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China, Russia, Iran: Ports and Power Along the Belt and Road

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If the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor doesn’t live up to the hype, Russia may stand to benefit.

By Nicholas Trickett and Oliver Thomas
March 23, 2017

China’s planners have studied the art of using economic pacts to pursue strategic objectives. The “One Belt, One Road” initiative (OBOR) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are prime examples. China has pinned its hopes of gaining strategic preeminence in the South and Central Asian regions thanks to its deep pockets. Infrastructure investment confers power to influence regional affairs. But South and Central Asia are not lacking of powers seeking influence — Russia and Iran have their own regional investments, plans and partners.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is particularly important for China. With access to Pakistani ports, China will be able to expand its market reach and bring in foreign direct investment to ease the devaluation of the renminbi. The renminbi’s drop signals China’s hope to increase the amount of low wage jobs abroad and play it safe on future risks while implementing financial reform. Though China has become the world’s largest banking system, debt has played a pivotal role in its growth in recent years.

OBOR serves as a buffer: debt finances infrastructure projects abroad to provide short-term employment, create some growth abroad, unload industrial overcapacity, and cement influence and ownership of assets in other countries. Though CPEC is ostensibly profitable, it better represents China’s attempts to buy influence and access to the Indian Ocean with debt while providing Chinese industries a stimulus. Pakistan has proven a willing partner due to its political interests in the region and need for investment.

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Gwadar as the Crown Jewel of CPEC

Pakistan’s Gwadar port is a trade hub for CPEC on the Indian Ocean rim. China announced what has become a $57 billion investment plan into CPEC, capped off by Gwadar. In a recent interview, the chairman of the Gwadar Port Authority, Dostain Khan Jamaldini, stated that “Gwadar can become a Shenzhen-level city in ten years,” indicating that the port will be open to numerous trading actors besides China. But the rhetoric about expanding trade likely does not reflect reality. There’s mounting evidence that the potential for high returns on the Chinese investment in Gwadar and CPEC will not match government claims.

Gwadar is not yet commercially operational due, in part, to a lack in connectivity via the East Bay Expressway, Balochistan. Other large sections of the proposed CPEC run through volatile areas that pose risks. Security concerns in Pakistan have prompted the government to create a new 13,700 personnel Special Security Division, whose sole purpose is to secure CPEC projects, while growing threats in western China have led to a severe security state in Xinjiang. China has also sought to deploy security assets to Gwadar. Finally, acute water shortage issues in Balochistan hinder large-scale construction projects. These hurdles are slowing the completion of China’s hoped-for energy import route circumventing the Malacca Strait.

A Tale of Two Ports

The nearby Iranian port Chabahar, where India is investing, exists as a geopolitical mirror to Gwadar. The two projects reflect the successes and limits of China’s efforts to extend its influence on the Indian Ocean rim. Though Indian officials stress that Chabahar is not a competitor port, its strategic rationale suggests otherwise.

India needs land access to Afghanistan to realize its ambitions to play a larger role in Central Asian trade and security. However, Pakistan has installed a transit blockade for Indian goods bound to Iran and beyond. In response, Afghanistan has banned Pakistani transit for trucking goods through its territory, a bad sign for growing hopes for regional rail connectivity between Tajikistan and Pakistan through Afghanistan. But the Chabahar port will help India’s push to play a deciding role in the future of Afghanistan and the region.

Iran has opened Chabahar to Indian and Japanese investment, though delays and doubts about the project linger. India recently approved a $150 million development plan to begin building up the investment zone stipulated by the initial agreement last May. Though India seems sluggish, both Japan and India have profit-driven interests for the port’s development. Satellite imagery does show progress at Chabahar, despite delays, and oil port Bandar Abbas is in serious need of capacity relief to handle oil flows.

Chinese investment in Iran, on the other hand, has not appreciably changed since the nuclear deal took effect. China’s approach to Iran does not seem to portend an increase of investment to curry political influence as has been the case in Pakistan, particularly as Iran has other suitors. Tehran has not particularly privileged Chinese oil and gas companies as it has sought investment and partnerships to develop its reserves.

Chabahar is a critical project for regional energy security that, even with hiccups, India and Japan are committed enough to complete. China’s studied use of infrastructure investment, while helpful for Pakistan’s equity markets, may not produce the desired results in time due to limitations in China’s strategy and a complicated political environment in the region that hinders interconnectivity. The arc of these two ports’ development offers an interesting window into Russia’s balancing act with China over Iran and India.

