What's new

How long can India ignore the Taliban

sudhir007

SENIOR MEMBER
Jul 6, 2009
4,728
1
5,553
How long can India ignore the Taliban

It is time for India to open a dialogue track with the Quetta Shoora of the Taliban, which increasingly chafes at restraints and controls imposed upon it by Pakistan
by Ajai ShuklaBusiness Standard, 14th June 11
After a decade of deft manoeuvring in Afghanistan with its successful aid policy, New Delhi has taken its eye off the ball. While Washington tries hard to nudge Mullah Omar into sharing power in Afghanistan – a political watershed in a decade-long war – our mandarins have chosen to pooh-pooh the process. Taking cover behind the Mullah Akhtar Mansour fiasco – when a “senior Taliban leader” was flown by the Royal Air Force from Pakistan to Kabul last November for peace talks, but turned out to be a money-seeking impostor – Indian officials dismiss any thought of opening their own track to the Taliban with the toss-off: “Who knows who we would end up talking to?”
But, as I discovered during a recent visit to Kabul, the dialogue with the Taliban is being seriously pursued and it is captivating everyone who matters: the insurgents, the Afghan polity and government, the Americans, the United Nations and practically every Afghan who has time left over from scrabbling together a livelihood
Lutfullah Mashal from the National Directorate of Security, Afghanistan’s key intelligence agency, told me that American negotiators have met Mullah Omar’s representatives, including Syed Taib Agha, a Taliban ambassador-at-large.
Besides Agha, the dialogue has also featured Qudratullah Jamal, formerly Mullah Omar’s minister for information and culture. Admittedly, Mullah Omar himself has remained invisible, but that is not necessarily suspicious; negotiating is something that Omar disdains. As Mashal says, “Nobody has seen Mullah Omar, nobody has talked to him, but his trusted people are talking.”
This dialogue, however, has created discord between Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shoora and Pakistan. Taliban sources lament that Pakistani pressure is forcing Omar to engage with the Americans. Without that, he would be little disposed to talk, being increasingly confident of outlasting the coalition forces in Afghanistan. Given the Quetta Shoora’s single-point agenda of forcing foreign forces out of Afghanistan, negotiating with the Americans is a humiliating climb-down. But Islamabad, with its feet held to the fire by Washington, has bluntly told Omar that dialogue is essential, if only to stave off US pressure. But this is a serious loss of face for the Taliban and confuses its rank and file.
Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, the Taliban’s representative to Pakistan until Islamabad handed him over to Washington for an extended stay in Guantanamo Bay, is among those who best understand the Taliban’s complex relationship with Pakistan. Zaeef points to the growing contradiction between the Taliban’s uncompromising rejection of foreign occupation on the one hand; and on the other, Islamabad’s weak-kneed acceptance of American drone attacks and Special Forces operations on its territory. Pakistan has also arrested, and handed over to America, dozens of senior Taliban leaders over the last decade. A proud Pashtun like Omar resents being coerced into dialogue by what he considers a duplicitous and craven government.
Says another Talib: “We are angrier today at Pakistan than America. Pakistan is playing a double game, telling the Muslims that we are looking after your interests … but actually they are working for America. Thousands of Taliban are in jails in Pakistan even today.”
AfPak watchers know that Taliban-Pakistan relations were hardly smooth when Omar called the shots in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. Now, however, uneasy coexistence is giving way to deep bitterness within the Taliban.
This widening fault line provides South Block an opportunity to transform its traditional power calculus in the AfPak region, which unquestioningly lumps Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shoora with the ISI-military combine. There seems little recognition of Mullah Omar’s impending collision with Islamabad; nor that “the Taliban” that the ISI mobilises against Indians in Afghanistan belong to the Haqqani network, which Pakistan maintains far more lovingly than the Quetta Shoora. Divide and rule is standard ISI practice; during the anti-Soviet jihad, it had presided over seven Afghan mujahideen factions, playing one against the other. Today, the ISI effectively maintains two Afghan Taliban by keeping the Haqqani network functionally and financially autonomous from the Quetta Shoora. But, despite the fear that the Haqqani network generates with its suicide strikes and Al Qaeda linkages, Mullah Omar remains the spiritual and symbolic leader of the Taliban, the Amir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the Faithful). With his uncomplicated agenda (freeing Afghanistan of foreigners); his straightforward methods (gun-toting insurgency rather than suicide bombings); and his growing disenchantment with Pakistan, he represents a real opportunity for an Indian overture.
But ideology invariably trumps realism within the Indian establishment; anyone who deals with the ISI is surely the enemy! Abdul Hakim Mujahid, a former senior Talib official, now deputy head of the High Peace Council, provides the obvious context. “The Taliban are in the battlefield against the world’s greatest power, which heads of a coalition of 48 countries. They will take the support of anyone who could support them … Pakistan; the Indian government; or the Iranian or Chinese government. This is the nature of the battlefield.”
New Delhi’s dialogue with Mullah Omar will not be easy. Omar knows that India supported the hated Afghan communists; then the Soviet Union invaders; then the mujahideen factions that battled the Taliban; and then the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Furthermore, the fissures between Pakistan and the Taliban may not turn out wide enough to exploit. But as South Block prepares for a post-2014 AfPak, it would be a strategic blunder to not even have tried to open communications with a major player in the Great Game.
 
