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Huntington in Hindsight

i agree with a lot of what is being said, but there is a danger of framing all this arab revolution into a broader framework of a western type leftist argument - typical things like womens rights, despotic leaders, islamism and everything to do with what the west regards as islamism and being "arab".


a most curious situation is developing, large majorities in Muslim majority countries simultaneous resent and admire the US - how does one explain this??
why does this puzzle you,the US has many great things about it - it has a developed economy, it offers opportunity, it offers upward mobility (well maybe before, lol) - everyone admires this, but thats the carrot, theres a stick which precedes this, i think we all know what that entails.

the above perhaps reinforces my point.

the arabs and the islamic world have been intellectually cuckolded for centuries, they have never been able frame and map out whats best for them, is it so hard to take the best from the US/europe and meld it into a way that fits in with your own respective societies.


if you dont frame and OWN your own events and history then someone else will do that, and therefore OWN these said events, this is been the story for centuries, first physical and now mental slavery, theres no confidence and consensus on saying "this is whats best for us and this is what we want......"

i quite like the chinese model, their argument is democracy is not one size fits all, this is probably true in a different sense for the islamic world, but the chinese have the confidence to state this, and no one can really argue against the chinese taking ownership of china.


is this thread not a case in point of what i am saying - because it looks to me like we are fighting to claim ownership of our history, our own political, social, religious and cultural inclinations and motivations - all because one man called huntington said so.....sorry, i dont want to play this game....
 
but there is a danger of framing all this arab revolution into a broader framework of a western type leftist argument - typical things like womens rights, despotic leaders, islamism and everything to do with what the west regards as islamism and being "arab".

An absolutely fascinating statement, what the heck does it mean?? -- Perhaps the greater danger is in sticking to stereo types - stereo types of "arabs" as being outside history - are women's rights somehow not important to arab societies??, are there any societies or society (Pakistan as a example may be a exception) where women, who are more than 50% of the population, be deproived of what they think are their rights, and the rest of the world be unconcerned? -- r3, I think we must try and look past sterotypes and the piece below may help us understand this better:

March 11, 2011
Beyond the Clash of Civilizations
By GILLES KEPEL

Once I had lunch with Samuel Huntington at the Harvard Faculty Club. I was eager to talk to him because he had used my 1991 book, “La Revanche de Dieu” (“The Revenge of God”), in his famous article and subsequent volume, “The Clash of Civilizations.”

I had argued that the emergence of religious political movements from the 1970s onward had comparable roots in Islam, Judaism and Christendom: They were all born of a reaction to the passing of the industrial age and had to do with a global rewriting of political identities that shifted from social to religious parlance.

Paradoxically, Huntington had focused only on the chapter that dealt with the Islamic world, and made use of it to help develop his idea about the exceptional character of the Muslim civilization; he had no interest in the study of the opposing forces that fought for hegemony over that new political discourse and competed with secular groups to control the central values of society. To him, Islam was homogenous — and “other.” We had a good talk, though our views remained quite dissimilar.

A few years later came 9/11. Huntington was elevated to a second media apotheosis: Al Qaeda terrorism proved him right, many believed, as it demonstrated on the ground that Islam had an absolutist dimension, and that the mass of the faithful could become Osama bin Laden’s followers.

In the meanwhile, I had written another book, “Jihad,” whose subtitle in the original French was “Expansion and Decline of Islamism.” The English-language translation, published in early 2002, skipped that part. I contended that Islamism, as a cohesive ideology, was doomed to decline, because it bore a fault line between two irreconcilable trends.

On the one side were the radicals, who would use more and more demonstrative violence to underline the weakness of the powers-that-be in an attempt to mobilize the masses on their side, and who would finally find themselves isolated and ostracized by those same masses, as the failure of Egyptian and Algerian radicals had proven in the 1990s.

On the other side, a growing amount of Islamists were converting to the creed of pluralism and democracy, as was already then the case in Turkey. That change would not take place without turmoil within their ranks, but at the end of the day their ideological purity — based on the “absolute sovereignty of Allah” concept — would be corroded by parliamentary participation. Hence the movement would lose its unity and integrity
.