Russia’s Iran Approach

Russian-Iranian relations are often discussed regarding mutual interests in the Middle East as Russia and Iran seek to push out U.S. influence and assert a stronger role on their shared periphery. Their partnership is most solidly founded in the Caspian: Russia has sold majority stakes of two strategic ports in Dagestani capital Makhachkala and Astrakhan to Iranian firms, Iran is pushing against Azerbaijan’s position as leading shipper in the Caspian, and Lukoil’s projected $8.5 billion in spending on Caspian oil and gas will ideally transit Iran to Asian markets as it comes onstream.

The Russian-Iranian political relationship has outstripped the economic relationship for some time. Even with as much as a 70-80 percent increase in trade turnover in 2016, it only totaled $2.2 billion. Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak has stated that he expects a FREE TRADE agreement to be signed between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union at the end of March. For now, it remains political chatter but as Russia tries to lure Iranian investment into its Muslim regions, there will likely be an increase in business contacts that may allow Russia to try to leverage existing ties between different ethnic and religious communities in the Caspian region and Tatarstan.

Though China has a vastly superior set of financial and economic tools to invest in Iran and deepen ties, Lukoil was the first oil and gas company to sign a contract after the unveiling of the New Petroleum Contract. Even with attempts by Iran to locally source production for arms by using joint ventures or licensing products, Russia’s arms industry is looking to lock up market share in Iran before CHINESE EXPORTS can compete, creating pathway dependencies like those found in the Indian military. Further, the symbolic significance of a free trade agreement, should it happen, will likely aid ongoing negotiations with India for a similar deal.

With these facts in mind, Chabahar is an economic and political bellwether for FUTURE TRADE between Russia, Iran, and India that figures into the regional balance of power. China is unlikely to worry given the tiny trade volumes involved. But symbols beget the appearance of regional cooperation and the possibility of introducing new supply chains that will, by and large, circumvent the desired routes in which China is investing.

The Limits of Russian Interests in Pakistan

Despite smaller moves on arms sales and exercises to strengthen military ties with Pakistan, Russia’s economic interests in Pakistan remain ambivalent at best due to its regional goals and challenges in Afghanistan. An agreement was inked in 2015 for a $2 billion gas pipeline between Karachi and Lahore, but Russian business interests are constrained in their ability to move into the market due to lack of knowledge, limited areas of competitive advantage, and lack of financing. Even with the pipeline project, there are ongoing negotiations to drive Russia’s tolling fees down as Pakistan dangles the threat of competition with Qatar as a bargaining chip. There have been small attempts at encouraging INVESTMENT AND TRADE between Punjab and Tatarstan, but any successes would be a pittance for both parties.

Pakistan has publicly stated Russia can use Gwadar for exports. Regardless, Gwadar is not a logical transit point for Russian imports or exports. Rosneft now owns the Gujarati port of Vadinar after its acquisition of Essar Oil and oil transit for Russian crude will never travel through Central Asia to Pakistan. The nature of Russia’s access is also unclear, given denials from the Kremlin as it attempts to manage its newfound interest in Pakistan with its more important relationship with India. Aside from energy — dominated by Chinese investment — Russia has little reason to economically engage Pakistan. Pakistan already eats up 35 percent of China’s arms exports and while Russia will seek market share, China has firmly established itself. Instead, improving access and influence with the Taliban is a key goal as Russia seeks to undermine Kabul. But until Tajikistan joins the Eurasian Economic Union and transit through Afghanistan and Pakistan toward India is guaranteed, there will be little reason for Russia to pursue a deeper commitment aside from bettering political ties on security issues.

Russia’s Opening?

Given the unclear efficacy of infrastructure investments, China’s OBOR initiative does little to guarantee growth without reform in transit states and easing political tensions. Pakistan has seen positive signs. The World Bank authorized a $450 million for a program to improve financial access, the government is adamant that reforms improving the business climate for entrepreneurship are taking root, and Pakistan’s equity markets have performed remarkably well of late.

Still, political tensions and security issues will prevent transit through Afghanistan and cut off Tajikistan from trade with Pakistan for a long time to come. Russia has a noticeably better relationship with Tehran than Beijing and its policies in Pakistan must be viewed through the lens of its broader engagement with the Indian Ocean region. China’s expansion into Pakistan has ossified animosities between the Indian and Pakistani governments, creating a situation for Russia to play multiple sides. Though China may pretend that its investments are “win-win” and carry no political agenda, there still are regional winners and losers.

