rkjindal91
FULL MEMBER
- Mar 16, 2011
- 260
- 0
Nixon's tilt towards Pak, China led India
to 1st nuclear test
Dec 6, 2011, 02.27PM IST PTI
WASHINGTON: US tilt towards Pakistan and its overtures to China in the
early 70s apparently led India to go ahead with the decision to conduct its first nuclear test in Pokharan in 1974, which caught the entire western intelligence by surprise.
A secret State Department intelligence note, dated January 14, 1972,
acknowledged that US policy had an impact on India's decision making on nuclear weapons, saying there was "little doubt" that the then president Richard Nixon's announcement of
his trip to China changed New Delhi's calculations. The late US president, who was forced to step down in the wake of Watergate scandal, had troubled relations with India because of his tilt towards Pakistan in the 1971 Indo-Pak war and his moves to reconcile with China.
Declassified American documents of the
era reveal that as of early 1971, all
evidence indicated that the Government
of India had decided to defer indefinitely the development and explosion of a test device. "In early August, however, the cabinet
undertook a review of Indian nuclear
policy in the wake of President Nixon's
July 16 announcement of his proposed
trip to China. There can be little doubt
that the July 16 announcement has had major implications for India's security
calculations and its nuclear policy," the
six-page intelligence note said, which
was released by the National Security
Archive.
"In New Delhi's view, the announcement
appeared to rule out all hope that India
(not a signatory to the NPT) could
anticipate a joint US-Soviet umbrella
against the threat of Chinese nuclear
attack," it said, adding that the decision to detonate a nuclear device may have
been triggered by the deepening crisis in Indo-Pakistani relations. "India may have concluded that an early test would demonstrate its increasing military strength to Pakistan and remind the latter's Chinese and American friends
of its potential power," the intelligence
note said. "Although the immediate issue with Pakistan has been settled, a test still would probably be regarded as very useful by the Indians," it added. The documents claim that US assessment
was that a nuclear test would constitute
dramatic support for India's contention
that it is the only important power on the subcontinent. "India also may hope that a demonstrated nuclear capability would quash any thoughts of revenge the Pakistanis might still entertain," the
State department said. Six months later in June 1972, the then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, wrote to president Nixon about intelligence
reports which also came from other
sources that India has decided to go
nuclear. "Such a test would likely affect the attitudes of the USSR and the People
Republic of China toward South Asia, and
would probably generate Pakistani
pressures for enhanced security guarantees. Again, we should be carefully consider our position," Kissinger wrote in his note. Analysing the latest round of declassified documents of the era, the National
Security Archives writes that relations
between New Delhi and Washington
were already cool during the Nixon
administration which treated India as a relatively low priority. "Henry Kissinger's secret trip to China underlined India's low priority by suggesting that if New Delhi ever faced a crisis with Beijing it could not count on Washington for help, it said. PTI LKJ AKD.
NSA 12061355 NNNN
to 1st nuclear test
Dec 6, 2011, 02.27PM IST PTI
WASHINGTON: US tilt towards Pakistan and its overtures to China in the
early 70s apparently led India to go ahead with the decision to conduct its first nuclear test in Pokharan in 1974, which caught the entire western intelligence by surprise.
A secret State Department intelligence note, dated January 14, 1972,
acknowledged that US policy had an impact on India's decision making on nuclear weapons, saying there was "little doubt" that the then president Richard Nixon's announcement of
his trip to China changed New Delhi's calculations. The late US president, who was forced to step down in the wake of Watergate scandal, had troubled relations with India because of his tilt towards Pakistan in the 1971 Indo-Pak war and his moves to reconcile with China.
Declassified American documents of the
era reveal that as of early 1971, all
evidence indicated that the Government
of India had decided to defer indefinitely the development and explosion of a test device. "In early August, however, the cabinet
undertook a review of Indian nuclear
policy in the wake of President Nixon's
July 16 announcement of his proposed
trip to China. There can be little doubt
that the July 16 announcement has had major implications for India's security
calculations and its nuclear policy," the
six-page intelligence note said, which
was released by the National Security
Archive.
"In New Delhi's view, the announcement
appeared to rule out all hope that India
(not a signatory to the NPT) could
anticipate a joint US-Soviet umbrella
against the threat of Chinese nuclear
attack," it said, adding that the decision to detonate a nuclear device may have
been triggered by the deepening crisis in Indo-Pakistani relations. "India may have concluded that an early test would demonstrate its increasing military strength to Pakistan and remind the latter's Chinese and American friends
of its potential power," the intelligence
note said. "Although the immediate issue with Pakistan has been settled, a test still would probably be regarded as very useful by the Indians," it added. The documents claim that US assessment
was that a nuclear test would constitute
dramatic support for India's contention
that it is the only important power on the subcontinent. "India also may hope that a demonstrated nuclear capability would quash any thoughts of revenge the Pakistanis might still entertain," the
State department said. Six months later in June 1972, the then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, wrote to president Nixon about intelligence
reports which also came from other
sources that India has decided to go
nuclear. "Such a test would likely affect the attitudes of the USSR and the People
Republic of China toward South Asia, and
would probably generate Pakistani
pressures for enhanced security guarantees. Again, we should be carefully consider our position," Kissinger wrote in his note. Analysing the latest round of declassified documents of the era, the National
Security Archives writes that relations
between New Delhi and Washington
were already cool during the Nixon
administration which treated India as a relatively low priority. "Henry Kissinger's secret trip to China underlined India's low priority by suggesting that if New Delhi ever faced a crisis with Beijing it could not count on Washington for help, it said. PTI LKJ AKD.
NSA 12061355 NNNN