After 9/11 those views were not the most popular; some in the French press suggested I be fired from my university chair. To them, the theory of a decline of Islamism was laughable, while Samuel Huntington became a prophet of sorts.

A decade later, many are surfing on the wave (and the Web) of Arab democratic revolutions. The same people who had extolled Huntington now make an auto-da-fé of his book, saying he misled us in pointing at Arabs and Muslims as radically “other”; now we know them to be just like us — they tweet, they’re on Facebook, and the figurehead of the Egyptian revolution is Google’s Middle East manager.

Things may actually be slightly less simple — and they should be put in perspective in the frame of the modern history of Islamism and its decline. Jihadi radicalism failed to mobilize the Muslim masses. Conversely, the authoritarian regimes of the Ben Alis and the Mubaraks, whose life expectancy had been extended by their Western allies for a decade because they bragged they were the bulwark against jihadism, became irrelevant.

Today, Arab civil society has dispelled its curse: It has moved on from “Either Ben Ali or Bin Laden” to “Neither Bin Laden nor Ben Ali.” The Arab revolutions have reached Phase One in Tunisia and Egypt — toppling the dictators — but they face the same ordeal: The parlance of democracy and human rights in which they coined political mobilization now has to deal with pressing social issues and address huge cohorts of jobless young urban poor
.


Lacking it, the secularized middle classes that took the lead in Tunis and Cairo will be at risk. Islamists kept a low profile — even in Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood has the biggest and best organized network of charities, mosques and local associations. They couldn’t beat the democrats, so they joined them.

Listening to their slogans, reading their publications in Arabic, one is struck by the fact that — as opposed to Khomeini in 1978-79 — they were unable to control the revolution’s vocabulary. Now, they must either keep on that track — and relinquish “sovereignty to the people,” albeit with their own religious tradition and culture — or they must capitalize on the dissatisfaction of the disinherited and push their old “Islam is the alternative” agenda.

The Islamists, for the time being, are divided along generational and ideological lines, but they have not vanished from the Arab street — let alone from Tahrir Square, where Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi, back from Qatar, addressed the crowd for the Friday prayer. They find themselves, along with the whole of society, at a defining moment. It has little to do with the grand schemes of the clash of civilizations, and far more with grass-roots issues. All Arab politics are local — and Western academe could pay slightly more attention to that field than to the World Wide Web
.

Gilles Kepel is professor of Middle Eastern politics at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) and a senior fellow of the Institut Universitaire de France.
 
the arab world was and is about 'oil before democracy' and it continues to be so - arab oil runs the western economies and will do so in the future - frankly nothing has really changed - take egypt for example - mubarak has gone but his military remains in power (NO US sanctions here) and egypt has NO oil but it has a 'peace' agreement with israel. the whole world has been taken by surprise with whats happening in tunesia, egypt, algeria, bahrein, qatar and RSA. can one imagine these countries run by 'Democrats' who may or maynot toe the 'american line'. the US has supported 'strongmen' in the middle-east and near-east because of one point only 'OIL'!!! - the oil of the CAR has to go through Pakistan - the oil of the ME goes through the gulf. the US and the west cares more about the 'aspirations' of their people and hence OIL will always have priority over the 'aspirations' of the people of the ME and near east. they cannot lose their way of life!!!

with the US and EU, it has never been about the people and frankly it is not their fault as our rulers have welcomed them with open arms.
 
Fatman


You may enjoy reviewing post number 35. Most observers would agree with you, the perception among overwhelming majorities is that the US and the so called West are duplicitous, both in their public pronouncements about their affinity to the ideas regarding representative governance and most certainly about the supremacy of the public will in all countries, particularly those which also have Muslim majorities and export oil.

However, and it won't be the first time and they will only learn after they have screwed this thing up totally, US and Western policy makers would do well to reexamine their notions and drop stereo types --- even now we hear talk of "intervention" in Libya (an oil exporter), it is clear that the politicians and the so called intelligence community in Western countries, are either entirely unaware of the degree to which they are seen as lacking credibility in Muslim and Arab majority countries, Or they come from marketing backgrounds, wherein it's not important what you have to sell. In orther words they see this moment in history in the only context they can relate with.
 