Very less point in p!ssing off the Americans at this stage , we don't want NATO to take us as an enemy . And Mullah Omar can hardly guarantee the safety of our consulates. Imho we should wait and watch , instead of taking hasty decisions .

Despite what some people think , The U.S will maintain a presence in the area to check terrorism , deny space to Russia or China and perhaps get a hold of the minerals which have recently surfaced in Afghanistan .Patience is the key :tup:
 
Taliban is the worst thing that can happen to humanity. Such senseless people who can convert century old Buddhism icons to rubble; intolerent to everything except a narrow twisted following of Islam should be terminated.
 
Very less point in p!ssing off the Americans at this stage , we don't want NATO to take us as an enemy . And Mullah Omar can hardly guarantee the safety of our consulates. Imho we should wait and watch , instead of taking hasty decisions .

Despite what some people think , The U.S will maintain a presence in the area to check terrorism , deny space to Russia or China and perhaps get a hold of the minerals which have recently surfaced in Afghanistan .Patience is the key :tup:

Too much patience can also be counter-productive.

US/NATO are opening backdoor channels to talk to Mullah Omar to expedite their withdrawal, ignoring the Haqqani network. That should mean something. If India wants a larger piece of the Afghan pie, then India has to act, act to safeguard its interests, act accordingly as to how, where and when it suits her interests. If that means hiding (not burying) the hatchet with the one eyed Omar for the moment, so be it. India already enjoys teh support of Afghan govt, the anti-taliban factions, the locals. Support of another major player in Afghanistan will only further India's interests. This is real-politik, there is no place for idealism in it. Only self-serving interests.
 
Too much patience can also be counter-productive.

US/NATO are opening backdoor channels to talk to Mullah Omar to expedite their withdrawal, ignoring the Haqqani network. That should mean something. If India wants a larger piece of the Afghan pie, then India has to act, act to safeguard its interests, act accordingly as to how, where and when it suits her interests. If that means hiding (not burying) the hatchet with the one eyed Omar for the moment, so be it. India already enjoys teh support of Afghan govt, the anti-taliban factions, the locals. Support of another major player in Afghanistan will only further India's interests. This is real-politik, there is no place for idealism in it. Only self-serving interests.

Agree fully with the bolded part , its all real -politik .

But dont see how Mullah Omar will even consider a dialogue with India , much influenced as he is by the ISI . Afghanistan is a land of tribes and many are anti-Taleban . Eg the hazaras . If a complete U.S withdrawal is the ultimate result --which seems quite unlikely. India should use all its assets and resources to ensure the Taleban do not get to dominate Afghanistan , like pre 2001 and a balance of power is maintained somehow.

Maybe something can be worked out with Russia and Iran . We already have a Tajikistan base and as per last reports we are sharing it with Russia .

Wouldn't mind if Russia became our full-fledged strategic partner in Central Asia.

As long as the Taleban is kept at bay, since ideologically, there is a negligible chance of them ever being swayed by India instead of Pakistan.
 
