What's new

Mapping the kinetic aspect of the Operation Inherent Resolve to defeat ISIL (Updated)

LeGenD

MODERATOR
Joined
Aug 28, 2006
Messages
15,813
Reaction score
162
Country
Pakistan
Location
Pakistan
BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS OF THE ISIL

"At its peak, IS ruled over 88,000 sq km (34,000 sq miles) stretching across the Iraq-Syria border." - BBC*

Syria and Iraq contemplated merger to create the United Arab Republic in the 1960s.



Iraqi President Hassan al-Bakr and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad had finalized the merger process in 1978 but Saddam Hussein forced al-Bakr to step down and secure his grip on Iraq. Saddam also suspended the merger process:


However, a Syrian journalist and author Hassan Hassan provides a detailed account of the origins of ISIL and how Saddam helped cultivate an ideology that facilitated ISIL movement:


Related information in following link:


Bush administration found an opportunity to get rid of Saddam regime after 9/11. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) got wind of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party getting in touch with Al-Qaeda operatives and Iraq having hidden caches of chemical weapons. However, American coverage of these interesting realities is botched due to political polarization between the Democrats and the Republicans. Nevertheless, Bush administration launched Operation Iraqi Freedom to topple Saddam regime in 2003:



ISIL movement began to take shape in response to the ill-advised De-Ba'athification move of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that was established with American support in 2003:


De-Ba'athification move of the CPA entailed disbanding Ba'ath Party as well as Iraqi armed forces and bureaucracy created under Saddam. This move set the stage for an extremely violent Iraqi insurgency in which Al-Qaeda Network in Iraq (AQI) was also involved. AQI was founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2004. This man had links to Osama Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda Network in Af-Pak region. This relationship was acknowledged in a Pakistani report:


US-led forces fought and overcame Iraqi insurgency during the (2004 - 2008) period in a series of well-executed operations, and Obama administration called for withdrawal of NATO from Iraq in 2011 when situation on the ground looked much better.

As for Saddam, his sons were killed in 2003 and he was hanged in 2006. His last words are cryptic but telling.

"Don't think this is over. This is just the beginning."

But sectarianism of then Iraqi Prime Minister (PM) Nouri al-Maliki provided sufficient impetus to AQI remnants and Saddam loyalists to REGROUP and establish ISIL with support of allies in Syria.


As you can see:





+

"Yes, I think extremism was there. It is in the region, not in Iraq. Don’t forget that extremism came from other countries. And these would-be suicide bombers came from all over the Arab world, and from almost over 100 countries, even some Western countries. And they were large numbers, and they managed to bring themselves in Syria, they did occupy quite large swaths of territory in Syria, and then they were able to cross into Iraq.

Now, the fault lines are this: Under these circumstances, you should win your population over. You shouldn’t push your population towards the other side. What happened because of political enmity, and political differences in the country, it was one against the other. So with the government, and the government has set an opposition, whether they are Shia or Sunni or Kurds. And these others, they were gathering against the government. By doing this, they were attracting people from all sorts of life, including terrorists, including those who resort to violence. And in that critical moment, the whole thing snapped. Terrorists, because they were able in Syria, they were being readied to cross the border to Iraq. And the atmosphere in Iraq was created that they will welcome these fighters in the country. And that was a major mistake by the government. And they could have done much better by winning over their own people, the Iraqi people, so that terrorists will not thrive into our own communities.


And that’s what happened. The whole state collapse, security forces collapse, whole divisions of the army collapse, and the terrorists took over. And of course, some people in these areas welcomed these terrorists under the assumption that these terrorists will save them from — I put it in brackets — the oppressive means of the Baghdad government, although it wasn’t oppressive as such. But people were not happy. So they thought this Daesh, and these tours will help them to take out what they think is their own." - Iraqi PM Dr. Haider al-Abadi


The “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” (ISIS) is the main source of instability, not only in Iraq and Syria, but also throughout the Middle East. The instability poses a danger for the other parts of the world because of the influx of foreign fighters to the region. Extremists have taken advantage of the continuing conflicts in Iraq and Syria, with Syria in particular serving as a magnet for thousands of foreign fighters from more than 90 countries. While most of these ISIS combatants are men, many women have left their countries behind to join the “caliphate” and support its cause. Social media have played a key role in luring women to join ISIS. This study therefore analyzed the ISIS organization’s social media propaganda and grass-roots recruitment activities aimed at women in Turkey. The results of the analysis provide important information about the strategies that ISIS uses to spread its ideology.