An absolutely fascinating statement, what the heck does it mean??

once again, i am not saying things like women rights are not important, they are.

but if you saw the demonstrations you would see armies of women marching and shouting, they looked pretty free to express themselves to me, but does anyone know what they were really saying, or are we not just imputing our own agenda's interpretations without actually asking them?
 
For want of a strategy
Harlan Ullman


According to Washington rules, criticising the foreign policy or strategy of any administration need not be fair or balanced. Strategy can always be attacked for being wrong regardless of the merit of the claim. Or, perhaps easier, the White House can be accused of having no strategy at all. But, both criticisms can fit.

George W Bush had the wrong strategy for achieving his “freedom agenda” through attacking Iraq. Barack Obama appears to have no clear strategy for dealing with the extraordinary protests sweeping through much of the Arab world or a regional strategy to address the Afghanistan-Pakistan debacle despite lengthy AfPak studies and reviews. Of course, the Obama White House, like others, would strongly object to either charge.

Unfortunately, until the Obama administration answers three questions, absence of a strategy for the Arab world and AfPak is self-evident: what are the US’s broader aims regarding this Arab awakening, how are they being achieved and what is the regional plan for Afghanistan? Promoting human rights and supporting indigenous protests against autocratic (and unstable) leaders are not strategies. Calling for a pluralistic Afghanistan where governance extends beyond Kabul, likewise, is a hope or a wish. It is too well known that it is not a strategy.

The Obama administration inherited messes in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Tunisian, Egyptian, Yemeni, Libyan and other protests in the Arab world that continue with unpredictable outcomes are all different and a single strategic response will not fit each. Compounding these challenges, it is difficult to see where in the administration cogent strategy is being made and implemented. Contradictory or confusing statements by the administration reinforce this impression.

With the exit of General Jim Jones as national security advisor, who acts as the chief White House strategist for national security policy? Clearly, Secretary of Defence Robert Gates and Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen have well grounded strategic minds. However, their remit is the defence department, not broader strategy.

Despite the recently published national security diplomatic strategy, Foggy Bottom, awash with many talented special envoys and a charismatic yet sensible Secretary of State, has not fashioned a cogent strategic response to and for the remarkable and unpredictable events roiling the Arab world.

While the House and Senate have their own foreign policy experts, notably Senators John Kerry and Richard Lugar, Congress is not the proper place to fill a strategic void even though it has a powerful voice in these matters. Columnists, academics and pundits regularly suggest strategies of their own in writing or on television, usually with minimal effect. Hence, too often, White Houses are reactive and generally controlled by events without necessarily anticipating or shaping them to the country’s benefit. And, given today’s massive and obscene debt and deficits, spending on foreign policy, regardless of the strength or presence of strategy, inevitably and possibly precipitously will decline
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In the Arab world, Egypt is the strategic centre of gravity. While we agonise over no-fly zones and whether or not to use military force to ensure the exit of Mr Qaddafi, what happens in Egypt can change much of the world for good or for ill. Therefore, any strategy must be Egypt-centric and directed at assisting Egypt in making a successful transition to a pluralistic state under the rule of law. Furthermore, engaging Egypt and possibly other Arab and Muslim states to prevent a humanitarian disaster in Libya should be a high priority supported by the Arab League.

Discussions with friends and allies as well as international institutions from the UN to the European Union and NATO are making slow progress regarding Libya. Is this further proof of strategy by default?


Regarding Afghanistan, the US and Pakistan remain at a stand-off over Mr Raymond Davis, a contract employee of the CIA charged with murdering two Pakistanis and awaiting trial in a Lahore jail. Writing last week in the Washington Post, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari pleaded for patience from the US, correctly warning that Pakistan was a “tinderbox” ready to explode if its existential war against terror and fanatical extremists was not properly handled. Unfortunately, given the US’s unyielding demand for the immediate and safe return of Mr Davis, this affair could too easily destroy US-Pakistani relations for a long time with clear and unhappy consequences for the war in Afghanistan especially when Congress understandably weighs into this melee and cuts funding for Pakistan.

