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How China’s defence law changes pave the way for greater global military influence
Illustration: Craig Stephens
Just as much of the world celebrated the dawning of 2021 and bade good riddance to the much-maligned 2020, China quietly updated key legislation that could change world events.
On January 1, an amended National Defence Law came into effect after having been approved by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee. The seemingly technical, legalistic change would normally be unremarkable, but the amendments that were included could have profound effects on China’s legal standing and willingness to deploy its military overseas.
By providing legal support for China’s future overseas adventurism, the law both underlines Beijing’s intent to be a more activist military power and expands the reasons it might project its power overseas. As such, the little-reported amended law might be the most significant event in global politics for years. Some amendments continue the themes in domestic politics seen in recent years.
For the latter, the new law shifts the balance of responsibility for certain actions from the State Council – currently headed by Premier Li Keqiang, to the Central Military Commission, with Xi as its chair. This commission is now the lead agency in organising and implementing national defence mobilisation.
Of course, there has been little doubt that it is the party organs, and the general secretary in particular, that make decisions over military deployments, mobilisation and utilisation. Nevertheless, these amendments now add de jure confirmation of the minimal role played by the state.
More significant in the new law is the change to “military activities carried out by the state”. Previously, the activities the law applied to were largely a broad description of effectively protecting the homeland, including to “guard and resist aggression” and “safeguard the sovereignty, unification, territorial integrity and security of our country”.
Now, with the addition of just three words, this description has expanded to incorporate far more expansive activities.
One of these words is “disruption”, a vague term that could include anything from protests in Hong Kong, Tibet or Xinjiang to unrest over socio economic conditions. Of even greater international import, though, was the inclusion of the phrase defending “Overseas development interests”. This phrase suggests China now considers all of its investments and economic activity, domestic and overseas, to be worthy of protection by military force.
This is a substantial legal change and reflects long-term trends in China’s military capabilities and defence posture. From the creation of the modern state in 1949, Beijing was primarily worried about protection of the country’s territory and unity from foreign powers.
Its largest military engagements were to protect the country’s borders, such as in clashes with India and the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1969; its claim to territorial sovereignty with clashes against Vietnam in the South China Sea in 1974 and 1988; or to support foreign allies in the Korean war from 1951 and the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979.
Now, the new defence law theoretically enables China to deploy overseas in support of its economic interests. Given the country’s stellar growth during the past four decades and substantial increase in overseas investments as part of its “go out” policy since the turn of the century, these interests are varied and global.
It is easy to imagine, for instance, Chinese troops being deployed to Pakistan to protect its Belt and Road Initiative investments as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor from attack by Baloch separatists or Indian Aggression, or Chinese vessels escorting ships in the Persian Gulf and Strategic Strait as regional tensions rise. The People’s Liberation Army could be deployed to a South Pacific island or African state that has descended into ungoverned unrest to secure mining interests and Chinese citizens.
https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinio...-law-changes-pave-way-greater-global-military
China’s military takes charge of war powers with new defence law
Minnie Chan
31 December 2020
China has expanded the power of its Central Military Commission (CMC) – headed by President Xi Jinping – to mobilise military and civilian resources in defence of the national interest, both at home and abroad.
Revisions to the National Defence Law, effective from January 1, weaken the role of the State Council – China’s cabinet – in formulating military policy, handing decision-making powers to the CMC.
For the first time, “disruption” and protection of “development interests” have been added to the legislation as grounds for the mobilisation and deployment of troops and reserve forces.
The legislation also specifically stresses the need to build a nationwide coordination mechanism for the mobilisation of state-owned and private enterprises to take part in research into new defence technologies covering conventional weapons, as well as the non-traditional domains of cybersecurity, space and electromagnetics.
Military and political analysts said the amendments aimed to strengthen the country’s military leadership under Xi, providing it with the legal grounds to respond to the challenges of accelerating confrontations between China and the US.
Deng Yuwen, a former deputy editor of the Communist Party publication Study Times, said the amendments aimed to legalise and formally apply the “special” nature of China’s political and defence system when dealing with situations that could harm the regime at home and abroad.
“China’s political nature is very different from many countries … it’s not surprising for Beijing to enhance the leadership of the CMC when the PLA is going out to defend China’s national interests across the world,” said Deng, who is now an independent political commentator in the US.