ISIL movement was able to draw recruits from multiple countries through its social media campaigns in line with Islamic eschatology of the Black Banners: Mehdi will come and create an army of the Black Banners to defeat regional enemies and Dajjal. Many take this eschatology seriously.




---

OFFICIAL LINKS



---

STRATEGY AND TACTICS


Obama administration launched Operation Inherent Resolve to destroy ISIL with support of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Syria and Iraqi government under PM Dr. Haider al-Abadi in 2014.

Mapping the kinetic aspect of the Operation Inherent Resolve to defeat ISIL in the Middle East during the (2014 - 2018) period:


_106170029_end_of-caliphate_v8_640-nc.png



---

ACHIEVEMENTS / MILESTONES

1.
Fall of ISIL stronghold in Iraq (i.e. Fallujah) to US-backed forces in 2016 (also identified as Operation Breaking Terrorism)

Details: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Battle_of_Fallujah



---

2. Fall of ISIL stronghold in Iraq (i.e. Mosul) to US-backed forces in 2017

Details: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Mosul_(2016–2017)



A Tale of Two Mosuls, The resurrection of the Iraqi armed forces and the military defeat of ISIS


---

3. Fall of ISIL stronghold in Syria (i.e. Raqqa) to US-backed forces in 2017

Details: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Raqqa_(2017)




59ea4ab16bf6a.image.jpg



---

4. American troops eliminate ISIL chief Abu Bakr al Baghdadi in a military operation in Syria (i.e. Idlib) in 2019 (also identified as Operation Kayla Mueller)

Details: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Abu_Bakr_al-Baghdadi








------

PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTS






REFERENCES

*

 
all being shifted to afghanistan. Nicely left out others who did far more to defeat daesh than yankee sam.
 
all being shifted to afghanistan.
Former TTP members created ISIS-K in Afghanistan.

Formation and Relationship with ISIS Core
In 2014, Pakistani national Hafiz Saeed Khan was chosen to spearhead IS-K province as its first emir. Khan, a veteran Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commander, brought along other prominent TTP members—including the group’s spokesman Sheikh Maqbool and many district chiefs—when he initially pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi in October 2014. Many of these individuals were included in the first Khorasan Shura or leadership council.

IS-K’s early membership included a contingent of Pakistani militants who emerged in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province around 2010, just across the border from the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Many of these militants were estranged members of TTP and Lashkar-e Islam, who had fled Pakistan to escape pressure from security forces. The appointment of Khan as IS-K’s first emir, and former Taliban commander Abdul Rauf Khadim as his deputy, further facilitated the group’s growth, utilizing long established recruitment networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, as of 2017, some members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the Haqqani Network, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) had also defected to IS-K.

IS-K has received support from the Islamic State’s core leadership in Iraq and Syria since its founding in 2015. As the Islamic State loses territory, it has increasingly turned to Afghanistan as a base for its global caliphate. Following IS-K’s official pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State’s global “ummah,” Islamic State wilayats (or provinces) in Iraq and Syria publicly announced their congratulations for the movement’s expansion into Central Asia through media statements and videos. To that end, the Islamic State has invested some financial resources in its Khorasan province—as much as several hundred thousand dollars—to improve its networks and organization in Central Asia. Additionally, a recent United Nations publication commented that “[ISIS] core continues to facilitate the relocation of some of its key operatives to Afghanistan,” including Abu Qutaiba, the Islamic State’s former leader in Iraq’s Salah al-Din province. Afghanistan remains a top destination for foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) in the region, as well as for fighters leaving battlefields in the Levant. IS-K’s public affairs prowess, global prestige, and sustained resources facilitate the recruitment of these FTFs, drawing them away from other militant movements.


Link: https://www.csis.org/programs/trans...rorism-backgrounders/islamic-state-khorasan-k

The Islamic State announced the formation of its Afghan affiliate in January 2015. ISKP (also known asISIS-K) was onceconcentrated in eastern Afghanistan, particularly in Nangarhar province,which borders the region of Pakistan formerly known as theFederally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). There, ISKP was mostly comprisedof former Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants who fled Pakistani army operations in the FATA after mid-2014.


