading for Islamabad


Francis Fukuyama wrote a sequel to his celebrated book The End of History and the Last Man (1992) no sooner than he realised that he was hopelessly wrong in his prediction that the global triumph of political and economic liberalism was at hand. He wrote: “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the crossing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such… That is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western democracy as the final form of human government.” But in no time he realised his rush to judgment and he retracted with another book.

However, unlike the celebrated American neocon thinker, Indian foreign policy thinkers who were heavily influenced by his 1992 thesis are yet to retract. The Indian discourses through the 1990s drew heavily from Fukuyama to throw overboard the scope for reinventing or reinterpreting ‘non-alignment’ in the post-Cold War setting and came to a rapid judgment that Russia belonged to the dustbin of history. Our discourses never really got updated despite Fukumaya’s own retraction.

Indeed, western commentators also fuelled the consequent sense of insecurity in Delhi through the 1990s by endorsing that India would never have a ‘Russia option’ again and Boris Yeltsin’s Russia itself was inexorably becoming an ‘ally’ of the west — and, therefore, what alternative is there for India but to take to the New American Century project? Remember the drama of the Bill Clinton administration arm-twisting Yeltsin not to give to India the cryogentic engines?

In sum, India got entrapped in a ‘unipolar predicament’. The best elucidation of this self-invited predicament has been the masterly work titled Crossing the Rubicon by Raja Mohan, which was of course widely acclaimed in the US. While releasing the book at a function in Delhi, the then National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra even admitted that India’s main foreign policy challenge was somehow to engage the US’s “attention”.

Russia, of course, went on to prove our pundits completely wrong. Russia remerged as a global player and the evidence of it is today spread (and is poised to expand) all across global theatres — Libya, Syria, Iran, Central Asia, Afghanistan, etc.
Why I am underscoring all this is that I am strongly reminded of that sad chapter in the recent history of India’s foreign policy when I see the huge ‘psywar’ being let loose on Pakistan currently when that country too is at a crossroads with regard to its future policy directions in a highly volatile external enviornment.

In Pakistan’s case, the ‘psywar’ substitutes Russia with China. The US’s ‘Track II’ thesis is that China is hopelessly marooned in its own malaise so much so that it has no time, interest or resources to come to Pakistan’s aid, the two countries’ ‘all-weather friendship’ notwithstanding. Let me cull out two fine pieces of this ongoing ‘psywar’.

One is the lengthy article featured by America’s prestigious flag-carrier Foreign Affairs magazine in early December titled “China’s Pakistan conundrum”. Its argument is: ‘China will not simply bail out Pakistan with loans, investment, and aid, as those watching the deterioration of US-Pakistani relations seem to expect. China will pursue politics, security, and geopolitical advantage regardless of Islamabad’s preferences’. It puts forth the invidious argument that China’s real use for Pakistan is only to “box out New Delhi in Afghanistan and the broader region.”

Alongside the argument is the highly-tendentious vector that is beyond easy verification, namely, that US and China are increasingly ‘coordinating’ their policies toward Pakistan. Diplomacy is part dissimulation and we simply don’t know whether the US and China are even anywhere near beginning to ‘coordinate’ about ‘coordinating’ their regional policies in South Asia, especially with regard to Pakistan (and Afghanistan). The odds are that while the US and China may have some limited convergent interests, conceivably, their strategic interests are most certainly in sharp conflict.

A milder version of this frontal attack by US pundits on Pakistan’s existential dilemma appears in Michael Krepon’s article last week titled ‘Pakistan’s Patrons’, which, curiously, counsels Islamabad to follow India’s foreign-policy footsteps and make up with the US. Krepon literally suggests that the Pakistanis are living in a fool’s paradise.

The obvious thrust of this ‘psywar’ — strikingly similar to what India was subjected to in the 1990s — is that Pakistan has no option but to fall in line with the US regional strategies, as it has no real ‘China option’. The main difference between India and Pakistan is that the foreign policy elites in Islamabad — unlike their Indian counterparts — are not inclined to buy into the US argument with a willing suspension of disbelief. In a way, the Sino-Pakistan relationship is proving once again to be resilient. Pakistan is in no mood to get into a ‘unipolar predicament’, as the Indian elites willingly did in the 1990s.
Thus, the visit by the Chinese delegation led by State Councilor, Dai Bingguo to Islamabad at this point in time assumes much significance. Dai is one of the highest-ranking figures in the Chinese foreign-policy establishment and the fact he is leading a delegation that includes of senior Chinese military officials is very significant. Dai is scheduled to meet not only Pakistan’s political leadership at the highest level but also army chief Ashfaq Kayani and ISI head Ahmed Shuja Pasha.