When President Eisenhower took office, he convened his advisors in what was called Project Solarium named for the place where the meetings took place in the White House to develop a national security strategy. Midway through his term, President Obama needs to do the same. A cogent, well argued strategy is needed. For want of that strategy, the wars in all forms that confront us cannot be won.


The writer is Chairman of the Killowen Group that advises leaders of government and business, and Senior Advisor at Washington DC’s Atlantic Council

(This piece was written before Raymond Davis’ release — Ed)
 
The US and UK media in particular and think tanks in Western capitals have been enthusiastic about the Arab spring ("they are just like us"), and indeed one of the aspects that has been most appealing about the Arab spring is that these movements for the most part have been about violence --- but beginning with US and UK efforts to destabilize Libya through Egypt, an interesting new angle is developing - Western powers hoping to shape a future in which they are relevant, now seek to shape events that will define the Arab spring (who said anything about hijack?) -- However, readers will not have failed to notice the quality both of reportage and commentary in Western media of events in Libya (and soon Syria) and events and their meaning in Bahrain, Yemen and Arabia - Whereas much concern is expressed and backed by UN resolutions with regard to civilians in Libya, the civilian populations of Bahrain, Arabia and Yemen (coincidentally US allies) seems to have escaped the attention of Western media and the UN -- Arab Spring meet Imperialism 2.0 :
.-
Friends, below is an editorial from the Daily Times

EDITORIAL: Another imperialist intervention?

With the UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution on Libya authorising all UN members “to take all necessary measures [notwithstanding the previous arms embargo] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory”, the stage was all set for a foreign intervention. A no-fly zone was also announced in the UNSC resolution. In view of this, the Libyan government took a pragmatic decision and declared an immediate ceasefire. Libyan Foreign Minister Mussa Kussa announced that the government wanted to protect civilians and it was ready to open “all dialogue channels with everyone interested in the territorial unity of Libya”. The UNSC’s resolution is another stark reminder of how imperialist powers can manipulate the world system to their advantage. Muammar Gaddafi’s blood-curdling rhetoric on crushing the rebel movement in Benghazi did not help either. He said, “...we are determined. We will track them down, and search for them, alley by alley, road by road, the Libyan people all of them together will be crawling out.” These were ominous words and may have even provoked some members of the UNSC to vote for (or abstain from voting against) the resolution the way they did. It also gave the west a chance to call for direct military intervention.

It is unfortunate that the opposition to Gaddafi’s long 43-year rule did not remain within the bounds of peaceful protest, either from the rebels’ or the government’s side. Descent into civil war was inevitable as a result. The Libyan armed forces pulled no punches and Gaddafi’s hostile speeches made the chances of a mediated settlement impossible. Having said that, a foreign military intervention, even if it follows the UNSC resolution and does not lead to any foreign forces on Libyan soil or foreign occupation, is the wrong way to settle this issue. History is replete with examples of covert operations to get around the restriction on foreign ground forces. On top of that, pre-emptive strikes against Gaddafi’s forces were never ruled out by the UNSC resolution. The US led the pack while Britain and France are all too ready to assist it. Long-range bomber aircraft can be launched while a fleet of US naval ships is already present in the Mediterranean. The outcome of such an attack cannot be predicted but it may lead to a wider war. If the Libyan government is unable to stave off the destruction of its air force and military, a regional conflagration could be imminent. The internal struggle of the Libyan people and their rebellion against Gaddafi’s rule has been turned into a potentially international conflict. This is highly dangerous.

It is hoped that the Gaddafi regime sticks to the ceasefire and negotiates with the rebel forces instead of attacking them head-on. If this does not work out, the world would see a new, potentially devastating conflict. The Arab League may have been hankering for Gaddafi’s overthrow and thus paved the way for the UNSC through its own resolution asking for a no-fly zone, but if a full-fledged military intervention takes place, the Arab world would not remain unaffected. We have seen the disastrous results of foreign intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Kosovo and other countries. It is therefore best advised that the west should not repeat the same mistakes. In principle, too, such an intervention is uncalled for. The Libyan opposition might not be averse to an imperialist intervention but the responsible states of the world should not lend support to such an aggressive posture.
 

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