How long can India ignore the Taliban

It is time for India to open a dialogue track with the Quetta Shoora of the Taliban, which increasingly chafes at restraints and controls imposed upon it by Pakistan
by Ajai ShuklaBusiness Standard, 14th June 11
After a decade of deft manoeuvring in Afghanistan with its successful aid policy, New Delhi has taken its eye off the ball. While Washington tries hard to nudge Mullah Omar into sharing power in Afghanistan – a political watershed in a decade-long war – our mandarins have chosen to pooh-pooh the process. Taking cover behind the Mullah Akhtar Mansour fiasco – when a “senior Taliban leader” was flown by the Royal Air Force from Pakistan to Kabul last November for peace talks, but turned out to be a money-seeking impostor – Indian officials dismiss any thought of opening their own track to the Taliban with the toss-off: “Who knows who we would end up talking to?”
But, as I discovered during a recent visit to Kabul, the dialogue with the Taliban is being seriously pursued and it is captivating everyone who matters: the insurgents, the Afghan polity and government, the Americans, the United Nations and practically every Afghan who has time left over from scrabbling together a livelihood
Lutfullah Mashal from the National Directorate of Security, Afghanistan’s key intelligence agency, told me that American negotiators have met Mullah Omar’s representatives, including Syed Taib Agha, a Taliban ambassador-at-large.
Besides Agha, the dialogue has also featured Qudratullah Jamal, formerly Mullah Omar’s minister for information and culture. Admittedly, Mullah Omar himself has remained invisible, but that is not necessarily suspicious; negotiating is something that Omar disdains. As Mashal says, “Nobody has seen Mullah Omar, nobody has talked to him, but his trusted people are talking.”
This dialogue, however, has created discord between Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shoora and Pakistan. Taliban sources lament that Pakistani pressure is forcing Omar to engage with the Americans. Without that, he would be little disposed to talk, being increasingly confident of outlasting the coalition forces in Afghanistan. Given the Quetta Shoora’s single-point agenda of forcing foreign forces out of Afghanistan, negotiating with the Americans is a humiliating climb-down. But Islamabad, with its feet held to the fire by Washington, has bluntly told Omar that dialogue is essential, if only to stave off US pressure. But this is a serious loss of face for the Taliban and confuses its rank and file.
Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, the Taliban’s representative to Pakistan until Islamabad handed him over to Washington for an extended stay in Guantanamo Bay, is among those who best understand the Taliban’s complex relationship with Pakistan. Zaeef points to the growing contradiction between the Taliban’s uncompromising rejection of foreign occupation on the one hand; and on the other, Islamabad’s weak-kneed acceptance of American drone attacks and Special Forces operations on its territory. Pakistan has also arrested, and handed over to America, dozens of senior Taliban leaders over the last decade. A proud Pashtun like Omar resents being coerced into dialogue by what he considers a duplicitous and craven government.
Says another Talib: “We are angrier today at Pakistan than America. Pakistan is playing a double game, telling the Muslims that we are looking after your interests … but actually they are working for America. Thousands of Taliban are in jails in Pakistan even today.”
AfPak watchers know that Taliban-Pakistan relations were hardly smooth when Omar called the shots in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. Now, however, uneasy coexistence is giving way to deep bitterness within the Taliban.
This widening fault line provides South Block an opportunity to transform its traditional power calculus in the AfPak region, which unquestioningly lumps Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shoora with the ISI-military combine. There seems little recognition of Mullah Omar’s impending collision with Islamabad; nor that “the Taliban” that the ISI mobilises against Indians in Afghanistan belong to the Haqqani network, which Pakistan maintains far more lovingly than the Quetta Shoora. Divide and rule is standard ISI practice; during the anti-Soviet jihad, it had presided over seven Afghan mujahideen factions, playing one against the other. Today, the ISI effectively maintains two Afghan Taliban by keeping the Haqqani network functionally and financially autonomous from the Quetta Shoora. But, despite the fear that the Haqqani network generates with its suicide strikes and Al Qaeda linkages, Mullah Omar remains the spiritual and symbolic leader of the Taliban, the Amir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the Faithful). With his uncomplicated agenda (freeing Afghanistan of foreigners); his straightforward methods (gun-toting insurgency rather than suicide bombings); and his growing disenchantment with Pakistan, he represents a real opportunity for an Indian overture.
But ideology invariably trumps realism within the Indian establishment; anyone who deals with the ISI is surely the enemy! Abdul Hakim Mujahid, a former senior Talib official, now deputy head of the High Peace Council, provides the obvious context. “The Taliban are in the battlefield against the world’s greatest power, which heads of a coalition of 48 countries. They will take the support of anyone who could support them … Pakistan; the Indian government; or the Iranian or Chinese government. This is the nature of the battlefield.”
New Delhi’s dialogue with Mullah Omar will not be easy. Omar knows that India supported the hated Afghan communists; then the Soviet Union invaders; then the mujahideen factions that battled the Taliban; and then the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Furthermore, the fissures between Pakistan and the Taliban may not turn out wide enough to exploit. But as South Block prepares for a post-2014 AfPak, it would be a strategic blunder to not even have tried to open communications with a major player in the Great Game.