Softening attempts to publicly resist OBOR in Moscow mask a shifting calculus that the Caspian region can form a stop to China’s expansion. Iran and Russia prefer to split the Caspian between themselves and have acted accordingly. Barring a major shift in Pakistani-Indian relations that would improve overland trade routes through Pakistan and Afghanistan, Russia is poised to use its bread and butter — energy and weapons — as policy instruments to maximize regional influence without committing tremendous financial reserves to projects of dubious economic value. Russia’s approach to CPEC is asymmetrical, using target sectors to compete with China where possible. Chabahar will provide an important conduit for this double-game as work progresses, no matter the news out of Gwadar.

Nicholas Trickett currently works at a think tank in Washington D.C. He is finishing an M.A. in Eurasian studies through the European University at St. Petersburg with a focus on energy security and Russian foreign policy.

Oliver Thomas is a recent alumnus of a research Fulbright grant to study in Taiwan on the island of Kinmen. He currently writes for the Taiwan Brief and works at a think tank in Washington D.C. He will pursue further study in politics and international relations at the University of Cambridge in the fall.

http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/china-russia-iran-ports-and-power-along-the-belt-and-road/
 
There’s mounting evidence that the potential for high returns on the Chinese investment in Gwadar and CPEC will not match government claims.

What is the mounting evidence unexplained nor any reference given?

The nearby Iranian port Chabahar, where India is investing, exists as a geopolitical mirror to Gwadar. The two projects reflect the successes and limits of China’s efforts to extend its influence on the Indian Ocean rim


"One year after the Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with the P5+1 states, the deal has not lived up to expectations. Iran recently launched a nuclear-capable missile, violating a UN Security Council resolution (which prohibits any Iranian nuclear launch or test). Further, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has vowed that Iran “will not cooperate with America over the regional crisis, Their aims in the region are 180 degrees opposed to Iran’s.” Given this scenario, the prospect of lifting of all sanctions on Iran is again in doubt. The uncertainty regarding sanctions could undeniably have negative consequences for the India-Iran Chabahar deal. Gwadar has no such problems.There are no restrictions on China’s investment anywhere nor is Pakistan subject to any kind of UN sanctions. Furthermore, China holds veto power on the UN Security Council — thus even in the case of a proposed resolution that could impact Gwadar, China could veto the move and continue its economic ventures with Pakistan.

Despite enhanced Indo-Afghan diplomatic, political, and economic connections, Pakistan’s role and influence in Afghanistan has not withered. Though the central government of Afghanistan leans more toward India, Pakistan has connections with several ethnic groups who represent a major portion of Afghan society.

There is no economic competition between Pakistan and China. Chinese investment in Pakistan is also aimed at boosting trade with the rest of Asia, and Pakistan won’t become a hurdle in China’s quest to reach the Middle East and Persian Gulf . That’s because Pakistan is currently on the receiving end of a huge Chinese investment, which will revamp Pakistan’s feeble economic structure. However, the Iran-India dynamic is different. After the July 2015 agreement, Tehran is trying its level best to come into the mainstream international arena by accelerating trade in order to put its jammed economic wheel back on track. Iran will not allow India’s Central Asian dream to come true at the cost of Iranian interests."

http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/5-reasons-gwadar-port-trumps-chabahar/

CPEC is far more capable (Accommodate more ships, it's 100+ births when fully operational) available, secure and accessible, provides land based connectivity that will be upgraded to train access to Pakistan, China and central Asian countries in future, so share your part, make a road and get connected to CPEC. On the other hand American and Iranian relations are not going to be good under TRUMPH administration. I would like to see how Modi go against Americans and go with Chabahar project.

So the real question are:

* Security of Chabahar linkup when it going to connect Central Asian countries through Afghanistan where current Afghan puppet pro-India government hardly hold controls of 40% of land.

* Partnerships and Rivalries.

* Access through Afghanistan (What about formation of some new government where Afghan Taliban playing some role)

* Sea Monitoring (Vessels transporting goods to Chabahar up & down would also be subject to the active monitoring of the Pakistani Navy)

India needs land access to Afghanistan to realize its ambitions to play a larger role in Central Asian trade and security. However, Pakistan has installed a transit blockade for Indian goods bound to Iran and beyond. In response, Afghanistan has banned Pakistani transit for trucking goods through its territory, a bad sign for growing hopes for regional rail connectivity between Tajikistan and Pakistan through Afghanistan. But the Chabahar port will help India’s push to play a deciding role in the future of Afghanistan and the region.

Afghanistan is pro-India till the American forces and their puppet government there. I don't see Indians have courage to come help their favorable Afghan government by sending Indian forces in Afghanistan to make them secure and fund this Government to function. Of-course if India can economic blockade Pakistan trade routes in 1971 war then in the next event of Indian eventuality will result in wise-versa.