Related information in following Pakistani publication:


- - - - -

Efforts to soften ISIS-K in Afghanistan are documented in following sources:

ISIS-K: deadly nuisance or strategic threat?











Nicely left out others who did far more to defeat daesh than yankee sam.
FYI

Russian contribution = Limited efforts and capacity (Syria only)
Turkish contribution = Limited efforts and capacity (Syria only)
Iranian contribution = Sincere efforts but limited capacity (Syria and Iraq)


Fighting ISIS in Syria: Operation Euphrates Shield and the lessons learned from the al-Bab Battle


A Comparative Study of U.S. and Iranian Counter-ISIS Strategies

 
The Air War Against the Islamic State
The Role of Airpower in Operation Inherent Resolve

Airpower played a pivotal role in the U.S.-led fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) from 2014 to 2019 and contributed to the success of Operation Inherent Resolve. This report sheds light on the impact of the air operations in Operation Inherent Resolve and whether airpower could have been applied differently to achieve faster, more-sustainable outcomes. The authors incorporate interviews with U.S. and coalition personnel, primary-source documents, and U.S. and coalition strike and sortie data to document the operational history of the air war, assess the relationship between airpower effects, and analyze the strategic and operational impact of airpower in Operation Inherent Resolve.

The authors find that, although airpower played an essential role in combating ISIS, airpower alone would not have been likely to defeat the militant organization. Instead, the combination of airpower and ground forces—led by Iraqi and Syrian partners—was needed to destroy the Islamic State as a territorial entity. The overarching strategy of Operation Inherent Resolve, which put ground-force partners in the lead, created several challenges and innovations in the application of airpower, which have implications for future air wars. To be prepared to meet future demands against nonstate and near-peer adversaries, the U.S. Air Force and the joint force should apply lessons learned from Operation Inherent Resolve.

Key Findings

  • Airpower played a critical role in Operation Inherent Resolve, based on the "by, with, and through" strategy, which placed local partners as leaders of the fight to destroy the caliphate. In turn, partners' capabilities and interests shaped how airpower was used.
  • Although more-aggressive air operations might have slightly accelerated the defeat of ISIS, they are unlikely to have significantly altered the timeline.
  • The deep fight in Operation Inherent Resolve affected ISIS's finances, but it could not affect ISIS's main center of gravity—territory—meaning that strategic attack did not play a decisive role in this operation.
  • Critical enablers, such as remotely piloted aircraft and aerial refueling aircraft, were in high demand and provided vital capabilities but were at times overstretched.
  • Essential wartime skills, such as deliberate-targeting and defensive counterair operations, were used for the first time in years in a real operation, requiring reinvigoration of these proficiencies.
  • Battlespace management within the Operation Inherent Resolve coalition was a point of disagreement, particularly between the Combined Joint Task Force Commander and the Combined Air Forces Component Commander, and affected the development of the deep fight.
  • Necessary efforts to prevent civilian casualties and reduce collateral damage depleted precision-guided munition stockpiles.

Recommendations

  • The joint force should revise its targeting doctrine based on the experience in Operation Inherent Resolve, including potentially incorporating the strike cell construct into doctrine or determining whether to use the Joint Air Ground Integration Center to integrate airpower with ground partners in the absence of forward joint terminal attack controllers.
  • The joint force should reinvigorate, reexamine, and revise the target-development process to make it more efficient.
  • The joint force should modify the allocation process for high-demand assets in joint campaigns to reduce inefficiencies and increase agility.
  • The joint force should reexamine battlespace management and revise doctrine or tactics, techniques, and procedures so that it can more dynamically manage both the close and the deep fights.
  • The Air Force will need to limit civilian casualties and collateral damage, requiring it to allocate precision-guided munitions efficiently across theaters and identify how to safely use second- and third-choice munitions.
  • The Air Force should continue to develop more targeteers and intelligence professionals to support a reinvigoration of the target-development process.
  • Self-defense rules of engagement in air-to-air operations should be stressed to airmen in training and real-world flying events. Leaders should emphasize to airmen that they are empowered and expected to defend the airspace, while avoiding inadvertent escalation.

 

Back
Top Bottom