Indian foreign policy is always flawed which creates enough political/ economic and social problems for Indian civilians. There can’t be anything ‘Absolute’ good or bad, nor there can be any Idealism or Perfection, especially when you deal politics. A project is acceptable when it reaches at least ‘Fitness Landscape’ and professionals generally don’t try to improve the product/ process more than that. Things are said to be good or bad on the ‘Comparative’ basis only and we always have to compromise with the circumstances to handle the situations. Search of perfectness/ Idealism or Absolute Good generally results in losses/ humiliation and sometimes losing the platform also. I remember, Mr Gandhi was shot down by a Hindu extremist because Mr Gandhi was being blamed for favoring Muslims that time while Mr Gandhi himself named ‘Hey Ram’ few times at the time of his death. Search of Perfectness is just not advisable either working on any project or dealing international politics or economic issues.

Whenever US/ West wants, they use Taliban/ Al Qaeda and when these militants go against them, they are called terrorists. Even right now, US is either trying to convince Taliban for different usage or they want to fight with them, while India is the country who is blacklisted by Taliban. “Begani Shaadi me Abdulla Deevana.” While the rule of thumb is, “Those who win they Rule.” and Rule cant be begged on the streets like how US keep begging for either help against Taliban, or, at the same time they have those who want to use Taliban also against their competitors and keep trying to convince Taliban. Why India is worried for any right or wrong Taliban does. Taliban is winning in Afghan and they deserve to Rule the land they won and can do whatever they want there. Even if they offer stone to death type penalty to women, its also not quite different to many Indian Kings who used to have 100s of women in their Haram, both the cases give slow death, Taliban just have different taste. Also, Indian philosophy says that whenever something very wrong happens to us then its mainly because of any very bad deed of previous birth and if something is written in destiny, on the lines of hand, it is set to happen. Why India would worry for anything Taliban does in Afghan or in any where in world until it doesn’t harm India’s interests?

India was never part of NATO in Afghan and with construction works in Afghan, Indian military have been giving training to the Afghan military loyal to Mr Karzai as it was believed that NATO would finally win there. But if it is now the Taliban then India must prepare itself for Taliban Rule in Afghan also. Not only Mr H Karzai and his ministry but many Afghans have lived and studied in Indian universities who may form a bridge of friendship between India and Taliban Rule in Afghan. India is concerned with Taliban only to that extent that Taliban don’t allow any anti-India activity in Afghan, rest India mustn’t be concerned with anything Taliban do inside Afghan or with rest of world. and India may not only use the Afghan nationals but also other regional powers, Afghan’s neighbours, to convince Taliban rule to maintain friendly attitude with India. Afghan in on the of trade link to Central Asia and India has invested much in Afghan to explore resource rich Central Asia and Indian trade with Central Asia may well rise to even above $20bn/ year in just next 5 to 6 years if ‘Chah Bahar’ port of Iran gets operated for trade. and Taliban rule can get at least $500mil to $1bn of foreign currency just as transit fee from India after just 6 to 7 years from now. Even total defense budget of Pakistan is around $4.5bn which operates over 400 aircrafts and 10 submarines, with over 400,000 active military personnel. ISI might be asking for hardly around $5,000 to $10,000 for every made in china AK47 while $500mil to $1.0bn per year is enough to buy bullet proof jackets also. And getting recognition from a country like India, even on a limited level, may provide Taliban a seat in UN also, for what Taliban Rule in Afghan was never qualified in between 1989 to 2001. Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and UAE were the 3 nations who gave diplomatic recognition to Taliban rule in between 1989 to 2001.

India must try to find that certain day when they will reach the ‘Fitness Landscape’ to start diplomatic talks with Taliban with help of other regional powers and Afghan citizens including the current Afghan rulers like Karzai ministry. There is no meaning of searching for Idealism in International politics. “Either politics would reach an end or it finally results in power exercise among the concerned parties. End result of political efforts is only power exercise, if it doesn’t stop till a certain milestone.” India must not fool its civilians about the current environment of international politics and would always be prepared for negotiations to fulfill its different political and economic interests, even if they will have to talk with Taliban also one day.
 
Except Pakistan , its in no other countries interest for Mullahs taliban to return to power , there is very hiigh possibility of USA staying in Afghan beyond 2014 , no need to rush into anything yet .... India has played it safe the past ten years , it has given them good results and should continue the same way as they have been !
 
...Till taliban rules india.Inshallah soon.