Pakistan has publicly stated Russia can use Gwadar for exports. Regardless, Gwadar is not a logical transit point for Russian imports or exports.


So what is the alternative for Russia? Through India? Through Afghanistan? where there is no infrastructure. or CPEC that started operation cant Russia make road for 200 or 300 miles. What is the logic behind writers this point?

This is what I found the existence road infrastructure between china and Russia. Russia need to make Rail or Road link of around 2 to 300 miles

RussiaChina RoadLink.jpg



Aside from energy — dominated by Chinese investment — Russia has little reason to economically engage Pakistan. Pakistan already eats up 35 percent of China’s arms exports and while Russia will seek market share, China has firmly established itself.

Well the biggest development in Military cooperation with China is JF-17 and the power plant for this aircraft is Russian RD-93. Russian Mil MI-35M Hind-E and Mil Mi-17 helicopters are in use of Pakistan Army. In reality Russia is selling cautiously to Pakistan because of their Indians friend are making a lot of noise about selling to Pakistan. In fact Pakistan would like to buy from Russia. I think Russia has out maneuver India diplomatically and hocked up in defense contracts smartly. Hope fully after secured money and contracts, Russia will play his part firs against ISIS in Afghanistan by cooperating with Pakistan, Iran and China.
 
Last edited:
What is the mounting evidence unexplained nor any reference given?




"One year after the Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with the P5+1 states, the deal has not lived up to expectations. Iran recently launched a nuclear-capable missile, violating a UN Security Council resolution (which prohibits any Iranian nuclear launch or test). Further, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has vowed that Iran “will not cooperate with America over the regional crisis, Their aims in the region are 180 degrees opposed to Iran’s.” Given this scenario, the prospect of lifting of all sanctions on Iran is again in doubt. The uncertainty regarding sanctions could undeniably have negative consequences for the India-Iran Chabahar deal. Gwadar has no such problems.There are no restrictions on China’s investment anywhere nor is Pakistan subject to any kind of UN sanctions. Furthermore, China holds veto power on the UN Security Council — thus even in the case of a proposed resolution that could impact Gwadar, China could veto the move and continue its economic ventures with Pakistan.

Despite enhanced Indo-Afghan diplomatic, political, and economic connections, Pakistan’s role and influence in Afghanistan has not withered. Though the central government of Afghanistan leans more toward India, Pakistan has connections with several ethnic groups who represent a major portion of Afghan society.

There is no economic competition between Pakistan and China. Chinese investment in Pakistan is also aimed at boosting trade with the rest of Asia, and Pakistan won’t become a hurdle in China’s quest to reach the Middle East and Persian Gulf . That’s because Pakistan is currently on the receiving end of a huge Chinese investment, which will revamp Pakistan’s feeble economic structure. However, the Iran-India dynamic is different. After the July 2015 agreement, Tehran is trying its level best to come into the mainstream international arena by accelerating trade in order to put its jammed economic wheel back on track. Iran will not allow India’s Central Asian dream to come true at the cost of Iranian interests."

http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/5-reasons-gwadar-port-trumps-chabahar/

CPEC is far more capable (Accommodate more ships, it's 100+ births when fully operational) available, secure and accessible, provides land based connectivity that will be upgraded to train access to Pakistan, China and central Asian countries in future, so share your part, make a road and get connected to CPEC. On the other hand American and Iranian relations are not going to be good under TRUMPH administration. I would like to see how Modi go against Americans and go with Chabahar project.

So the real question are:

* Security of Chabahar linkup when it going to connect Central Asian countries through Afghanistan where current Afghan puppet pro-India government hardly hold controls of 40% of land.

* Partnerships and Rivalries.

* Access through Afghanistan (What about formation of some new government where Afghan Taliban playing some role)

* Sea Monitoring (Vessels transporting goods to Chabahar up & down would also be subject to the active monitoring of the Pakistani Navy)



Afghanistan is pro-India till the American forces and their puppet government there. I don't see Indians have courage to come help their favorable Afghan government by sending Indian forces in Afghanistan to make them secure and fund this Government to function. Of-course if India can economic blockade Pakistan trade routes in 1971 war then in the next event of Indian eventuality will result in wise-versa.




So what is the alternative for Russia? Through India? Through Afghanistan? where there is no infrastructure. or CPEC that started operation cant Russia make road for 200 or 300 miles. What is the logic behind writers this point?