Obviously, Beijing is making a big point through the timing of this visit as well, which, incidentally, is taking place at a time of great uncertainties in Pakistan’s internal affairs. When it comes to relations with China, it must be assumed that Pakistan’s civil and military leaderships are together.

Dai doesn’t really have a US counterpart as he is ranked above the FM. Arguably, it would be secretary of state Hillary Clinton. If so, to what extent Dai ‘coordinated’ his proposed visit with Clinton will be of particular interest. The future of the US’s ‘psywar’ on Pakistan is at stake.

The big question is whether this would be Dai’s last major trip to South Asia, as he is a key member of President Hu Jintao’s team and China is moving into a period of transition at the leadership level. Dai’s visit to Delhi for the Special Representatives meet was called off at the last minute.
Posted in Diplomacy, Politics.
 
Who said a strong & assertive China is in Indian interest ?

Containing China is more important to India than to US.
 
Well let the swords clash and lets see if China breaks or India breaks. If that's the choice you want

Well its always an indirect clash for influence rather than a direct clash militarily.

So no, neither will be broken. But the pawns..? yes they will become the sacrificial lambs ;)
 
Well its always an indirect clash for influence rather than a direct clash militarily.

So no, neither will be broken. But the pawns..? yes they will become the sacrificial lambs ;)

Oh you mean like India being America's pawn lol didn't see that coming did you lol
 
Oh you mean like India being America's pawn lol didn't see that coming did you lol

I saw that coming from you and considering how lame it is, I am not surprised.

It would not be wrong to say India is making use of US' paranoia regarding China for its own use without becoming unnecessarily antagonistic of China. Clever policy.
 
So you see India as America's pawn. It was foreseeable but you don't like to think of India as a pawn yea rite

The thing is against Pakistan and China we are open to give or take all help to anyone but in other case people should not expect any help from India, we will work in our own interest. :yahoo:
 
The thing is against Pakistan and China we are open to give or take all help to anyone but in other case people should not expect any help from India, we will work in our own interest. :yahoo:

So what you are saying is against China and Pakistan you are prepared to be pawns or cannon fodder lol
 
So you see India as America's pawn. It was foreseeable but you don't like to think of India as a pawn yea rite

Read my post again...this time s.l.o.w.l.y.

It would not be wrong to say India is making use of US' paranoia regarding China for its own use without becoming unnecessarily antagonistic of China. Clever policy.
 
Read my post again...this time s.l.o.w.l.y.

It would not be wrong to say India is making use of US' paranoia regarding China for its own use without becoming unnecessarily antagonistic of China. Clever policy.

And you need to read earlier posts. Indians being clever or non aligned is a myth. cant you read posts more than two lines?


A former respected ambassador of India wrote in article about India/Russia/America who knows more than you clearly states what Indians position was and is stop thinking its something clever on the contrary this Indian ambassador thinks it was a mistake :

Dai Bingguo heading for Islamabad


Francis Fukuyama wrote a sequel to his celebrated book The End of History and the Last Man (1992) no sooner than he realised that he was hopelessly wrong in his prediction that the global triumph of political and economic liberalism was at hand. He wrote: “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the crossing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such… That is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western democracy as the final form of human government.” But in no time he realised his rush to judgment and he retracted with another book.

However, unlike the celebrated American neocon thinker, Indian foreign policy thinkers who were heavily influenced by his 1992 thesis are yet to retract. The Indian discourses through the 1990s drew heavily from Fukuyama to throw overboard the scope for reinventing or reinterpreting ‘non-alignment’ in the post-Cold War setting and came to a rapid judgment that Russia belonged to the dustbin of history. Our discourses never really got updated despite Fukumaya’s own retraction.

Indeed, western commentators also fuelled the consequent sense of insecurity in Delhi through the 1990s by endorsing that India would never have a ‘Russia option’ again and Boris Yeltsin’s Russia itself was inexorably becoming an ‘ally’ of the west — and, therefore, what alternative is there for India but to take to the New American Century project? Remember the drama of the Bill Clinton administration arm-twisting Yeltsin not to give to India the cryogentic engines?