China’s success at controlling the Covid-19 pandemic has been seen by Beijing as an endorsement of the Communist Party’s authoritarian rule, particularly as many Western countries are still struggling with rising numbers of infections.
Chen Daoyin, an independent political commentator and former professor at the Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, said the changes showed the regime had gained the confidence to legitimise its long-standing principle that “the party commands the gun” and stamp its “absolute leadership over armed and reserved forces”.
“The move to include ‘Overseas development interests’ as a reason for armed mobilisation and war in the law would provide legal grounds for the country to launch war in the legitimate name of defending national development interests, in domestic and abroad” Chen said.
Zeng Zhiping, a military law expert at Soochow University, said one of the big changes of the law was the downgrading of the State Council’s role in formulating the principles of China’s national defence, and the right to direct and administer the mobilisation of its armed forces.
“The CMC is now formally in charge of making national defence policy and principles, while the State Council becomes a mere implementing agency to provide support to the military,” said Zeng, who is also a retired PLA lieutenant colonel.
“It’s a big contrast when compared with developed countries like Israel, Germany and France, which prefer to put their armed forces under civilian leadership. Even in the US, the civilian-led defence ministry plays a more important role than their military top brass, the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”
Chi said the ultimate goal of the amended defence law could be seen as Beijing’s latest response to the US policy of comprehensive strategic containment of a rising China.
“The Chinese Communist Party now has strong crisis awareness as it faces various new security challenges, pushing the PLA to come up with a new defence policy soon after completing the establishment of top-down commanding and coordinating systems under Xi’s leadership,” Chi said.
“The law revision is also a symbolic battle call by the party to warn all Chinese people to be combat-ready for a nationwide defence mobilisation, which the party has never done since [it came to power] in 1949.”
The amendments were passed by the National People’s Congress on December 26, after two years of deliberation. Three articles were removed, more than 50 were amended, while there were six additions. In a media conference earlier in December, a spokesperson for the CMC’s legislative affairs bureau said the changes gave the PLA a clear direction in its modernisation and development goals.
https://malaysia.news.yahoo.com/chi...GzaBF0NDLYw8FaP1O_sFY0k-vj2E-0z-f78-MRo2LwDQv
How China’s defence law changes pave the way for greater global military influence
- By providing legal support for future overseas adventurism, the law underlines Beijing’s intent to be a more activist military power and expands the reasons it might project its power abroad – a change that could shake up global politics
Illustration: Craig Stephens
Just as much of the world celebrated the dawning of 2021 and bade good riddance to the much-maligned 2020, China quietly updated key legislation that could change world events.
On January 1, an amended National Defence Law came into effect after having been approved by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee. The seemingly technical, legalistic change would normally be unremarkable, but the amendments that were included could have profound effects on China’s legal standing and willingness to deploy its military overseas.
By providing legal support for China’s future overseas adventurism, the law both underlines Beijing’s intent to be a more activist military power and expands the reasons it might project its power overseas. As such, the little-reported amended law might be the most significant event in global politics for years. Some amendments continue the themes in domestic politics seen in recent years.
For the latter, the new law shifts the balance of responsibility for certain actions from the State Council – currently headed by Premier Li Keqiang, to the Central Military Commission, with Xi as its chair. This commission is now the lead agency in organising and implementing national defence mobilisation.
Of course, there has been little doubt that it is the party organs, and the general secretary in particular, that make decisions over military deployments, mobilisation and utilisation. Nevertheless, these amendments now add de jure confirmation of the minimal role played by the state.
More significant in the new law is the change to “military activities carried out by the state”. Previously, the activities the law applied to were largely a broad description of effectively protecting the homeland, including to “guard and resist aggression” and “safeguard the sovereignty, unification, territorial integrity and security of our country”.
Now, with the addition of just three words, this description has expanded to incorporate far more expansive activities.
One of these words is “disruption”, a vague term that could include anything from protests in Hong Kong, Tibet or Xinjiang to unrest over socio economic conditions. Of even greater international import, though, was the inclusion of the phrase defending “Overseas development interests”. This phrase suggests China now considers all of its investments and economic activity, domestic and overseas, to be worthy of protection by military force.
This is a substantial legal change and reflects long-term trends in China’s military capabilities and defence posture. From the creation of the modern state in 1949, Beijing was primarily worried about protection of the country’s territory and unity from foreign powers.