This is what I found the existence road infrastructure between china and Russia. Russia need to make Rail or Road link of around 2 to 300 miles

View attachment 386750

Well the biggest development in Military cooperation with China is JF-17 and the power plant for this aircraft is Russian RD-93. Russian Mil MI-35M Hind-E and Mil Mi-17 helicopters are in use of Pakistan Army. In reality Russia is selling cautiously to Pakistan because of their Indians friend are making a lot of noise about selling to Pakistan. In fact Pakistan would like to buy from Russia. I think Russia has out maneuver India diplomatically and hocked up in defense contracts smartly. Hope fully after secured money and contracts, Russia will play his part firs against ISIS in Afghanistan by cooperating with Pakistan, Iran and China.

another delusion filled article ...
What is russia going to export through Gwadar ?
 
OBOR is dead without Russian and Iranian approval

it's in their interests to be part of OBOR.

another delusion filled article ...
What is russia going to export through Gwadar ?

Mineral, oil & gas from Siberia, bring pipeline to Gwadar port and load into tankers, Russia can have an trade road access to Arabian Sea then export to South Asia and South East Asia...which it's not bad at all.
 
it's in their interests to be part of OBOR.



Mineral, oil & gas from Siberia, bring pipeline to Gwadar port and load into tankers, Russia can have an trade road access to Arabian Sea then export to South Asia and South East Asia...which it's not bad at all.

selling oil and gas to whom in the Indian Ocean ?? definitely not India.
There are plenty of oil and natural gas exporters in the Indian Ocean region

it's in their interests to be part of OBOR.

Iran and Russia can speak for themselves

There is little Russian or Iranian participation
https://walizahid.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/One-Belt-One-Road-OBOR-China-projects.jpg
 
another delusion filled article ...
What is russia going to export through Gwadar ?

1) The only thing a Indian mind thinks is "Delusion", as only their aspect are correct and there is no other aspect.
2) If accepting your argument about Russian export, then what Russia in doing in "North–South Transport Corridor".
 
1) The only thing a Indian mind thinks is "Delusion", as only their aspect are correct and there is no other aspect.
2) If accepting your argument about Russian export, then what Russia in doing in "North–South Transport Corridor".

The North South Transport Corridor project was started in 2002. It is 2017. I will let you figure out the utility of the project

If you think Pakistanis are not delusional please state what Russian products are going to land up in Gwadar
 
it's in their interests to be part of OBOR.



Mineral, oil & gas from Siberia, bring pipeline to Gwadar port and load into tankers, Russia can have an trade road access to Arabian Sea then export to South Asia and South East Asia...which it's not bad at all.

Russia's biggest Oil refining port would be in Vadinar port in Gujarat, India.

So you are saying it would go to Gwadar port in Pakistan first and from there to Vadinar port in India? Why can't it directly go through China to India?


upload_2017-3-26_22-21-6.png
 
The North South Transport Corridor project was started in 2002. It is 2017. I will let you figure out the utility of the project

If you think Pakistanis are not delusional please state what Russian products are going to land up in Gwadar

It doesn't matter when NSTC project started
* Can't you see what is the availability and security of it.
* Has this project is stated and Russia is using it?

Firstly why should I have to explain what Russian's will import or export, its up to them we are not in marketing of products. We are talking about safer, faster closer route which will be cheaper option for countries. Now this is for Russian to decide what they should do.

Secondly, hypothetically if Russia have nothing to import or export today (which is not the case even today), no matter what route, how can you eliminate the possibility of the future economic activity in new emerging dynamics of region for Russian. It can change.
 
It doesn't matter when NSTC project started
* Can't you see what is the availability and security of it.
* Has this project is stated and Russia is using it?

Firstly why should I have to explain what Russian's will import or export, its up to them we are not in marketing of products. We are talking about safer, faster closer route which will be cheaper option for countries. Now this is for Russian to decide what they should do.

Secondly, hypothetically if Russia have nothing to import or export today (which is not the case even today), no matter what route, how can you eliminate the possibility of the future economic activity in new emerging dynamics of region for Russian. It can change.

INSTC is already operational.
 


Federico PIERACCINI
| 11.03.2017 | OPINION
The Strategic Triangle that Is Changing the World
While the world continues to decipher, or digest, the new Trump presidency, important changes are afoot within the grand strategic triangle that lies between Russia, Iran and China

Away from the current chaos in the United States, major developments are progressing, with Iran, Russia and China coordinating on a series of significant moves crucial for the future of the Eurasian continent. With a population of more than five billion people, constituting about two-thirds of the Earth's population, the future of humanity passes through this immense area. Signaling a major change from a unipolar world order based on Europe and the United States to a multipolar world steered by China, Russia and Iran, these Eurasian states are carving out a leading role in the development of the vast continent. As part of the challenges faced by these leading multipolar countries, the disruptive events originating in the post-WWII Euro-Atlantic world order will need to be tackled.