There are certain differences between the mindsets among the Muslim nations for India. I heard, South Asian are mainly called ‘Indian’, (those who live in Indian colonies), in Dubai regardless they come from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka or Nepal. Just talk to a Saudi in a Western country, he will find almost no difference between an Indian national with a Pakistani. Even if you want to play pool in a Western country, we generally find a Pakistani in group and Arabic on other side (regardless any Arab nation), my one experience. Just have a look on Indian foreign policy, until they found Iran alright on the international platform, India even voted against Iran also few years before on nuclear issue one time, when Indo-US friendship was going on, but the time even Arab League criticized Iran recently, India was absent during that voting and they now find Arabs wrong here. go to the Indian news papers and read support for Iran right now. Just wait for a while and see how many old friends Iran will get back if there will be any more sanctions against them. I read that Russia just moved a warship for Syria, Iran’s ally, and India is also just not happy with the new sanctions on Iran, even if they are only absentees till now. “until the established power balance in continued, its OK, but even a little change, …….. too many movements are seen.”

Even during Taliban rule in Afghan during 1989 to 2001, there was just no sign that Taliban was interested in India and whatever happened in Kashmir since 1989, India blamed to those who were based in Pakistan only. Even during Indian Plane hijack to Kandahar, Taliban role was just as a middle man between India and the militants and Maulana Masood Azhar was finally seen living somewhere in Pakistan as he had no criminal record in Pakistan, I read somewhere. and about Plane hijack, the hijackers could take the plane to directly Pakistan also if they wanted to, or, to a third place like to any African country like Congo or to a similar country who are facing civil wars and UN forces are fighting with different militant groups there. how it matter if the hijackers just wanted the Indian government to release few militants in return of the passengers?

India will have conflicts with only its neighbours in future. Rest, too many friends India may find in Taliban itself who will be willing to shift their families to India for better education, like how so many Afghani get enrollment in Indian institutes. Predictions for future is always uncertain and, “Politics is based to fulfilling different political interests only.”
 
Forget it India. Afghan Taliban have always supported Jihad in Indian Occupied Kashmir. They might not be anti-india, but they will never side with india over the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

And for those of you indians who think you can battle the Afghan Taliban, all I can say is :rofl: Is the Indian Army more powerful than the U.S. army :rofl:
 
There are certain differences between the mindsets among the Muslim nations for India. I heard, South Asian are mainly called ‘Indian’, (those who live in Indian colonies), in Dubai regardless they come from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka or Nepal. Just talk to a Saudi in a Western country, he will find almost no difference between an Indian national with a Pakistani. Even if you want to play pool in a Western country, we generally find a Pakistani in group and Arabic on other side (regardless any Arab nation), my one experience. Just have a look on Indian foreign policy, until they found Iran alright on the international platform, India even voted against Iran also few years before on nuclear issue one time, when Indo-US friendship was going on, but the time even Arab League criticized Iran recently, India was absent during that voting and they now find Arabs wrong here. go to the Indian news papers and read support for Iran right now. Just wait for a while and see how many old friends Iran will get back if there will be any more sanctions against them. I read that Russia just moved a warship for Syria, Iran’s ally, and India is also just not happy with the new sanctions on Iran, even if they are only absentees till now. “until the established power balance in continued, its OK, but even a little change, …….. too many movements are seen.”

Even during Taliban rule in Afghan during 1989 to 2001, there was just no sign that Taliban was interested in India and whatever happened in Kashmir since 1989, India blamed to those who were based in Pakistan only. Even during Indian Plane hijack to Kandahar, Taliban role was just as a middle man between India and the militants and Maulana Masood Azhar was finally seen living somewhere in Pakistan as he had no criminal record in Pakistan, I read somewhere. and about Plane hijack, the hijackers could take the plane to directly Pakistan also if they wanted to, or, to a third place like to any African country like Congo or to a similar country who are facing civil wars and UN forces are fighting with different militant groups there. how it matter if the hijackers just wanted the Indian government to release few militants in return of the passengers?

India will have conflicts with only its neighbours in future. Rest, too many friends India may find in Taliban itself who will be willing to shift their families to India for better education, like how so many Afghani get enrollment in Indian institutes. Predictions for future is always uncertain and, “Politics is based to fulfilling different political interests only.”

Just by reading your first paragraph, I can tell how ignorant you are about South Asians so its not even worth repling to your B.S.

By the way, change our flag SOviet Union is dead.
 

Users Who Are Viewing This Thread (Total: 2, Members: 0, Guests: 2)


Pakistan Defence Latest Posts

Back
Top Bottom