Its largest military engagements were to protect the country’s borders, such as in clashes with India and the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1969; its claim to territorial sovereignty with clashes against Vietnam in the South China Sea in 1974 and 1988; or to support foreign allies in the Korean war from 1951 and the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979.
Now, the new defence law theoretically enables China to deploy overseas in support of its economic interests. Given the country’s stellar growth during the past four decades and substantial increase in overseas investments as part of its “go out” policy since the turn of the century, these interests are varied and global.
It is easy to imagine, for instance, Chinese troops being deployed to Pakistan to protect its Belt and Road Initiative investments as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor from attack by Baloch separatists or Indian Aggression, or Chinese vessels escorting ships in the Persian Gulf and Strategic Strait as regional tensions rise. The People’s Liberation Army could be deployed to a South Pacific island or African state that has descended into ungoverned unrest to secure mining interests and Chinese citizens.
https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinio...-law-changes-pave-way-greater-global-military
China’s military takes charge of war powers with new defence law
Minnie Chan
31 December 2020
China has expanded the power of its Central Military Commission (CMC) – headed by President Xi Jinping – to mobilise military and civilian resources in defence of the national interest, both at home and abroad.
Revisions to the National Defence Law, effective from January 1, weaken the role of the State Council – China’s cabinet – in formulating military policy, handing decision-making powers to the CMC.
For the first time, “disruption” and protection of “development interests” have been added to the legislation as grounds for the mobilisation and deployment of troops and reserve forces.
The legislation also specifically stresses the need to build a nationwide coordination mechanism for the mobilisation of state-owned and private enterprises to take part in research into new defence technologies covering conventional weapons, as well as the non-traditional domains of cybersecurity, space and electromagnetics.
Military and political analysts said the amendments aimed to strengthen the country’s military leadership under Xi, providing it with the legal grounds to respond to the challenges of accelerating confrontations between China and the US.
Deng Yuwen, a former deputy editor of the Communist Party publication Study Times, said the amendments aimed to legalise and formally apply the “special” nature of China’s political and defence system when dealing with situations that could harm the regime at home and abroad.
“China’s political nature is very different from many countries … it’s not surprising for Beijing to enhance the leadership of the CMC when the PLA is going out to defend China’s national interests across the world,” said Deng, who is now an independent political commentator in the US.
China’s success at controlling the Covid-19 pandemic has been seen by Beijing as an endorsement of the Communist Party’s authoritarian rule, particularly as many Western countries are still struggling with rising numbers of infections.
Chen Daoyin, an independent political commentator and former professor at the Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, said the changes showed the regime had gained the confidence to legitimise its long-standing principle that “the party commands the gun” and stamp its “absolute leadership over armed and reserved forces”.
“The move to include ‘Overseas development interests’ as a reason for armed mobilisation and war in the law would provide legal grounds for the country to launch war in the legitimate name of defending national development interests, in domestic and abroad” Chen said.
Zeng Zhiping, a military law expert at Soochow University, said one of the big changes of the law was the downgrading of the State Council’s role in formulating the principles of China’s national defence, and the right to direct and administer the mobilisation of its armed forces.
“The CMC is now formally in charge of making national defence policy and principles, while the State Council becomes a mere implementing agency to provide support to the military,” said Zeng, who is also a retired PLA lieutenant colonel.
“It’s a big contrast when compared with developed countries like Israel, Germany and France, which prefer to put their armed forces under civilian leadership. Even in the US, the civilian-led defence ministry plays a more important role than their military top brass, the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”
Chi said the ultimate goal of the amended defence law could be seen as Beijing’s latest response to the US policy of comprehensive strategic containment of a rising China.
“The Chinese Communist Party now has strong crisis awareness as it faces various new security challenges, pushing the PLA to come up with a new defence policy soon after completing the establishment of top-down commanding and coordinating systems under Xi’s leadership,” Chi said.
“The law revision is also a symbolic battle call by the party to warn all Chinese people to be combat-ready for a nationwide defence mobilisation, which the party has never done since [it came to power] in 1949.”
The amendments were passed by the National People’s Congress on December 26, after two years of deliberation. Three articles were removed, more than 50 were amended, while there were six additions. In a media conference earlier in December, a spokesperson for the CMC’s legislative affairs bureau said the changes gave the PLA a clear direction in its modernisation and development goals.
https://malaysia.news.yahoo.com/chi...GzaBF0NDLYw8FaP1O_sFY0k-vj2E-0z-f78-MRo2LwDQv
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