In sum, India got entrapped in a ‘unipolar predicament’. The best elucidation of this self-invited predicament has been the masterly work titled Crossing the Rubicon by Raja Mohan, which was of course widely acclaimed in the US. While releasing the book at a function in Delhi, the then National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra even admitted that India’s main foreign policy challenge was somehow to engage the US’s “attention”.

Russia, of course, went on to prove our pundits completely wrong. Russia remerged as a global player and the evidence of it is today spread (and is poised to expand) all across global theatres — Libya, Syria, Iran, Central Asia, Afghanistan, etc.
Why I am underscoring all this is that I am strongly reminded of that sad chapter in the recent history of India’s foreign policy when I see the huge ‘psywar’ being let loose on Pakistan currently when that country too is at a crossroads with regard to its future policy directions in a highly volatile external enviornment.

In Pakistan’s case, the ‘psywar’ substitutes Russia with China. The US’s ‘Track II’ thesis is that China is hopelessly marooned in its own malaise so much so that it has no time, interest or resources to come to Pakistan’s aid, the two countries’ ‘all-weather friendship’ notwithstanding. Let me cull out two fine pieces of this ongoing ‘psywar’.

One is the lengthy article featured by America’s prestigious flag-carrier Foreign Affairs magazine in early December titled “China’s Pakistan conundrum”. Its argument is: ‘China will not simply bail out Pakistan with loans, investment, and aid, as those watching the deterioration of US-Pakistani relations seem to expect. China will pursue politics, security, and geopolitical advantage regardless of Islamabad’s preferences’. It puts forth the invidious argument that China’s real use for Pakistan is only to “box out New Delhi in Afghanistan and the broader region.”

Alongside the argument is the highly-tendentious vector that is beyond easy verification, namely, that US and China are increasingly ‘coordinating’ their policies toward Pakistan. Diplomacy is part dissimulation and we simply don’t know whether the US and China are even anywhere near beginning to ‘coordinate’ about ‘coordinating’ their regional policies in South Asia, especially with regard to Pakistan (and Afghanistan). The odds are that while the US and China may have some limited convergent interests, conceivably, their strategic interests are most certainly in sharp conflict.

A milder version of this frontal attack by US pundits on Pakistan’s existential dilemma appears in Michael Krepon’s article last week titled ‘Pakistan’s Patrons’, which, curiously, counsels Islamabad to follow India’s foreign-policy footsteps and make up with the US. Krepon literally suggests that the Pakistanis are living in a fool’s paradise.

The obvious thrust of this ‘psywar’ — strikingly similar to what India was subjected to in the 1990s — is that Pakistan has no option but to fall in line with the US regional strategies, as it has no real ‘China option’. The main difference between India and Pakistan is that the foreign policy elites in Islamabad — unlike their Indian counterparts — are not inclined to buy into the US argument with a willing suspension of disbelief. In a way, the Sino-Pakistan relationship is proving once again to be resilient. Pakistan is in no mood to get into a ‘unipolar predicament’, as the Indian elites willingly did in the 1990s.

Thus, the visit by the Chinese delegation led by State Councilor, Dai Bingguo to Islamabad at this point in time assumes much significance. Dai is one of the highest-ranking figures in the Chinese foreign-policy establishment and the fact he is leading a delegation that includes of senior Chinese military officials is very significant. Dai is scheduled to meet not only Pakistan’s political leadership at the highest level but also army chief Ashfaq Kayani and ISI head Ahmed Shuja Pasha.

Obviously, Beijing is making a big point through the timing of this visit as well, which, incidentally, is taking place at a time of great uncertainties in Pakistan’s internal affairs. When it comes to relations with China, it must be assumed that Pakistan’s civil and military leaderships are together.

Dai doesn’t really have a US counterpart as he is ranked above the FM. Arguably, it would be secretary of state Hillary Clinton. If so, to what extent Dai ‘coordinated’ his proposed visit with Clinton will be of particular interest. The future of the US’s ‘psywar’ on Pakistan is at stake.

The big question is whether this would be Dai’s last major trip to South Asia, as he is a key member of President Hu Jintao’s team and China is moving into a period of transition at the leadership level. Dai’s visit to Delhi for the Special Representatives meet was called off at the last minute.
Posted in Diplomacy, Politics.
 

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