Looking at major projects within the Eurasian continent, one thing that stands out is the role of China, Russia and Iran in different areas under their influence. The One Belt, One Road project proposed by Beijing (investments of around one trillion dollars over the next ten years); the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) advanced by Moscow to integrate the former Soviet republics of Central Asia; and Iran's role in Middle East aiming to bring stability and prosperity to the region - all are central to Eurasian development. Of course, being multipolar, all these projects fully converge, requiring concerted and joint development for the overall success of the Eurasian continent.

In this sense, the areas of greatest turmoil include areas that fall under the sphere of influence of these leading Eurasian states. The main concentrations of upheaval can be easily identified in the Middle East and North Africa, not to mention the area of the Persian Gulf, where Saudi Arabia's criminal war against Yemen has now continued unabated for the past 24 months.

Islamic terrorism, a source for cooperation.

The common source of instability for the Eurasian continent stems from Islamic terrorism, deployed as an instrument of division and conflict. In this sense, the Saudi and Turkish role in nurturing and spreading Wahhabism as well as the Muslim Brotherhood means that they are directly opposed to the stability of the Chinese, Russian and Iranian sphere. With the full financial support of China, and military support of Russia, Tehran’s role in the region unsurprisingly becomes decisive. Iran is the country in which Sino-Russian influence is manifested at all levels in the region and beyond. The deterioration of the military situation in Syria has nevertheless obliged Moscow to intervene militarily in support of Syria, a key regional ally of Iran, but also provided a perfect way to counter Saudi-Turkish influence in the region. The growing Shia crescent linking Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon is vital for retaining the influence of a multipolar world in the region. Washington has thus far been able to dictate matters through the actions of Saudi Arabia and Turkey, its regional cat’s paws, whose interests often align with that of Zionist elements, neoconservative and Wahhabi, that exist within the US deep state. Of course, Washington seeks to preserve the unipolar world order through its regional allies, aiming to remain the ultimate arbiter of Middle Eastern affairs, an area reverberating with instability from the Persian Gulf to North Africa.

It is no wonder, then, that Moscow has sought to establish a special relationship with the post-Morsi (Muslim Brotherhood) government in Egypt, which will curtail the Saudi-American influence on Cairo and North Africa, especially following the destruction of Gaddafi's Libya. Al Sisi’s signals are encouraging, representing one of clearest examples of a multipolar world in the making. Egypt accepted Saudi funding during the time of highest tension between Doha and Riyadh, an obvious moment of weakness on the part of Cairo, especially after the coup that removed Morsi, who was supported by Qatar, Turkey and the United States. Yet in recent times, Egypt has been happy to cooperate with Moscow, especially in regard to arms. (The purchase of two Mistral ships from France assumes the further purchase of weaponry from Moscow; the same is the case with nuclear-energy development as an alternative to the massive importation of oil from Saudi Arabia, which was suspended by Riyadh following the commencement of dialogue between Cairo and Damascus). Egypt seeks a strategic positioning in the region that winks at the Russo-Sino-Iranian triangle (talks on Egypt joining the EAEU have been in the air for quite some time), although not completely ruling out the economic contribution of Saudi Arabia and the United States. On the contrary, the influence of Turkey and Iran is rejected and declared hostile, mainly because of the continuing relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, a major concern in the Sinai.

Stability in the Middle East and North Africa relies on an expansion of Iran’s mediating role; important financial contributions from the People's Republic of China (take a look at the situation in Libya and the reconstruction in Syria); and military cooperation with the Russian Federation. The importance of focusing on these areas of the globe can not be overstated, representing the first steps towards a more fundamental restructuring of the world order in different parts of the Eurasian landmass.

Caucasus, Central Asia and Afpak: Syria as a case study.

Often when looking at the danger posed by political Islam and Wahhabi extremism, three key areas of the Eurasian continent are usually under consideration: the former Soviet republics of Central Asia; the complicated border between Afghanistan and Pakistan; and the Caucasus area. In these areas, cooperation between China, Russia and Iran is once again playing a key role, seeing many attempts to mediate tensions and conflicts that would potentially be catastrophic for economic-development projects. The recent terrorist attacks in Pakistan in Lahore showed the true face of cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, strongly encouraged by China and Russia. Shortly after a brief exchange of fire between the militaries of Afghanistan and Pakistan on their common border, an agreement was reached between Kabul and Islamabad to reduce tensions and advance the peace talks heavily sponsored by Moscow and Beijing. The need to halt the escalation of tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan is one of the primary focuses of Russia and China in what is one of the most unstable regions of the world and what are transit lines for future projects led by the China-Iran-Russia alliance. The instability of this particular area depends largely on the role that India, Saudi Arabia, the US and Turkey intend to play to counterbalance the Eurasian trio. It is not at all coincidental that Moscow is trying in various ways to reach a complex understanding with each of these players. Saudi Arabia and Turkey are the center of control and administration for international terrorism, Riyadh and Ankara’s negative influence being felt from Syria and Libya through to Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Caucasus. The determining factor is not always the United States, though Washington naturally encourages all kinds of destructive efforts directed against the integration of the Eurasian continent.

Syria appears to be the first point of understanding reached on paper between Turkey and Russia, and could, if it obtains a positive outcome to the conflict, represent a foundation on which to build a strategic cooperation in areas like Afpak and Central Asia. In this sense, the energy-corridor incentives represented by pipelines, of which Russia is the main player, should not be underestimated, as in the case of the Turkish Stream. Also in the Caucasus, another area of extreme instability, the role played by Russia and Iran was decisive during the four days of war in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The energy factor is certainly a big incentive for Saudi Arabia, which has long observed energy diversification with interest by focusing on civilian nuclear power, something of which Russia is a world leader. Moscow plays its cards variously by providing military and economic cooperation to its closest partners (Iran, China, Syria, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan); strengthening bilateral alliances through the incentive of cooperation in weapons systems (India, Pakistan and Egypt); and energy cooperation with seemingly distant nations (UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia) in order to pry open a breach through which to gather broader geopolitical arrangements.

The overall strategy of the three leading Eurasian nations aims primarily to strengthen the national borders of the countries with the most turbulent regions. Putin's recent trip to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan aims to strengthen the soft underbelly of the Russian Federation, eliminating the threat and influence of radical Islamic terrorism in order to allow for the expansion of economic cooperation in the Eurasian Union. While not an easy task, it is certainly encouraged by the prospect of mutual gain for the nations involved, with mutually agreeable bilateral agreements in the place of diktats. In a sense, it is what the People's Republic is attempting to establish in Central Asia, one of the most volatile regions of the world, endeavoring to reach agreements and expand its pool of energy resources as occurred recently in Turkmenistan. Another example of the reduction of threats to the Eurasian landmass can be seen in the Xinjiang province, which China has focused on as an area that needs an easing of socio-political tensions, in the interests of obviating outside efforts to destabilize China, directed mainly from Turkey through its partner Turkmenistan.

The Indian role in this context is more difficult to understand, compressed within an anti-Pakistan and anti-Chinese sentiment, as well as a subjection to the United States, together with good historical friendship with the Russian Federation. The role of New Delhi in this part of the world is the most indecipherable, seeing India’s (inscrutable) efforts to advance its own strategic goals. The strategic importance of Moscow and Tehran are essential in balancing the Indian position. Historically India was an important ally of the USSR, and India militarily continues to advance important military projects with the Russian Federation. In recent years, the Islamic Republic of Iran has greatly contributed to the Indian diversification of energy supplies. The fact that Tehran is a privileged partner of Beijing shows what a multipolar world looks like, and also helps to balance the anti-Chinese sentiment deeply rooted in the Indian establishment. In this case, Russia and Iran are clearly playing a mediating role between China and India. The fact that India and China are both important gas customers of Iran, as well as the fact that both China and India are cooperating with Russia on a military base, helps understand how Moscow and Tehran are cutting out Washington and diluting the anti-Chinese sentiment in India.

The tensions that Washington fans in India is increasingly being doused, not least because it is at odds with India’s need to create a stable business environment for development without precluding any opportunity for partnership. The most difficult challenge is the peace process between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which goes against Indian geopolitical interests that are aligned with the American position in the region. To mitigate this situation, strong joint cooperation is required. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will try to implement a framework within which to discuss and reach all-inclusive agreements between the parties involved. Once again, a regional discussion between Eurasian powers does not include the old world order of the US and Europe.

The role played by China and Russia in Central Asia can not be overstated, because of the importance of the potentially available energy resources. This is not to mention the future cooperation between the two gigantic economic areas, such as with the European Union and Asia, that will transit through Central Asia, transforming the Eurasian Union into a golden bridge linking Europe and Asia. At the moment, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is an organization like the SCO that tends to prioritize the fight against terrorism; but increasingly it is seen as offering a place for discussion, an organization that offers a path toward economic cooperation by first laying down the necessary foundation of territorial stability. In this area of the globe, economic prosperity depends heavily on social, political and military stability.

After all, this is the great challenge that Russia, China and Iran are facing, namely to de-escalate the hot zones (Middle East, Persian Gulf and North Africa) by eradicating the terrorist problem, and preventing the escalation of tensions in neighboring regions lying immediately within their sphere of influence (the Caucasus, Afghanistan-Pakistan and Central Asia), thus avoiding destructive destabilization.

It is only once an international framework is in place that these areas will see the stability that will allow for the deep and wide-ranging economic cooperation that will be of historic significance. In this sense the entry of India and Pakistan into the SCO was the first step of a complicated deal led by China and Russia that covers a dozen nations. The same situation can be observed with the future entry of Iran into the SCO, with the specific objective of expanding the influence of the SCO in unstable areas like the Persian Gulf and Middle East. In this sense the discussions regarding the entry of Egypt into the SCO as a full member is aimed at expanding the SCO’s positive influence even as far away as North Africa.

Russia, China and Iran are laying down the foundations for developments that will make the US irrelevant in its struggle to extend its unipolar moment. Combining the population of the Eurasian continent with the demographic and economic growth of these areas, it is not too difficult to understand how, in the space of just over two decades, the area stretching from Portugal to China, which includes dozens of nations of all latitudes and longitudes that extend from the Arctic regions of the Russian Federation to the Indian sea or the Persian Gulf, will be the central pivot around which the global economy will revolve. The combination of land and sea trade corridors will make the Eurasian continent the world's core, not only in terms of production but also in terms of trade and consumption, due to the increase of wealth of the middle-class areas of the world.

In a strategic vision that historically incorporates decades of planning, Tehran, Moscow and Beijing have fully understood that stability is the primary objective to be achieved in order to effectively promote economic development that benefits all the nations involved. In Asia, ASEAN has begun to have a less belligerent attitude towards China, although Beijing continues to ensure its strategic interests with the construction and militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea. The Philippines’ president, Rodrigo Duterte, seems to understand the potential gains of multipolar cooperation, and the path followed by his country in recent months forges a path for all other Asian nations, especially following the abandonment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) project by Washington. It remains to be seen what role the old European continent can play while still being shackled to the American strategy that is focused on isolating Russia, China and Iran, committed to advancing Washington's global hegemony at cost, even if it involves committing economic suicide, as can be seen in Ukraine with the sanctions against the Russian Federation.

One should not rule out a future change in direction in Europe as a direct result of failed policies that for too long have genuflected before American interests at the expense of the interests of European citizens. It is not accidental that many parties considered populist and nationalist have every intention of turning to the East and pursuing cooperation that for too long has been denied by the stupidity of Western elites.

China, Russia and Iran appear to have every intention of accelerating the project of global cooperation and show no intention of shutting the doors to new players from outside Eurasia, especially in an increasingly globalized and interconnected world. Just take a look at the links of the People's Republic of China with the development projects in South America to understand how the scope of these projects aim to include all nations without exception. This is the foundation on which the new multipolar world order is based, and sooner or later the American and European elites will understand this. The dilemma for Western elites lies in their diminished role in the future international order: no longer will the US and Europe be the lone protagonists but actors who are part of an international cast. The unipolar international order is running out of time and the old world order is in crisis. Will Europeans and Americans be able to accept a role as co-protagonists, or will they reject inevitable historical change, condemning themselves in the process to oblivion?
 
INSTC is already operational.

The recent initiatives by India, Iran and Russia, supported by the countries of Central Asia and also Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan, provides a favorable atmosphere to re-activate and realise the full potential of the INSTC. However, without sustained efforts by the member states to address the bottlenecks, it will only remain an ambitious plan, an unfulfilled connectivity project.

The initiatives taken to enhance connectivity through INSTC will get a further boost during the 6th INSTC Coordination Council meeting along with the 7th Expert Committee meeting to be held on August 19-21, 2015 in New Delhi.

http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/InternationalNorthSouthTransportCorridor_msroy_180815
 
Firstly why should I have to explain what Russian's will import or export, its up to them we are not in marketing of products. We are talking about safer, faster closer route which will be cheaper option for countries. Now this is for Russian to decide what they should do.

You do not know what the Russians will export or import. You do not know with which countries they are going to trade. but you expect CPEC to be big and important for Russia. Talk about blowing hot air.

There is nothing significant for Russia to export. Russia is not shipping weapons on NSTC or CPEC route. Neither are they shipping petroluem or natural gas to the Indian Ocean.

This is a good visualization of Russia's trading partners
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/rus/#Destinations

There is virtually zero trade with Indian Ocean countries minus India

INSTC is already operational.

Of course it is operational. Azerbaijan was part of the old USSR. It has transport links with Russia. All you need is a connection into Iran.
 

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